Bootleggers & Baptists: How Economic Forces and Moral Persuasion Interact to Shape Regulatory Politics by Adam Smith
Authors: Adam Smith
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indicates, there is no obviously comparable quid pro quo with the moral community. Instead, there are evolved habits of the heart that, in every functioning society, operate as low-cost order-generating bonds. Seeking to serve private interests alone is not enough: successful politicians must clothe their actions in a public interest cloak woven from the familiar moral fiber that binds together the community they serve.
We begin our analysis by drawing on the moral philosophy of Adam Smith and David Hume. We then relate their notions of other-regarding or unselfish behavior to research in experimental economics, which directly tests the hypothesis that an other-regarding element is indeed at play when ordinary people engage in trade or other economic transactions. The literature we survey suggests that unselfish human behavior is every bit as fundamental as the self-interested striving of “homo economicus”—a fact that can and will be accounted for by successful political agents. Our discussion at this point lays the foundations of our answer to “Why Baptists?”
Evidence of other-regarding behavior observed in experimental economics can be seen as grounds for a genetic tendency to cooperate and thus survive in groups. We pursue this line of reasoning by delving into an evolutionary explanation of what may be going on in the experimental economics studies we survey. Here we describe the role and rise of religion, first as a survival mechanism in human communities and later as a governing mechanism. Communities with a high degree of cooperation and other-regarding behavior—a prerequisite for successful defense against raiders from other bands—were better adapted for survival. Groups that cooperated best in battle lived to see another day. Groups whose members fought isolated struggles, refusing to risk their individual safety for the benefit of their fellows, never left the field of battle. Evolutionary psychologists, zoologists, and religion scholars tell us that over the millennia, human communities characterized by a high degree of cooperative behavior survived (Ridley 1996; Wade 2009; Wright 1994). Those characterized by defection did not (Nowak 2011). Group survival in a Hobbesian jungle required altruistic behavior that religion can promote (Rubin 2002, 59–63; Wade 2009, 72). Religion and religious practices evolved as apparently low-cost mechanisms for inducing cooperation and perpetuating community social norms and moral values (Wade 2009, 48–51). Populations in surviving cooperative communities passed on cooperative genes. Those in defecting communities did not. Having laid another round of stones in the Baptist foundation based on evolutionary forces, we then show how moral appeals by politicians can be seen as necessary and desirable. Bootleggers and Baptists then emerge as a winning coalition.
In the chapter’s final section, we turn to both recent and historical American protest movements to show how rational ignorance inflamed protesters’ passions—and how politicians seized the opportunity to pass pork to favored Bootleggers. This gets to the heart of our theory: the good intentions of the many often unexpectedly pave the way for the private interests of the few. Our final message is a cautionary one: when unconstrained favor-seeking behavior becomes endemic, bets on Bootlegger/Baptist coalitions yielding efficiency gains will tend to be losing wagers. Instead, as Tullock (1975) argued, the pursuit of government favors ends up consuming resources while producing little or no wealth.
A note to our readers before proceeding. We get a bit technical in some of the discussion that follows, which may turn off some readers. Others may simply find the answer to the motivating question “Why Baptists?” to be self-evident. Nevertheless, we believe those who are interested in more than just an unpacking of the old familiar story of private interests swindling the public will find something new
We begin our analysis by drawing on the moral philosophy of Adam Smith and David Hume. We then relate their notions of other-regarding or unselfish behavior to research in experimental economics, which directly tests the hypothesis that an other-regarding element is indeed at play when ordinary people engage in trade or other economic transactions. The literature we survey suggests that unselfish human behavior is every bit as fundamental as the self-interested striving of “homo economicus”—a fact that can and will be accounted for by successful political agents. Our discussion at this point lays the foundations of our answer to “Why Baptists?”
Evidence of other-regarding behavior observed in experimental economics can be seen as grounds for a genetic tendency to cooperate and thus survive in groups. We pursue this line of reasoning by delving into an evolutionary explanation of what may be going on in the experimental economics studies we survey. Here we describe the role and rise of religion, first as a survival mechanism in human communities and later as a governing mechanism. Communities with a high degree of cooperation and other-regarding behavior—a prerequisite for successful defense against raiders from other bands—were better adapted for survival. Groups that cooperated best in battle lived to see another day. Groups whose members fought isolated struggles, refusing to risk their individual safety for the benefit of their fellows, never left the field of battle. Evolutionary psychologists, zoologists, and religion scholars tell us that over the millennia, human communities characterized by a high degree of cooperative behavior survived (Ridley 1996; Wade 2009; Wright 1994). Those characterized by defection did not (Nowak 2011). Group survival in a Hobbesian jungle required altruistic behavior that religion can promote (Rubin 2002, 59–63; Wade 2009, 72). Religion and religious practices evolved as apparently low-cost mechanisms for inducing cooperation and perpetuating community social norms and moral values (Wade 2009, 48–51). Populations in surviving cooperative communities passed on cooperative genes. Those in defecting communities did not. Having laid another round of stones in the Baptist foundation based on evolutionary forces, we then show how moral appeals by politicians can be seen as necessary and desirable. Bootleggers and Baptists then emerge as a winning coalition.
In the chapter’s final section, we turn to both recent and historical American protest movements to show how rational ignorance inflamed protesters’ passions—and how politicians seized the opportunity to pass pork to favored Bootleggers. This gets to the heart of our theory: the good intentions of the many often unexpectedly pave the way for the private interests of the few. Our final message is a cautionary one: when unconstrained favor-seeking behavior becomes endemic, bets on Bootlegger/Baptist coalitions yielding efficiency gains will tend to be losing wagers. Instead, as Tullock (1975) argued, the pursuit of government favors ends up consuming resources while producing little or no wealth.
A note to our readers before proceeding. We get a bit technical in some of the discussion that follows, which may turn off some readers. Others may simply find the answer to the motivating question “Why Baptists?” to be self-evident. Nevertheless, we believe those who are interested in more than just an unpacking of the old familiar story of private interests swindling the public will find something new
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