directorate has a Special Activities Operations staff that conducts paramilitary activities, such as those in Afghanistan.
One officer estimates that overall, 75 percent of the time of operations officers in the field is devoted to gathering intelligence and the rest to covert action.
Today, covert action accounts for only 3 percent of the national foreign intelligence budget—roughly $500 million—or 15 percent of the CIA’s budget. But covert action accounts for most of the black eyes the agency has received.
In the beginning, there were many successes—or what seemed to be successes. In 1948, the CIA funded the Christian Democrats in Italy, helping to prevent communists from taking over the Italian government. In 1950, Col. Edward G.Lansdale, who was on loan to the CIA from the Air Force, helped the Philippine leader Ramon Magsaysay overcome the communist-backed Huk guerrillas. On August 21, 1953, the CIA, led by Kermit Roosevelt, overthrew the left-wing government of Prime Minister Mohamed Mossadeq in Iran after he nationalized the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Three days later the shah, who had fled the previous week, returned to the palace.
Buoyed by these triumphs, the U.S. became more aggressive. America interpreted the most innocuous developments as further evidence that the Soviet Union was about to encircle the world. In June 1954, the CIA supported the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala after he nationalized 400,000 acres of idle banana-plantation land owned by United Fruit Co. Arbenz had offered $600,000, precisely what the company had declared as the land’s value for tax purposes. Moreover, he had come to power in popular elections. But Arbenz’s leftleaning politics and the fact that some of the people around him were communists were seen by Washington as reasons enough to overthrow him.
In most cases, the benefits of covert action were only temporary. Arbenz was replaced by even more objectionable and often ruthless leaders. Guatemala has been in turmoil ever since. In Iran, the shah lasted more than twenty-five years and was toppled and replaced by the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979.
While twenty-five years of stability is a great feat, the CIA action in installing the shah “identified Iran and the shah more closely with the U.S. than was good for either of them,” Gregory Treverton wrote in his book
Covert Action.
“It also set in motion a kind of psychological dependence by the shah on the United States that Americans no doubt liked initially but came to lament in 1977 and 1978. “ 19
Meanwhile, the Soviets used the CIA’s meddling in the affairs of other countries to great effect. The U.S. was seen as imperialistic and hypocritical. What more evidence was needed than the fact that it would overthrow a legally elected leader? David A. Phillips, a CIA officer who played a majorrole in the ouster of Arbenz, would later say that on balance, the CIA should not overthrow an elected leader. 20
“Defenders of covert action would say we are fighting to preserve liberty and democracy and the American way,” said Simmons, a former CIA officer who was later staff director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. “But when you get into the details, you wonder if they are talking about the same thing. He may be an SOB and a dictator, but he is our SOB, whereas Arbenz, who was democratically elected, was not an SOB, but he wasn’t ours.”
On April 17, 1961, the CIA began the invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. It would be a dismal failure. The Directorate of Operations was so fixated on secrecy that it did not consult the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence for an assessment of whether the Cuban people would rise up against Castro once an invasion began. If it had, the judgment would have been that the Cubans would not support the invasion. *
Just before the invasion, CIA analysts had concluded that Castro “was likely to grow stronger rather than weaker as time goes by.” One
One officer estimates that overall, 75 percent of the time of operations officers in the field is devoted to gathering intelligence and the rest to covert action.
Today, covert action accounts for only 3 percent of the national foreign intelligence budget—roughly $500 million—or 15 percent of the CIA’s budget. But covert action accounts for most of the black eyes the agency has received.
In the beginning, there were many successes—or what seemed to be successes. In 1948, the CIA funded the Christian Democrats in Italy, helping to prevent communists from taking over the Italian government. In 1950, Col. Edward G.Lansdale, who was on loan to the CIA from the Air Force, helped the Philippine leader Ramon Magsaysay overcome the communist-backed Huk guerrillas. On August 21, 1953, the CIA, led by Kermit Roosevelt, overthrew the left-wing government of Prime Minister Mohamed Mossadeq in Iran after he nationalized the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Three days later the shah, who had fled the previous week, returned to the palace.
Buoyed by these triumphs, the U.S. became more aggressive. America interpreted the most innocuous developments as further evidence that the Soviet Union was about to encircle the world. In June 1954, the CIA supported the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala after he nationalized 400,000 acres of idle banana-plantation land owned by United Fruit Co. Arbenz had offered $600,000, precisely what the company had declared as the land’s value for tax purposes. Moreover, he had come to power in popular elections. But Arbenz’s leftleaning politics and the fact that some of the people around him were communists were seen by Washington as reasons enough to overthrow him.
In most cases, the benefits of covert action were only temporary. Arbenz was replaced by even more objectionable and often ruthless leaders. Guatemala has been in turmoil ever since. In Iran, the shah lasted more than twenty-five years and was toppled and replaced by the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979.
While twenty-five years of stability is a great feat, the CIA action in installing the shah “identified Iran and the shah more closely with the U.S. than was good for either of them,” Gregory Treverton wrote in his book
Covert Action.
“It also set in motion a kind of psychological dependence by the shah on the United States that Americans no doubt liked initially but came to lament in 1977 and 1978. “ 19
Meanwhile, the Soviets used the CIA’s meddling in the affairs of other countries to great effect. The U.S. was seen as imperialistic and hypocritical. What more evidence was needed than the fact that it would overthrow a legally elected leader? David A. Phillips, a CIA officer who played a majorrole in the ouster of Arbenz, would later say that on balance, the CIA should not overthrow an elected leader. 20
“Defenders of covert action would say we are fighting to preserve liberty and democracy and the American way,” said Simmons, a former CIA officer who was later staff director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. “But when you get into the details, you wonder if they are talking about the same thing. He may be an SOB and a dictator, but he is our SOB, whereas Arbenz, who was democratically elected, was not an SOB, but he wasn’t ours.”
On April 17, 1961, the CIA began the invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. It would be a dismal failure. The Directorate of Operations was so fixated on secrecy that it did not consult the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence for an assessment of whether the Cuban people would rise up against Castro once an invasion began. If it had, the judgment would have been that the Cubans would not support the invasion. *
Just before the invasion, CIA analysts had concluded that Castro “was likely to grow stronger rather than weaker as time goes by.” One
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