Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency by James Bamford Page B
Authors: James Bamford
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leaders of both parties in the
State Dining Room, Eisenhower almost laughably said how he "heartily
approved of the inquiry." Then he said how he "was worried that
members of Congress in conducting the inquiry would try to dig into the
interior of the CIA and its covert operation." He added that he was sure
the leaders of Congress realized that "such attempts would be harmful to
the United States." A little more than a dozen years later, Richard Nixon
would also attempt to use the rubric of "national security" and "CIA
intelligence operations" to hide his personal involvement in a politically
damaging scandal.
The
members asked a few polite questions but never quizzed Eisenhower about his own
role. Senator Mike Mansfield asked, "What would the President think if there
were to be established in the Congress a joint congressional committee which
would oversee the activities of the CIA?" The thought no doubt horrified
Eisenhower. "The operation of the CIA was so delicate and so secret in
many cases," he said, "that it must be kept under cover."
The next
morning the doors to the Foreign Relations Committee Room were shut and
guarded. Chairman J. William Fulbright gaveled the Senate hearings to order.
Seated along the broad witness table, each administration official followed
Eisenhower's instructions and dodged, ducked, or lied outright about the
president's involvement in the U-2 program. Allen Dulles chose to stonewall.
"I don't discuss what the president says to me or I say to the
president." Years later, Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon
referred to the testimony given the committee as "just gobbledy-gook"
and admitted, "Our testimony was not totally frank because we were
defending—we were trying to hide the White House responsibility for this."
But
Dillon's boss went much further than gobbledy-gook. When asked point-blank by
Fulbright if there was "ever a time" that the president approved each
U-2 flight, Secretary of State Christian Herter simply swallowed hard and then
told a bold-faced lie. "It has never come up to the president."
In the
hearing room, overseeing the testimony for the CIA and making sure no secrets
were released to the public, was Richard Helms, who would later go on to become
the agency's director. Years later, he would look back on the testimony and
say: "They were all sworn. Knowing what they knew and what actually went
on, if it isn't perjury I don't understand the meaning of the word."
Richard
Helms had reason to be interested in the perjury over the U-2. In 1977 he was
convicted in federal court and sentenced to two years in prison for a similar
offense. Questioned by the chairman of the same Senate committee about the
CIA's involvement in a coup in Chile, he lied to Fulbright and claimed there
was none. Although Helms would later assert that his oath of secrecy to the CIA
permitted him to lie to Congress, federal judge Barrington D. Parker strongly
disagreed. Telling Helms, "You now stand before this court in disgrace and
shame," the judge went on to ridicule his claim that lying to Congress to
protect secrets was acceptable.
If public
officials embark deliberately on a course to disobey and ignore the laws of our
land because of some misguided and ill-conceived notion and belief that there
are earlier commitments and considerations which they must observe, the future
of our country is in jeopardy.
There are
those employed in the intelligence security community of this country . . . who
feel that they have a license to operate freely outside the dictates of the law
and otherwise to orchestrate as they see fit. Public officials at every level,
whatever their position, like any other person, must respect and honor the
Constitution and the laws of the United States.
Despite
his stern lecture, Parker suspended Helms's sentence and added a $2,000 fine.
Although
Fulbright treated the president's men with kid gloves and Eisenhower's role
never emerged, there was great bitterness
State Dining Room, Eisenhower almost laughably said how he "heartily
approved of the inquiry." Then he said how he "was worried that
members of Congress in conducting the inquiry would try to dig into the
interior of the CIA and its covert operation." He added that he was sure
the leaders of Congress realized that "such attempts would be harmful to
the United States." A little more than a dozen years later, Richard Nixon
would also attempt to use the rubric of "national security" and "CIA
intelligence operations" to hide his personal involvement in a politically
damaging scandal.
The
members asked a few polite questions but never quizzed Eisenhower about his own
role. Senator Mike Mansfield asked, "What would the President think if there
were to be established in the Congress a joint congressional committee which
would oversee the activities of the CIA?" The thought no doubt horrified
Eisenhower. "The operation of the CIA was so delicate and so secret in
many cases," he said, "that it must be kept under cover."
The next
morning the doors to the Foreign Relations Committee Room were shut and
guarded. Chairman J. William Fulbright gaveled the Senate hearings to order.
Seated along the broad witness table, each administration official followed
Eisenhower's instructions and dodged, ducked, or lied outright about the
president's involvement in the U-2 program. Allen Dulles chose to stonewall.
"I don't discuss what the president says to me or I say to the
president." Years later, Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon
referred to the testimony given the committee as "just gobbledy-gook"
and admitted, "Our testimony was not totally frank because we were
defending—we were trying to hide the White House responsibility for this."
But
Dillon's boss went much further than gobbledy-gook. When asked point-blank by
Fulbright if there was "ever a time" that the president approved each
U-2 flight, Secretary of State Christian Herter simply swallowed hard and then
told a bold-faced lie. "It has never come up to the president."
In the
hearing room, overseeing the testimony for the CIA and making sure no secrets
were released to the public, was Richard Helms, who would later go on to become
the agency's director. Years later, he would look back on the testimony and
say: "They were all sworn. Knowing what they knew and what actually went
on, if it isn't perjury I don't understand the meaning of the word."
Richard
Helms had reason to be interested in the perjury over the U-2. In 1977 he was
convicted in federal court and sentenced to two years in prison for a similar
offense. Questioned by the chairman of the same Senate committee about the
CIA's involvement in a coup in Chile, he lied to Fulbright and claimed there
was none. Although Helms would later assert that his oath of secrecy to the CIA
permitted him to lie to Congress, federal judge Barrington D. Parker strongly
disagreed. Telling Helms, "You now stand before this court in disgrace and
shame," the judge went on to ridicule his claim that lying to Congress to
protect secrets was acceptable.
If public
officials embark deliberately on a course to disobey and ignore the laws of our
land because of some misguided and ill-conceived notion and belief that there
are earlier commitments and considerations which they must observe, the future
of our country is in jeopardy.
There are
those employed in the intelligence security community of this country . . . who
feel that they have a license to operate freely outside the dictates of the law
and otherwise to orchestrate as they see fit. Public officials at every level,
whatever their position, like any other person, must respect and honor the
Constitution and the laws of the United States.
Despite
his stern lecture, Parker suspended Helms's sentence and added a $2,000 fine.
Although
Fulbright treated the president's men with kid gloves and Eisenhower's role
never emerged, there was great bitterness
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