instructed Kim to evacuate North Korea and set up a government-in-exile in the Soviet Union. The next day, after Mao agreed to go to war, Stalin retracted his orders: Fyn Si [Stalin] to Kim I1 Sung, October 13, 1950, APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 347, pp. 74-5.
43. The best treatment of Chinese strategies during the war is Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism.
44. Evgueni Bajanov, "Assessing the Politics of the Korean War, 1949-51," CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 54, 87-91; and Weathersby, "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," ibid., 30-5.
45. Records of conversation, Stalin-Zhou Enlai, August 20, September 3 and 19, 1952, APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, pp. 54-72, 75-87, and d. 343, pp. 97-103.
46. Record of conversation, Mao-Iudin, May 2, 1956, AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 49, pa. 410, d. 9, pp. 124-30.
47. It is interesting to note, for instance, how Zhou and Liu Shaoqi repeatedly drew a political parallel between the purge of Gao Gang in January 1954 and the Beriia affair in Moscow six months earlier; records of conversation, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai-Ambassador Pavel Iudin, February 2 and 13, 1954, AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 47, d. 7, pa. 379, pp. 25-35, 36-40.
48. Mao's visit to Moscow was the first time a leader of any unified Chinese state had ever visited another Great Power.
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49. See Dmitri A. Volkogonov, Sem Vozhdei: galeria liderov SSSR [Seven chiefs: A gallery of Soviet leaders] (2 vols.) (Moscow: 1995), vol. 1, 410-11. The Litshun base was to be handed over without compensation, while the Chinese would pay in goods deliveries for the takeover of the Manchurian and Xinjiang factories.
50. Record of conversation, Iudin-Zhou Enlai, October 10, 1954, AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 47, pa. 379, d. 7, pp. 77-82.
51. Deborah A. Kaple, Four Myths about Soviet Involvement in China in the 1950s. Paper presented at the Cold War International History Project' s Conference on New Evidence on Cold War History, Moscow, January 12-15, 1993.
52. The Soviet Foreign Ministry received regular briefings from the Ministry of Education and the KGB on Chinese (and other foreign) students in the Soviet Union; see, for instance, the appendixes to AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 49, d. 4, p. 410.
53. Information from Russian military historians; see also Volkogonov, Sem Vozhdei, vol. 1, 411-12. The Russian military archives, at Podolsk outside Moscow, are unfortunately still closed for this period.
54. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988), 39-46. See also Iris Chang, Thread of the Silkworm (New York: Basic Books, 1995); David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994), especially 354-5. Although the Chinese never received a complete prototype, substantial amounts of technical information and specifications were transferred between early 1955 and mid-1958.
55. For useful overviews, see the quarterly reports of the Cultural Section in the Soviet embassy in Beijing, in AVPRF f. 100 and f. 0100 (referentura po kitaiu). See also the 1954-1955 runs of People's China, the official magazine of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; the memoirs of Soviet advisers in China, for instance, Nikolai Fe-dorenko, Kitaiskie zapisi [Chinese Reminiscences] (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel, 1955).
56. When the Soviets hastened to review their conversations with Gao in the wake of his purge, they found no indications of a ''special relationship," except Gao's criticizing Bo Yibo's economic policies in a talk with Soviet Vice-Premier Tevosian; see record of conversation, Vice-Premier I. F. Tevosian and Ambassador Iudin-Gao Gang, December 30, 1953, AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 47, pa. 379, d. 7, pp. 3-7.
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57. Record of conversation, V. V. Vaskov (Chargé d' affaires)-Mao Zedong, June 16, 1954, AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 47, pa. 379, d. 7, pp. 67-68; Kapitsa interview.
58. Record of conversation, Iudin-Zhou Enlai, January 18, 1954,
43. The best treatment of Chinese strategies during the war is Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism.
44. Evgueni Bajanov, "Assessing the Politics of the Korean War, 1949-51," CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 54, 87-91; and Weathersby, "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," ibid., 30-5.
45. Records of conversation, Stalin-Zhou Enlai, August 20, September 3 and 19, 1952, APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, pp. 54-72, 75-87, and d. 343, pp. 97-103.
46. Record of conversation, Mao-Iudin, May 2, 1956, AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 49, pa. 410, d. 9, pp. 124-30.
47. It is interesting to note, for instance, how Zhou and Liu Shaoqi repeatedly drew a political parallel between the purge of Gao Gang in January 1954 and the Beriia affair in Moscow six months earlier; records of conversation, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai-Ambassador Pavel Iudin, February 2 and 13, 1954, AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 47, d. 7, pa. 379, pp. 25-35, 36-40.
48. Mao's visit to Moscow was the first time a leader of any unified Chinese state had ever visited another Great Power.
page_39
Page 39
49. See Dmitri A. Volkogonov, Sem Vozhdei: galeria liderov SSSR [Seven chiefs: A gallery of Soviet leaders] (2 vols.) (Moscow: 1995), vol. 1, 410-11. The Litshun base was to be handed over without compensation, while the Chinese would pay in goods deliveries for the takeover of the Manchurian and Xinjiang factories.
50. Record of conversation, Iudin-Zhou Enlai, October 10, 1954, AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 47, pa. 379, d. 7, pp. 77-82.
51. Deborah A. Kaple, Four Myths about Soviet Involvement in China in the 1950s. Paper presented at the Cold War International History Project' s Conference on New Evidence on Cold War History, Moscow, January 12-15, 1993.
52. The Soviet Foreign Ministry received regular briefings from the Ministry of Education and the KGB on Chinese (and other foreign) students in the Soviet Union; see, for instance, the appendixes to AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 49, d. 4, p. 410.
53. Information from Russian military historians; see also Volkogonov, Sem Vozhdei, vol. 1, 411-12. The Russian military archives, at Podolsk outside Moscow, are unfortunately still closed for this period.
54. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988), 39-46. See also Iris Chang, Thread of the Silkworm (New York: Basic Books, 1995); David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994), especially 354-5. Although the Chinese never received a complete prototype, substantial amounts of technical information and specifications were transferred between early 1955 and mid-1958.
55. For useful overviews, see the quarterly reports of the Cultural Section in the Soviet embassy in Beijing, in AVPRF f. 100 and f. 0100 (referentura po kitaiu). See also the 1954-1955 runs of People's China, the official magazine of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; the memoirs of Soviet advisers in China, for instance, Nikolai Fe-dorenko, Kitaiskie zapisi [Chinese Reminiscences] (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel, 1955).
56. When the Soviets hastened to review their conversations with Gao in the wake of his purge, they found no indications of a ''special relationship," except Gao's criticizing Bo Yibo's economic policies in a talk with Soviet Vice-Premier Tevosian; see record of conversation, Vice-Premier I. F. Tevosian and Ambassador Iudin-Gao Gang, December 30, 1953, AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 47, pa. 379, d. 7, pp. 3-7.
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Page 40
57. Record of conversation, V. V. Vaskov (Chargé d' affaires)-Mao Zedong, June 16, 1954, AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 47, pa. 379, d. 7, pp. 67-68; Kapitsa interview.
58. Record of conversation, Iudin-Zhou Enlai, January 18, 1954,
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