23a-d. These must, however, be supplemented by the available Chinese documents, for instance, in Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu and Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, comps., Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan [Selected Mao Zedong works on foreign affairs] (Beijing:
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Zhongyang wenxian, 1994), 117-32, or Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, comp., Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong works since the founding of the PRC] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1987), vol. 1, 189-267. See also Dieter Heinzig, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty Negotiations: A Reappraisal in Light of New Sources," paper presented at a CWIHP/Dangdai Zhongguo yanjiusuo conference, Beijing, October 1997.
34. Records of conversation, Stalin-Mao, December 16, 1949, and January 22, 1950, APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, 9-17 and 29-38; see also Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners; Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
35. Ledovsky, "Mikoyan's Secret Mission," 88-9; Hu Qiaomu, Hu Qiaornu huiyi Mao Zedong [Hu Qiaomu remembers Mao Zodong] (Beijing: Renmin, 1994), 88; Mao to CCP Central Committee, January 3, 1950, in Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 122.
36. Records of conversation, Roshchin-Zhou Enlai, November 10, 1949, and Roshchin-Li Kenong, November 17, 1949, AVPRF f. 07, op. 22, pa. 36, d. 220, pp. 52-56 and 67-73. Ambassador Roshchin's conversation with Li, the head of the CCP intelligence services, gives a fairly good overview of Chinese aims in foreign policy prior to Mao's trip. The Chinese priorities were confirmed in the Kapitsa interview and the author's conversations with Vietnamese party historians, Hanoi, January 1996.
37. For further discussion, see comments by Chen Jian, Vojtech Mastny, Odd Arne Westad, and Vladislav Zubok in CWIHP Bulletin, 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996): 20-7.
38. See Kathryn Weathersby, "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence," Journal of American-East Asian Relations 2, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 425-58; "To Attack or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim I1 Sung and the Prelude to War," CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995): 1-9. Both the Russian Foreign Ministry archives (AVPRF, f. 59a) and the archives of the former CPSU Central Committee (TsKhSD, f. 89) have set up consolidated collections of declassified Russian documents on the Korean war.
39. Michael H. Hunt, "Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951," Political Science Quarterly 107 (Fall 1992): 453-78; Thomas Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams," International Security 17 (Summer 1992): 122-54; and Alexandre Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: September 16-October 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives," CWIHP Bulletin 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996): 94-107.
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40. Kathryn Weathersby, "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 30-5; Shu Guang Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995); Shtykov to Vyshinskii, May 12, 1950, AVPRF, f. 059a, op. 5a, p. 11, d. 3, 100-3. Kathryn Weathersby, who is the leading expert on the new Russian materials on the Korean War, disagrees with the view of Stalin as vacillating on the purpose of his Korean policies in the spring of 1950. "Stalin seems to have made a clear decision in January 1950 that taking South Korea would be feasible and advantageous and he proceeded with the plan." Weathersby, personal communication, October 1996.
41. Mao to Filippov (Stalin), October 2, 1950, APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 334, pp. 105-6; see also Mansourov, "Stalin," 99.
42. Mansourov, "Stalin," 103-4; see also Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), 98-9. On October 12, Stalin had
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Zhongyang wenxian, 1994), 117-32, or Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, comp., Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong works since the founding of the PRC] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1987), vol. 1, 189-267. See also Dieter Heinzig, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty Negotiations: A Reappraisal in Light of New Sources," paper presented at a CWIHP/Dangdai Zhongguo yanjiusuo conference, Beijing, October 1997.
34. Records of conversation, Stalin-Mao, December 16, 1949, and January 22, 1950, APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, 9-17 and 29-38; see also Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners; Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
35. Ledovsky, "Mikoyan's Secret Mission," 88-9; Hu Qiaomu, Hu Qiaornu huiyi Mao Zedong [Hu Qiaomu remembers Mao Zodong] (Beijing: Renmin, 1994), 88; Mao to CCP Central Committee, January 3, 1950, in Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 122.
36. Records of conversation, Roshchin-Zhou Enlai, November 10, 1949, and Roshchin-Li Kenong, November 17, 1949, AVPRF f. 07, op. 22, pa. 36, d. 220, pp. 52-56 and 67-73. Ambassador Roshchin's conversation with Li, the head of the CCP intelligence services, gives a fairly good overview of Chinese aims in foreign policy prior to Mao's trip. The Chinese priorities were confirmed in the Kapitsa interview and the author's conversations with Vietnamese party historians, Hanoi, January 1996.
37. For further discussion, see comments by Chen Jian, Vojtech Mastny, Odd Arne Westad, and Vladislav Zubok in CWIHP Bulletin, 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996): 20-7.
38. See Kathryn Weathersby, "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence," Journal of American-East Asian Relations 2, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 425-58; "To Attack or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim I1 Sung and the Prelude to War," CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995): 1-9. Both the Russian Foreign Ministry archives (AVPRF, f. 59a) and the archives of the former CPSU Central Committee (TsKhSD, f. 89) have set up consolidated collections of declassified Russian documents on the Korean war.
39. Michael H. Hunt, "Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951," Political Science Quarterly 107 (Fall 1992): 453-78; Thomas Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams," International Security 17 (Summer 1992): 122-54; and Alexandre Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: September 16-October 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives," CWIHP Bulletin 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996): 94-107.
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40. Kathryn Weathersby, "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 30-5; Shu Guang Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995); Shtykov to Vyshinskii, May 12, 1950, AVPRF, f. 059a, op. 5a, p. 11, d. 3, 100-3. Kathryn Weathersby, who is the leading expert on the new Russian materials on the Korean War, disagrees with the view of Stalin as vacillating on the purpose of his Korean policies in the spring of 1950. "Stalin seems to have made a clear decision in January 1950 that taking South Korea would be feasible and advantageous and he proceeded with the plan." Weathersby, personal communication, October 1996.
41. Mao to Filippov (Stalin), October 2, 1950, APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 334, pp. 105-6; see also Mansourov, "Stalin," 99.
42. Mansourov, "Stalin," 103-4; see also Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), 98-9. On October 12, Stalin had
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