CHEESE as a channel for deception, Robertson was subtly critical of the way his original contacts in Cairo, Georges Khouri and Madame Vigoretti-Antoniada, had not been pursued more professionally.
It does not appear that such opportunities as did present themselves were exploited to the full. The contrary seems rather to be the case. Levi, for example, went unaccompanied to see Madame Vigoretti-Antoniada and Georges Khouri, the two persons in Cairo who had been recommended to him by Count Scirombo. Nothing came of these meetings and no record survives of what passed. It is no doubt true that the practical difficulty of covering or recording such meetings were great, perhaps insuperable; it is also true that at the end of the operations SIME were no nearer to discovering the true sympathies of these people than they would have been had Levi not existed. At the same time a welcome opportunity was missed of testing the good faith of Levi himself at the very opening of the case.
Finally, Robertson turned to what he perceived as the central weakness in the CHEESE affair, which was the lack of funding.
Nicossof started his career in April 1941 with only £150. Nearly two years later, in February 1943, he was still without additional funds, but still apparently able to operate although during the intervening period his outgoing expenses must have at times been heavy. This situation must, until it is remedied, represent a grave weakness in the case. At any moment some senior Abwehr officer may from curiosity examine the back records and, if he does so, must reach the conclusion that Nicossofâs accountancy canonly be explained on the assumption that he is working under British control. SIME is, of course, fully alive to this danger, their report describes four attempts to secure additional funds: in August 1942, in October and again in December and the following January. None of these attempts was successful or at least had not been at the time the SIME report was written. It is, I think, pertinent to enquire whether this was wholly the Abwehrâs fault. We know at least from the message already quoted that in August 1942 Rossetti was making a genuine effort to pay ROBERTO , and this was not his first attempt. Similarly, we know that he was exerting himself in Turkey to secure the latest payment in January this year. He has not, therefore, been entirely neglectful of his agent. On the other hand I received the impression (perhaps wrongly) from the first or introductory report forwarded by SIME that Rossetti had not always enjoyed their full cooperation in his efforts to pay CHEESE . It is said, with regard to the August plan, that at the last moment CHEESEâS merchant friend was frightened off by the execution of five spies which had occurred a few days previously. Similarly, in December the flat at which CHEESE was to receive the money was raided at a crucial moment by the Egyptian police with the result that a fresh scheme had to be arranged.
I do not know if it was in SIMEâs power to have prevented either of these incidents: the report even seems to imply that both were staged. If so, I think SIME was following a false policy. In either case, apart from the general desirability of CHEESEâS receiving money, there was a distinct counter-espionage advantage to be gained from allowing, even compelling, the payment to proceed. In equivalent circumstances in this country we should, I think, have felt that a contact with the Abwehr in Aleppo and still more in Cairo was worth the slight lapse from reality involved in inducing a Greek merchant not to be frightened or persuading the Egyptian police to postpone a raid.
I make this point because our own experience has been that the Abwehr is not adept at paying its agents and not infrequently fails to do so unless rendered active assistance. This is, I think, because they lack not the means but the imagination. The problem of making a clandestine payment to
It does not appear that such opportunities as did present themselves were exploited to the full. The contrary seems rather to be the case. Levi, for example, went unaccompanied to see Madame Vigoretti-Antoniada and Georges Khouri, the two persons in Cairo who had been recommended to him by Count Scirombo. Nothing came of these meetings and no record survives of what passed. It is no doubt true that the practical difficulty of covering or recording such meetings were great, perhaps insuperable; it is also true that at the end of the operations SIME were no nearer to discovering the true sympathies of these people than they would have been had Levi not existed. At the same time a welcome opportunity was missed of testing the good faith of Levi himself at the very opening of the case.
Finally, Robertson turned to what he perceived as the central weakness in the CHEESE affair, which was the lack of funding.
Nicossof started his career in April 1941 with only £150. Nearly two years later, in February 1943, he was still without additional funds, but still apparently able to operate although during the intervening period his outgoing expenses must have at times been heavy. This situation must, until it is remedied, represent a grave weakness in the case. At any moment some senior Abwehr officer may from curiosity examine the back records and, if he does so, must reach the conclusion that Nicossofâs accountancy canonly be explained on the assumption that he is working under British control. SIME is, of course, fully alive to this danger, their report describes four attempts to secure additional funds: in August 1942, in October and again in December and the following January. None of these attempts was successful or at least had not been at the time the SIME report was written. It is, I think, pertinent to enquire whether this was wholly the Abwehrâs fault. We know at least from the message already quoted that in August 1942 Rossetti was making a genuine effort to pay ROBERTO , and this was not his first attempt. Similarly, we know that he was exerting himself in Turkey to secure the latest payment in January this year. He has not, therefore, been entirely neglectful of his agent. On the other hand I received the impression (perhaps wrongly) from the first or introductory report forwarded by SIME that Rossetti had not always enjoyed their full cooperation in his efforts to pay CHEESE . It is said, with regard to the August plan, that at the last moment CHEESEâS merchant friend was frightened off by the execution of five spies which had occurred a few days previously. Similarly, in December the flat at which CHEESE was to receive the money was raided at a crucial moment by the Egyptian police with the result that a fresh scheme had to be arranged.
I do not know if it was in SIMEâs power to have prevented either of these incidents: the report even seems to imply that both were staged. If so, I think SIME was following a false policy. In either case, apart from the general desirability of CHEESEâS receiving money, there was a distinct counter-espionage advantage to be gained from allowing, even compelling, the payment to proceed. In equivalent circumstances in this country we should, I think, have felt that a contact with the Abwehr in Aleppo and still more in Cairo was worth the slight lapse from reality involved in inducing a Greek merchant not to be frightened or persuading the Egyptian police to postpone a raid.
I make this point because our own experience has been that the Abwehr is not adept at paying its agents and not infrequently fails to do so unless rendered active assistance. This is, I think, because they lack not the means but the imagination. The problem of making a clandestine payment to
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