Paul II at World Youth Day celebrations in 1993. âYet another influence was our exposure, while living in Europe, to the historical beauty of a Church of saints, shrines and simple people at prayer, a Church that was truly the bedrock of western civilization,â the Bremers wrote in their parish newsletter.
When the White House approached Jerry about going to Iraq, Francie said that the couple âheld hands and prayed about it.â
In Baghdad, Bremer attended Mass every Sunday in the palace chapel, the vast room adorned with a mural of a Scud missile.
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Before departing for Baghdad, Bremer told an associate that he planned to âmake some bold decisions.â He was coming to bail water from the foundering ship and set it on a new course.
After accepting the job as CPA administrator, he spent a week in briefings and meetings at the Pentagon. He asked for proposals that could be put into action right away. He heard about plans to repair schools and power plants, but he knew Iraqis wouldnât see the results immediately. Shooting looters on sight would be bold, and he even proposed this at his first staff meeting in Baghdad, but he eventually concluded that such an action would be too politically risky. Forming an interim government at once, as Garner was trying to do, would be significant, but Bremer feared that Iraqi political leaders werenât ready. Then he heard about de-Baathification.
Bremer had concluded on his own that senior members of Saddamâs Baath Party would have to be purged, and that lower-ranking members would have to renounce their affiliation. He compared it to the de-Nazification undertaken by the Allies after World War II. But he didnât know much about the Baath Partyâs structure and operations.
Doug Feithâs office was armed with answers. In the months leading up to the war, there had been a vigorous debate between the Pentagon and the State Department over the scope of de-Baathification. State advocated a policy of âde-Saddamification,â which entailed purging two classes of Baathists: those who had committed crimes and those at the very top of the command structure. Defense had a more expansive view. Influenced by a paper on de-Nazification written by Ahmed Chalabiâs Iraqi National Congress, Feithâs office advocated a broader purge, as well as a prohibition on rank-and-file members holding senior government posts. The CIA agreed with State, while the vice presidentâs office weighed in with the Pentagon. The dispute eventually made its way to the White House, where the National Security Council tried to strike a compromise: Those in the highest ranks of the Baath Partyâabout 1 percent of the membershipâwould be fired from government jobs. Others would be subjected to a South Africaâstyle âtruth and reconciliation process.â The plan was included in a PowerPoint presentation for President Bush and other members of his war cabinetâCheney, Rumsfeld, Powell, and Riceâon March 10. Frank Miller, who chaired the NSC steering group on Iraq, was the presenter. According to two people present in the room, Bush gave the nod.
The decision lacked specificity. The NSC staff didnât know how the top ranks were structured or how many people were at those levels, even though this information was available on the Internet and in academic papers. But âthe thrust was clear: treat these people leniently and try to work with them,â one of the people at the meeting said.
At the Pentagon, the mechanics of de-Baathification were handled by Feithâs Office of Special Plans, which took its cues from the Iraqi National Congress. Chalabi and other INC officials argued passionately that a wholesale purge of the Baath Party was necessary to demonstrate Americaâs commitment to a new political order in Iraq. If the old guard were allowed to stick around, they maintained,
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