Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33 by Hector C. Bywater Page A
Authors: Hector C. Bywater
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merchant marine comprised nearly 1,000 steam and motor ships above 1,000 tons, including a fair number of large, high-speed liners. Many of these were taken over for naval duty as armed cruisers, auxiliary airplane carriers, and so forth.
For a war with the United States, Japan’s strategical position very closely approached the ideal. The nearest American fortified naval station was at Hawaii, 3,400 miles distant. From the Kuriles in the north to Formosa in the south an almost continuous rampart of insular bases guarded Japan from assault. Most of the waters that lapped the eastern shores of Asia were dominated by her: the Okhotsk Sea, the Sea of Japan, the Yellow and East China Seas. And now her conquest of the Philippines had extended this control to the South China Sea. Her vital lines of communication with the Asiatic mainland were therefore perfectly secure so long as her fleet remained in being. Furthermore, in the Bonins and the ex-German islands north of the Equator she had a cluster of actual or potential naval bases which lay athwart the direct route of shipping from the Eastern Pacific. Only from the north-east did it seem possible for a hostile fleet to approach her shores without passing within range of some Japanese torpedo base.
Most of her insular outposts had been strongly fortified years beforehand. Under the terms of the mandate she was prohibited from making military use of her ex-German territories in the Pacific, but this ruling naturally ceased to have weight with her when war became imminent. Anticipating a possible American attempt to seize one or more of these islands as an advanced base, Japan had taken steps during February and March, 1931, to safeguard them from a coup de main . Guns were mounted at the most important islands, as at Yap, Jaluit (in the Marshall Group), and Saipan (in the Marianas); but reliance was placed mainly on aircraft and submarines to keep enemy ships at a distance. While it was manifest that sea-power was destined to play the chief rôle in the struggle now developing, military strength on land was by no means a factor to be overlooked. Upon the Japanese army devolved the important task of ensuring the safety of those reservoirs on the Continent from which Japan obtained the major part of her imported food and raw materials. If these were to fail she could not continue the war. It was therefore of paramount importance that the claims she had staked out in China should be adequately protected from interference, the more so as the Chinese would gladly have seized the chance of revenging themselves for past injuries by denying Japan the commodities she required, had they been in a position to do so. China’s attitude in the war had yet to be defined, but that she would be at best a malevolent neutral was fully understood at Tokyo. Moreover, if Japan were to suffer reverses, nothing was more likely than that China would take up arms against her, a contingency the more to be dreaded in view of the growing strength and efficiency of the Chinese military forces, to which allusion has been made in a previous chapter.
It was clear, then, that a considerable portion of Japan’s army would be tied down to garrison duty in Manchuria and Mongolia, from which provinces she derived most of her Continental supplies. In fact, as the war proceeded and the attitude of China became more menacing, it was found expedient to keep no fewer than six divisions at various centres in Chinese territory. All the arts of Japanese diplomacy were employed to cultivate the goodwill of Russia, with whom relations had been none too cordial during the preceding decade.
On the outbreak of war, the Moscow Government proclaimed its neutrality; but, here again, Japan saw a doubtful friend who might be translated into an open foe if the fortune of war should go against her. So long as she remained at her full strength, Japan could afford to brave the covert enmity of her Continental neighbours, whom, in the
For a war with the United States, Japan’s strategical position very closely approached the ideal. The nearest American fortified naval station was at Hawaii, 3,400 miles distant. From the Kuriles in the north to Formosa in the south an almost continuous rampart of insular bases guarded Japan from assault. Most of the waters that lapped the eastern shores of Asia were dominated by her: the Okhotsk Sea, the Sea of Japan, the Yellow and East China Seas. And now her conquest of the Philippines had extended this control to the South China Sea. Her vital lines of communication with the Asiatic mainland were therefore perfectly secure so long as her fleet remained in being. Furthermore, in the Bonins and the ex-German islands north of the Equator she had a cluster of actual or potential naval bases which lay athwart the direct route of shipping from the Eastern Pacific. Only from the north-east did it seem possible for a hostile fleet to approach her shores without passing within range of some Japanese torpedo base.
Most of her insular outposts had been strongly fortified years beforehand. Under the terms of the mandate she was prohibited from making military use of her ex-German territories in the Pacific, but this ruling naturally ceased to have weight with her when war became imminent. Anticipating a possible American attempt to seize one or more of these islands as an advanced base, Japan had taken steps during February and March, 1931, to safeguard them from a coup de main . Guns were mounted at the most important islands, as at Yap, Jaluit (in the Marshall Group), and Saipan (in the Marianas); but reliance was placed mainly on aircraft and submarines to keep enemy ships at a distance. While it was manifest that sea-power was destined to play the chief rôle in the struggle now developing, military strength on land was by no means a factor to be overlooked. Upon the Japanese army devolved the important task of ensuring the safety of those reservoirs on the Continent from which Japan obtained the major part of her imported food and raw materials. If these were to fail she could not continue the war. It was therefore of paramount importance that the claims she had staked out in China should be adequately protected from interference, the more so as the Chinese would gladly have seized the chance of revenging themselves for past injuries by denying Japan the commodities she required, had they been in a position to do so. China’s attitude in the war had yet to be defined, but that she would be at best a malevolent neutral was fully understood at Tokyo. Moreover, if Japan were to suffer reverses, nothing was more likely than that China would take up arms against her, a contingency the more to be dreaded in view of the growing strength and efficiency of the Chinese military forces, to which allusion has been made in a previous chapter.
It was clear, then, that a considerable portion of Japan’s army would be tied down to garrison duty in Manchuria and Mongolia, from which provinces she derived most of her Continental supplies. In fact, as the war proceeded and the attitude of China became more menacing, it was found expedient to keep no fewer than six divisions at various centres in Chinese territory. All the arts of Japanese diplomacy were employed to cultivate the goodwill of Russia, with whom relations had been none too cordial during the preceding decade.
On the outbreak of war, the Moscow Government proclaimed its neutrality; but, here again, Japan saw a doubtful friend who might be translated into an open foe if the fortune of war should go against her. So long as she remained at her full strength, Japan could afford to brave the covert enmity of her Continental neighbours, whom, in the
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