Bridge Too Far by Cornelius Ryan Page A

happy to see me,” Bernhard recalled.  “He had a lot on his mind, and the presence of royalty in his area was understandably a responsibility that he could easily do without.”
    The Field Marshal’s renown as the greatest British soldier of the war
    had made him, in Bernhard’s words, “the idol of millions of
    Britishers.”  And the thirty-three-year-old Prince was in awe of
    Montgomery.  Unlike Eisenhower’s relaxed, almost casual manner,
    Montgomery’s demeanor made it difficult for Bernhard to converse easily
    with him.  Sharp and blunt from the outset, Montgomery made it clear
    that Bernhard’s presence in his area “worried” him.  With justification
    untempered by tact or explanation, Montgomery told the Prince that it
    would be unwise for Bernhard to visit the headquarters of the Dutch
    unit—the Princess Irene Brigade—attached to the British Second Army,
    quartered in
    the area around Diest, barely ten miles from the front line.  Bernhard, who, as Commander in Chief of the Netherlands Forces, had every intention of visiting Diest, for the moment did not respond.  Instead, he began to discuss the Dutch resistance reports.  Montgomery overrode him.  Returning to the matter, he told the Prince, “You must not live in Diest.  I cannot allow it.”  Irked, Bernhard felt compelled to point out that he was “serving directly under Eisenhower and did not come under the Field Marshal’s command.”  Thus, from the start, as Bernhard remembers the meeting, “rightly or wrongly, we got off on the wrong foot.”  (later, in fact, Eisenhower backed Montgomery regarding Diest, but he did say that Bernhard could stay in Brussels “close to 21/ Army Group headquarters, where your presence may be needed.”)
    Bernhard went on to review the situation in Holland as reflected in the underground reports.  Montgomery was told of the retreat and disorganization of the Germans, which had been going on since September 2, and of the makeup of the resistance groups.  To the best of his knowledge, Bernhard said, the reports were accurate.  Montgomery, according to the Prince, retorted, “I don’t think your resistance people can be of much use to us.  Therefore, I believe all this is quite unnecessary.”  Startled by the Field Marshal’s bluntness, Bernhard “began to realize that Montgomery apparently did not believe any of the messages coming from my agents in Holland.  In a way, I could hardly blame him.  I gathered he was a bit fed up with misleading information that he had received from the French and Belgian resistance during his advance.  But, in this instance, I knew the Dutch groups involved, the people who were running them and I knew the information was, indeed, correct.”  He persisted.  Showing the Field Marshal the message file and quoting from report after report, Bernhard posed a question: “In view of this, why can’t you attack right away?”
    “We can’t depend on these reports,” Montgomery told him.  “Just because
    the Dutch resistance claim the Germans have been retreating from
    September 2 doesn’t necessarily mean they are
    still retreating.”  Bernhard had to admit the retreat “was slowing down,” and there were “signs of reorganization.”  Still, in his opinion, there was valid reason for an immediate attack.
    Montgomery remained adamant.  “Anyway,” he said, “much as I would like to attack and liberate Holland, I can’t do it because of supplies.  We are short of ammunition.  We are short of petrol for the tanks and if we did attack, in all probability they would become stranded.” Bernhard was astounded.  The information he received in England from both SHAEF and his own advisers had convinced him that the liberation of Holland would be accomplished in a matter of days.  “Naturally I automatically assumed that Montgomery, commander on the spot, knew the situation better than anyone else,” Bernhard later said.  “Yet we had absolutely