Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33 by Hector C. Bywater Page B
Authors: Hector C. Bywater
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heyday of her power, she had never scrupled to exploit and oppress. But engaged as she now was in a life-and-death struggle, the dread of active intervention by China or Russia, or both, was ever-present in the minds of her strategists, and profoundly influenced their military decisions. It needed the acid test of war to reveal the full consequences of the high-handed policy which Japan had pursued for so many years. When adversity overtook her she found herself encompassed with enemies, eager to strike a deadly blow at her from the rear.
Nor was it only in China that she had a vulnerable flank to guard. Early in the war serious disorders took place in Korea. The independence party raised the standard of revolt in April, 1931, achieving so much initial success that an army of three divisions had to be hastily dispatched from Japan. The revolt was quelled after severe fighting, but the temper of the Koreans was such that it was deemed unwise to withdraw a single regiment. Another source of danger lay in Formosa, where the inhabitants had always been restive under Japanese rule. Here, also, the garrison had to be heavily reinforced. Altogether therefore, not less than eleven divisions — or seventy per cent of the army’s peace establishment — were practically immobilised.
But even after these deductions the military power of Japan remained exceedingly formidable. With the calling-up of the first-line reserves, the strength of the army available for active operations was raised to 800,000 effectives. At the back of these were second-line reserves to the number of 1,400,000 men, the majority of whom had undergone training. Since the World War of 1914-18, the equipment of the army had been vastly improved. Its artillery, train, and special services were organised on up-to-date lines, and furnished with material of the latest pattern. The tank corps, inaugurated ten years before, had now reached a strength of 120 heavy and light battle tanks. The military aviation service had some 800 planes ready for service. Thus, if the course of the war compelled Japan to do any extensive fighting on land, she was in a position to give a good account of herself. It only remains to be added that no effort had been spared to make the coastline of Japan proper impregnable to assault from the sea. Strong forts armed with heavy ordnance guarded all the principal harbours and strategic channels. Besides these stationary defences there was a network of railroads which enabled large masses of troops to be rapidly concentrated at any point along the coast where attack threatened.
Having now examined as briefly as possible the armed forces at the disposal of Japan, together with the salient features of her strategic situation, it is time to glance at the corresponding factors on the side of the United States.
Until a few years previous to the war with Spain the United States Navy had been treated as though its sole function were coast defence. As late as 1890 it was proposed to expend most of the money available for shipbuilding on a number of new monitors, powerful enough as floating batteries, but quite unfitted to cruise and fight on the high seas. Eventually, however, these ships were abandoned in favour of sea-going ironclads, which formed the nucleus of the first American battle fleet. With the acquisition of Spain’s colonies in the Pacific, the naval commitments of the United States were largely increased. It was no longer simply a question of providing for the defence of the home coasts: protection had now to be extended to American territory situated thousands of miles away in the Pacific Ocean.
How to make the Philippines reasonably safe from foreign aggression was a strategical problem of the first magnitude, and one with which the American people, it must be confessed, showed no desire to grapple. To do so would have involved an expenditure on armaments out of proportion to the economic value of the new colonies. In any case, it
Nor was it only in China that she had a vulnerable flank to guard. Early in the war serious disorders took place in Korea. The independence party raised the standard of revolt in April, 1931, achieving so much initial success that an army of three divisions had to be hastily dispatched from Japan. The revolt was quelled after severe fighting, but the temper of the Koreans was such that it was deemed unwise to withdraw a single regiment. Another source of danger lay in Formosa, where the inhabitants had always been restive under Japanese rule. Here, also, the garrison had to be heavily reinforced. Altogether therefore, not less than eleven divisions — or seventy per cent of the army’s peace establishment — were practically immobilised.
But even after these deductions the military power of Japan remained exceedingly formidable. With the calling-up of the first-line reserves, the strength of the army available for active operations was raised to 800,000 effectives. At the back of these were second-line reserves to the number of 1,400,000 men, the majority of whom had undergone training. Since the World War of 1914-18, the equipment of the army had been vastly improved. Its artillery, train, and special services were organised on up-to-date lines, and furnished with material of the latest pattern. The tank corps, inaugurated ten years before, had now reached a strength of 120 heavy and light battle tanks. The military aviation service had some 800 planes ready for service. Thus, if the course of the war compelled Japan to do any extensive fighting on land, she was in a position to give a good account of herself. It only remains to be added that no effort had been spared to make the coastline of Japan proper impregnable to assault from the sea. Strong forts armed with heavy ordnance guarded all the principal harbours and strategic channels. Besides these stationary defences there was a network of railroads which enabled large masses of troops to be rapidly concentrated at any point along the coast where attack threatened.
Having now examined as briefly as possible the armed forces at the disposal of Japan, together with the salient features of her strategic situation, it is time to glance at the corresponding factors on the side of the United States.
Until a few years previous to the war with Spain the United States Navy had been treated as though its sole function were coast defence. As late as 1890 it was proposed to expend most of the money available for shipbuilding on a number of new monitors, powerful enough as floating batteries, but quite unfitted to cruise and fight on the high seas. Eventually, however, these ships were abandoned in favour of sea-going ironclads, which formed the nucleus of the first American battle fleet. With the acquisition of Spain’s colonies in the Pacific, the naval commitments of the United States were largely increased. It was no longer simply a question of providing for the defence of the home coasts: protection had now to be extended to American territory situated thousands of miles away in the Pacific Ocean.
How to make the Philippines reasonably safe from foreign aggression was a strategical problem of the first magnitude, and one with which the American people, it must be confessed, showed no desire to grapple. To do so would have involved an expenditure on armaments out of proportion to the economic value of the new colonies. In any case, it
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