Being Soviet: Identity, Rumour, and Everyday Life Under Stalin 1939-1953 by Timothy Johnston Page B
Authors: Timothy Johnston
Tags: General, History, 20th Century, Europe, Political Science, Political Ideologies, Modern, Communism; Post-Communism & Socialism, Russia & the Former Soviet Union, Social History
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the [German] New Order in Europe’. 66 However, this negativity about German activities did not signal an abandonment of anti-British narra- tives. Pravda offered a distinctly pro-Iraqi view of the Anglo-Iraqi crisis in April 1941, claiming that the British capitalist lords were attempting to extend their influence over the region. 67
The central narrative through these final months remained that the USSR was demonstrating its wisdom and greatness by staying out of the European conflict. The key message of the Iraqi crisis was that it
64 A. A. Lobachev, Trudnymi Dorogami (Moscow, 1960), 120. Such claims of foresight must be treated with some caution but seem possible in the light of the wider ongoing conversation about the international situation.
65 Pravda , 05.04.1941, p. 1.
66 RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 28, ll. 34–8.
67 Pravda , 18.05.1941, p. 5.
The Liberator State? 1939–41 15
demonstrated the evils of war and the ‘unenviable lot of the small countries upon whom both warring camps look as current or future bridgeheads’. 68 Meanwhile, the Soviet Pact of Neutrality with Japan in April 1941 was held up as yet another symbol of the wisdom of Soviet peace policy whilst Ogon¨ek continued to print dramatic pictures of the destruction produced by the Anglo-German air war. 69
However, this confident talk of peace and security jarred against the ongoing discussion of, and preparation for, war. Every major city in the USSR underwent blackout and bombing rehearsals in early 1941. 70 At the same time, a June 1941 review of political propaganda in the Red Army warned of the ‘danger of unexpected incidents’ in the interna- tional arena and called for ‘constant preparedness to go onto a shattering offensive against the enemy’. 71 When Rudolf Hess, Hitler’s deputy, flew to Scotland in May 1941, the story received only scanty coverage, reflecting the growing unease about the international situation. 72 Mean- while the behind-the-scenes anti-German campaign grew in intensity. A model lecture for the Red Army, produced in late May warned that it was an error to conclude that the ‘German National Socialists have abandoned their anti-Soviet plans’. This language was echoed in a June 1941 report that criticized German imperialism and described the Wehrmacht as ‘enforcers and enslavers’. 73
Official Soviet Identity, with its emphasis on peace but warnings of war, became increasingly incoherent as the summer of 1941 approached. In May 1941 a local agitator wrote to Moscow to report a ‘very strange’ propaganda method being deployed in Rostov-on-Don. In Budeenyi Prospekt a large map had been erected in a window that was covered with National Socialist flags to ‘daily mark the advance of the German armies’. The display had become a popular feature and was surrounded ‘day and night’ by crowds discussing the international situation. 74 This largely positive image of Germany as a friend of the USSR contrasted sharply with I. Azarov’s experience in June 1941 when he was sent to Odessa with specific instructions to warn the sailors of the
68 Ibid.
69 Pravda , 19.04.1941, p. 5; 22.05.1941, p. 5; Ogon¨ek , 05.1941: 15, p. 10.
70 Iu. M. Luzhkov and B. V. Gromov, eds., Moskva Prifrontovaia, 1941–1942 (Moscow, 2001), 31, 46, 51–2; J. Scott, Duel for Europe: Stalin versus Hitler (Boston, 1942), 244–5.
71 RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 27, ll. 72–82.
72 Pravda , 14–15.05.1941, p. 5.
73 RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 27, ll. 72–82, 84–121.
74 Ibid. d. 29, l. 29.
16 Being Soviet
threat of German aggression. However, the credibility of his message was seriously undermined shortly after he arrived, on 14 June, when TASS issued a statement denying that relations with the Germans had deteriorated or that an invasion was imminent. Azarov was left uncer- tain what to say. 75 The Central Committee’s slogans in celebration of May Day captured this sense of uncertainty. The global proletariat was appealed to
The central narrative through these final months remained that the USSR was demonstrating its wisdom and greatness by staying out of the European conflict. The key message of the Iraqi crisis was that it
64 A. A. Lobachev, Trudnymi Dorogami (Moscow, 1960), 120. Such claims of foresight must be treated with some caution but seem possible in the light of the wider ongoing conversation about the international situation.
65 Pravda , 05.04.1941, p. 1.
66 RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 28, ll. 34–8.
67 Pravda , 18.05.1941, p. 5.
The Liberator State? 1939–41 15
demonstrated the evils of war and the ‘unenviable lot of the small countries upon whom both warring camps look as current or future bridgeheads’. 68 Meanwhile, the Soviet Pact of Neutrality with Japan in April 1941 was held up as yet another symbol of the wisdom of Soviet peace policy whilst Ogon¨ek continued to print dramatic pictures of the destruction produced by the Anglo-German air war. 69
However, this confident talk of peace and security jarred against the ongoing discussion of, and preparation for, war. Every major city in the USSR underwent blackout and bombing rehearsals in early 1941. 70 At the same time, a June 1941 review of political propaganda in the Red Army warned of the ‘danger of unexpected incidents’ in the interna- tional arena and called for ‘constant preparedness to go onto a shattering offensive against the enemy’. 71 When Rudolf Hess, Hitler’s deputy, flew to Scotland in May 1941, the story received only scanty coverage, reflecting the growing unease about the international situation. 72 Mean- while the behind-the-scenes anti-German campaign grew in intensity. A model lecture for the Red Army, produced in late May warned that it was an error to conclude that the ‘German National Socialists have abandoned their anti-Soviet plans’. This language was echoed in a June 1941 report that criticized German imperialism and described the Wehrmacht as ‘enforcers and enslavers’. 73
Official Soviet Identity, with its emphasis on peace but warnings of war, became increasingly incoherent as the summer of 1941 approached. In May 1941 a local agitator wrote to Moscow to report a ‘very strange’ propaganda method being deployed in Rostov-on-Don. In Budeenyi Prospekt a large map had been erected in a window that was covered with National Socialist flags to ‘daily mark the advance of the German armies’. The display had become a popular feature and was surrounded ‘day and night’ by crowds discussing the international situation. 74 This largely positive image of Germany as a friend of the USSR contrasted sharply with I. Azarov’s experience in June 1941 when he was sent to Odessa with specific instructions to warn the sailors of the
68 Ibid.
69 Pravda , 19.04.1941, p. 5; 22.05.1941, p. 5; Ogon¨ek , 05.1941: 15, p. 10.
70 Iu. M. Luzhkov and B. V. Gromov, eds., Moskva Prifrontovaia, 1941–1942 (Moscow, 2001), 31, 46, 51–2; J. Scott, Duel for Europe: Stalin versus Hitler (Boston, 1942), 244–5.
71 RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 27, ll. 72–82.
72 Pravda , 14–15.05.1941, p. 5.
73 RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 27, ll. 72–82, 84–121.
74 Ibid. d. 29, l. 29.
16 Being Soviet
threat of German aggression. However, the credibility of his message was seriously undermined shortly after he arrived, on 14 June, when TASS issued a statement denying that relations with the Germans had deteriorated or that an invasion was imminent. Azarov was left uncer- tain what to say. 75 The Central Committee’s slogans in celebration of May Day captured this sense of uncertainty. The global proletariat was appealed to
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