Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency by James Bamford
Authors: James Bamford
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certainly could not let them discover the risky bomber overflights which,
thankfully, had not yet come to light.
Sitting
with his back to the blue drapes and the broad windows looking out onto the
North Lawn, Eisenhower bemoaned the committee's investigation. "It was
clear," he later wrote irritatedly, "that Congress would insist on
some kind of investigation of the U-2 incident and the break-up of the Summit
Conference." "Administration officials should be calm and clear, but
should not be expansive and should not permit the investigators to delve into
our intelligence system .. . ," he warned. "Some investigators were
masters at beguiling witnesses and trying to find out all about our
intelligence systems." "No information," he said sternly,
"should be divulged" concerning those operations.
Privately,
Eisenhower had no use for congressional investigations. Over a Scotch in the
family quarters of the White House, Defense Secretary Tom Gates once brought up
his apprehension concerning his scheduled testimony before Lyndon Johnson's
Preparedness Committee. The questioning was going to focus on accusations that
the administration was deliberately underestimating Soviet missiles in order to
reduce Pentagon spending and balance the budget. "What's more," Gates
said, "that's under oath. That's an investigation." But Eisenhower quickly
brushed aside the defense secretary's concern. "Just stand up there and
tell 'em you won't take their oath."
Another
official fearful of the probe and seeking to scuttle it was General Nathan
Twining. It was he who had been most responsible for the bomber overflights, and
now, at the May 24 meeting, he was concerned that the investigators might soon
turn away from the CIA and toward his own organization. "The
investigation, once started, would seek to explore our whole intelligence
operation," he protested. "If the investigators probed CIA, they
would then want to investigate JCS operations." He then questioned
"whether there was anything we could do to stop the investigation."
After a
few moments, Eisenhower brought up the concept of executive privilege but
quickly rejected it as unworkable. The investigators could be stopped from
probing into advice given him by his personal staff, he said, but not into the
activities of other administration officials.
"Accordingly,"
he complained, "the investigation could not be stopped." But to limit
the possibility of a leak, he said, "administration officials should
testify themselves and not allow their subordinates to speak."
One other
possibility brought up by Eisenhower was to have Allen Dulles simply stonewall
all questions. "Mr. Dulles," he said, "might have to say that
CIA [is] a secret organization of the U.S. Government."
Still
another possibility was to try to turn the public against the Committee.
Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson suggested to Eisenhower that he go on
television and appeal to the American public to reject the investigation.
"The speech," he said, "should express the hope that no one in
this country will engage in activities which will imperil the capability of the
country to protect itself in the future. The speech should contain the
implication that there is a limit beyond which investigation cannot go without
imperiling our security." To further make the point about the dangers to
security such an investigation might cause, Anderson told Eisenhower he should
evoke the terrible image of Pearl Harbor.
But
Eisenhower was resigned to the inevitability of the investigation. He turned to
the most difficult topic: covering up his own involvement in the scandal.
"Congress could be told that overflights have been going on with the
approval of the secretary of State," he said, "and our scientific
advisers, who have indicated that this method of gathering intelligence is
necessary. It should be made clear that basic decisions respecting
reconnaissance overflights of denied territory have been made by the
president."
That,
thankfully, had not yet come to light.
Sitting
with his back to the blue drapes and the broad windows looking out onto the
North Lawn, Eisenhower bemoaned the committee's investigation. "It was
clear," he later wrote irritatedly, "that Congress would insist on
some kind of investigation of the U-2 incident and the break-up of the Summit
Conference." "Administration officials should be calm and clear, but
should not be expansive and should not permit the investigators to delve into
our intelligence system .. . ," he warned. "Some investigators were
masters at beguiling witnesses and trying to find out all about our
intelligence systems." "No information," he said sternly,
"should be divulged" concerning those operations.
Privately,
Eisenhower had no use for congressional investigations. Over a Scotch in the
family quarters of the White House, Defense Secretary Tom Gates once brought up
his apprehension concerning his scheduled testimony before Lyndon Johnson's
Preparedness Committee. The questioning was going to focus on accusations that
the administration was deliberately underestimating Soviet missiles in order to
reduce Pentagon spending and balance the budget. "What's more," Gates
said, "that's under oath. That's an investigation." But Eisenhower quickly
brushed aside the defense secretary's concern. "Just stand up there and
tell 'em you won't take their oath."
Another
official fearful of the probe and seeking to scuttle it was General Nathan
Twining. It was he who had been most responsible for the bomber overflights, and
now, at the May 24 meeting, he was concerned that the investigators might soon
turn away from the CIA and toward his own organization. "The
investigation, once started, would seek to explore our whole intelligence
operation," he protested. "If the investigators probed CIA, they
would then want to investigate JCS operations." He then questioned
"whether there was anything we could do to stop the investigation."
After a
few moments, Eisenhower brought up the concept of executive privilege but
quickly rejected it as unworkable. The investigators could be stopped from
probing into advice given him by his personal staff, he said, but not into the
activities of other administration officials.
"Accordingly,"
he complained, "the investigation could not be stopped." But to limit
the possibility of a leak, he said, "administration officials should
testify themselves and not allow their subordinates to speak."
One other
possibility brought up by Eisenhower was to have Allen Dulles simply stonewall
all questions. "Mr. Dulles," he said, "might have to say that
CIA [is] a secret organization of the U.S. Government."
Still
another possibility was to try to turn the public against the Committee.
Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson suggested to Eisenhower that he go on
television and appeal to the American public to reject the investigation.
"The speech," he said, "should express the hope that no one in
this country will engage in activities which will imperil the capability of the
country to protect itself in the future. The speech should contain the
implication that there is a limit beyond which investigation cannot go without
imperiling our security." To further make the point about the dangers to
security such an investigation might cause, Anderson told Eisenhower he should
evoke the terrible image of Pearl Harbor.
But
Eisenhower was resigned to the inevitability of the investigation. He turned to
the most difficult topic: covering up his own involvement in the scandal.
"Congress could be told that overflights have been going on with the
approval of the secretary of State," he said, "and our scientific
advisers, who have indicated that this method of gathering intelligence is
necessary. It should be made clear that basic decisions respecting
reconnaissance overflights of denied territory have been made by the
president."
That,
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