Romanian provinces at the mouth of the Danube. Tactical retraining, the occupation of new territories and worker mobilization were intended to reassure readers that the USSR was properly prepared for any future conflict. However, when set against the blanket of silence surrounding the Finnish front and the dark threats of coming war, they created an impression of official anxiety rather than confidence. The tensions between calls for produc- tivity and boasts of might were sometimes recognized by Soviet propa- gandists who complained that ‘hurrah patriotism’ and talk of the Red Army as a ‘shattering force’ weakened the ‘fighting spirit’ of the sol- diers. 59 Just as the Official Soviet Identity of the USSR as a diplomatic force became increasingly unclear, so the balance between reassuring might and war preparation became ever more uneasy.
By the spring of 1941, Official Soviet Identity was becoming con- fused: it boasted of might and peace whilst warning of war and criticized the Western powers without demonstrating much enthusiasm for the Germans. This uncertainty was reinforced by the tentative leakage of counter-messages that, in reality, fascism remained the USSR’s true enemy. After August 1939, anti-German films such as Minkin and Rappoport’s Professor Mamlock , and Eisenstein’s Alexander Nevsky were taken off the screen and the word ‘fascist’ disappeared from the official press. 60 However, when Simonov’s play A Young Man from Our Town first aired in March 1941, one observer noted that some actors were ‘adding more emotion to any lines that had anti-German implica- tions’. 61 More significantly a wave of rumours circulated that senior leaders were saying in closed auditoriums that ‘we married the Germans out of expediency not love’. 62 Several respondents to HIP claimed that they had heard ‘off stage’ anti-German rhetoric during this period: ‘There was no anti-German propaganda in the newspapers but anti- German propaganda was spread amongst the officers who spread it amongst the men (after the spring of 1940).’ 63 A. Lobachev argued
58 Pravda , 26.06.1940, pp. 1–4. See: R. Thurston, Life and Terror in Stalin’s Russia, 1934–1941 (1996).
59 RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 28, ll. 1–17.
60 T. Dickinson and C. De la Roche, Soviet Cinema (London, 1948), 59.
61 Figes, The Whisperers , 374.
62 L. Fischer, Thirteen Who Fled (New York, 1949), 36.
63 HIP. B4, 139, 8.
14 Being Soviet
with his fellow agitators over the fact that they should take a more negative line against the Germans, ‘diplomacy is one thing and political work in the army is another’. Not all of his colleagues agreed. 64 Their debates reflected some of the growing tensions at the heart of Official Soviet Identity as the Pact Period drew to a close.
April 1941 to June 1941: uncertain times
This growing confusion about the diplomatic identity of the USSR within the international community became even more pronounced after April 1941. The contents of the various official narratives did not change in the final months before war, but the tensions between the different strands became more marked. The decisive event, in terms of relations with Germany, came in early April when the Wehrmacht moved to support the Italian forces in the Balkans. On 5 April the USSR signed a Friendship and Non-Intervention Agreement with Yugoslavia. The Agreement guaranteed nothing other than friendly relations in the event of war. 65 However, its timing was choreographed to give the Germans a bloody nose when they invaded Yugoslavia the next day. This cautious negativity about Germany expanded gradually throughout the spring of 1941. Sergei Eisenstein was awarded the Stalin Prize for cinematography in April 1941 despite not having produced anything since the now banned Nevsky in 1938. A thematic plan for propaganda produced in June 1941 required, amongst other things, that TASS publish material about the ‘imperialist character of
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