History of the Second World War by Basil Henry Liddell Hart Page B

German ships were concentrated, with troops on board, at the ports nearest to Norway. Rather absurdly it was suggested — and astonishingly, believed — that these forces were waiting in readiness to deliver a counterstroke to a British descent on Norway.
    The start of the Norwegian operations was postponed three days, until the 8th. That further delay proved fatal to its prospects of success. It enabled the Germans to get into Norway just ahead of the Allies.
    On April 1 Hitler had finally made up his mind and ordered the invasion of Norway and Denmark to begin at 5.15 a.m. 011 the 9th. His decision followed a disturbing report that Norwegian anti-aircraft and coastal batteries had been given permission to open fire without awaiting higher orders — which suggested that the Norwegian forces were being made ready for action and that if Hitler waited any longer his chances of surprise, and success, would vanish.
    In the dark hours of April 9 advance detachments of German troops, mostly in warships, arrived in the chief ports of Norway, from Oslo right up to Narvik — and captured them with little difficulty. Their commanders announced to the local authorities that they had come to take Norway under German protection against an Allied invasion that was imminent — a statement that the Allied spokesmen promptly denied, and continued to deny.
    As Lord Hankey, a member of the War Cabinet at the time, stated:
     
 . . . from the start of planning to the German invasion, both Great Britain and Germany were keeping more or less level in their plans and preparations. Britain actually started planning a little earlier . . . both plans were executed almost simultaneously, Britain being twenty-four hours ahead in the so-called act of aggression, if the term is really applicable to either side.
     
    But Germany’s final spurt was faster and more forceful. She won the race by a very short head — it was almost a ‘photo-finish’.
    One of the most questionable points of the Nuremberg Trials was that the planning and execution of aggression against Norway was put among the major charges against the Germans. It is hard to understand how the British and French Governments had the face to approve the inclusion of this charge, or how the official prosecutors could press for a conviction on this score. Such a course was one of the most palpable cases of hypocrisy in history.
    Passing now to the course of the campaign, a surprising revelation is the smallness of the force which captured the capital and chief ports of Norway in the opening coup. It comprised two battlecruisers, a pocket battleship, seven cruisers, fourteen destroyers, twenty-eight U-boats, a number of auxiliary ships, and some 10,000 troops — the advance elements of three divisions that were used for the invasion. At no place was the initial landing made by more than 2,000 men. One parachute battalion was also employed — to seize the airfields at Oslo and Stavanger. This was the first time that parachute troops had been used in war and they proved very valuable. But the most decisive factor in the German success was the Luftwaffe; the actual strength employed in the campaign was about 800 operational planes and 250 transport planes. It overawed the Norwegian people in the first phase, and later paralysed the Allies’ countermoves.
    How was it that the British naval forces failed to intercept and sink the much weaker German naval forces that carried the invading detachments? The extent of the sea-space, the nature of the Norwegian coast, and the hazy weather were important handicaps. But there were other factors, and more avoidable handicaps. Gamelin records that when, on April 2, he urged Ironside, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to hasten the despatch of the expeditionary force, the latter replied: ‘With us the Admiralty is all-powerful; it likes to organise everything methodically. It is convinced that it can prevent any German landing on the west coast