History of the Second World War by Basil Henry Liddell Hart
Authors: Basil Henry Liddell Hart
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Hitler gave explicit orders to his military advisers to prepare comprehensive plans for an invasion of Norway if necessary. The special staff formed for the purpose met for the first time on February 5.
That day the Allied Supreme War Council met in Paris, and Chamberlain took Churchill with him. At this meeting plans were approved for preparing a force of two British divisions and a slightly smaller French contingent as ‘Aid to Finland’ — they were to be ‘camouflaged as volunteers’ in an endeavour to diminish the chances of an open war with Russia. But an argument developed over the route of their despatch. The British Prime Minister emphasised the difficulties of landing at Petsamo, and the advantages of landing at Narvik — particularly ‘to get control of the Gallivare ore-field’. That was to be the main object, and only a part of the force was to push on to Finland’s aid. The British arguments prevailed, and it was arranged that the force should sail early in March.
A fateful incident occurred on February 16. A German vessel, the Altmark, which was carrying British prisoners back from the South Atlantic, was chased by British destroyers and took refuge in a Norwegian fiord. Churchill sent a direct order to Captain Vian of H.M.S. Cossack to push into Norwegian waters, board the Altmark and rescue the prisoners. Two Norwegian gunboats were on the scene, but they were overawed and the subsequent protest of the Norwegian Government about the intrusion into their waters was rebuffed.
Hitler regarded the protest as merely a gesture to hoodwink him, and was convinced that the Norwegian Government was England’s willing accomplice. That belief was nourished by the passivity of the two gunboats and by the reports of Quisling that the action of the Cossack had been a ‘pre-arranged’ affair. According to the German admirals, the Altmark affair was decisive in swinging Hitler in favour of intervention in Norway. It was the spark that set fire to the powder trail.
Hitler felt that he could not wait for Quisling’s plans to develop, especially as German observers in Norway reported that Quisling’s party was making little progress, while reports from England indicated that some action in the Norwegian area was being planned, together with the assembly of troops and transports.
On the 20th Hitler sent for General von Falkenhorst and appointed him to command and prepare an expeditionary force for Norway, saying, ‘I am informed that the English intend to land there, and I want to be there before them. The occupation of Norway by the British would be a strategic turning movement which would lead them into the Baltic, where we have neither troops nor coastal fortifications . . . the enemy would find himself in a position to advance on Berlin and break the backbone of our two fronts.’
On March 1, Hitler issued his directive for the complete preparation for the invasion. Denmark was to be occupied, too, as a necessary strategic stepping stone and safeguard to his lines of communication.
But even now it was not a definite decision to strike. The records of Raeder’s conferences with Hitler show that Hitler was still torn between his conviction that ‘the maintenance of Norway’s neutrality is the best thing’ for Germany and his fear of an imminent British landing there. In presenting the naval plans on March g he dwelt on the hazards of undertaking an operation ‘contrary to all the principles of naval warfare’, while at the same time saying that it was ‘urgent’.
In the following week the state of anxiety on the German side became more feverish. On the 13th it was reported that British submarines were concentrated off the south coast of Norway; on the 14th the Germans intercepted a radio message which ordered Allied transports to be ready to move; on the 15th a number of French officers arrived at Bergen. The Germans felt that they were certain to be forestalled as their own expeditionary force was
That day the Allied Supreme War Council met in Paris, and Chamberlain took Churchill with him. At this meeting plans were approved for preparing a force of two British divisions and a slightly smaller French contingent as ‘Aid to Finland’ — they were to be ‘camouflaged as volunteers’ in an endeavour to diminish the chances of an open war with Russia. But an argument developed over the route of their despatch. The British Prime Minister emphasised the difficulties of landing at Petsamo, and the advantages of landing at Narvik — particularly ‘to get control of the Gallivare ore-field’. That was to be the main object, and only a part of the force was to push on to Finland’s aid. The British arguments prevailed, and it was arranged that the force should sail early in March.
A fateful incident occurred on February 16. A German vessel, the Altmark, which was carrying British prisoners back from the South Atlantic, was chased by British destroyers and took refuge in a Norwegian fiord. Churchill sent a direct order to Captain Vian of H.M.S. Cossack to push into Norwegian waters, board the Altmark and rescue the prisoners. Two Norwegian gunboats were on the scene, but they were overawed and the subsequent protest of the Norwegian Government about the intrusion into their waters was rebuffed.
Hitler regarded the protest as merely a gesture to hoodwink him, and was convinced that the Norwegian Government was England’s willing accomplice. That belief was nourished by the passivity of the two gunboats and by the reports of Quisling that the action of the Cossack had been a ‘pre-arranged’ affair. According to the German admirals, the Altmark affair was decisive in swinging Hitler in favour of intervention in Norway. It was the spark that set fire to the powder trail.
Hitler felt that he could not wait for Quisling’s plans to develop, especially as German observers in Norway reported that Quisling’s party was making little progress, while reports from England indicated that some action in the Norwegian area was being planned, together with the assembly of troops and transports.
On the 20th Hitler sent for General von Falkenhorst and appointed him to command and prepare an expeditionary force for Norway, saying, ‘I am informed that the English intend to land there, and I want to be there before them. The occupation of Norway by the British would be a strategic turning movement which would lead them into the Baltic, where we have neither troops nor coastal fortifications . . . the enemy would find himself in a position to advance on Berlin and break the backbone of our two fronts.’
On March 1, Hitler issued his directive for the complete preparation for the invasion. Denmark was to be occupied, too, as a necessary strategic stepping stone and safeguard to his lines of communication.
But even now it was not a definite decision to strike. The records of Raeder’s conferences with Hitler show that Hitler was still torn between his conviction that ‘the maintenance of Norway’s neutrality is the best thing’ for Germany and his fear of an imminent British landing there. In presenting the naval plans on March g he dwelt on the hazards of undertaking an operation ‘contrary to all the principles of naval warfare’, while at the same time saying that it was ‘urgent’.
In the following week the state of anxiety on the German side became more feverish. On the 13th it was reported that British submarines were concentrated off the south coast of Norway; on the 14th the Germans intercepted a radio message which ordered Allied transports to be ready to move; on the 15th a number of French officers arrived at Bergen. The Germans felt that they were certain to be forestalled as their own expeditionary force was
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