living in Macao, and occasionally did not act to his father’s liking (including granting remarkably frank interviews to foreign journalists).
Meanwhile, Kim Jong Il would fall in love with another beauty, Ko Y ǒ ng–h ǔ i, a dancer from a family of ethnic Koreans in Japan. She had two sons, Kim Jong Chol and Kim Jong Un. For a while in the late 1990s Ko acquired minor political clout, but like her predecessor she died at a relatively young age in 2004.
After Ko Y ǒ ng–h ǔ i death, Kim Jong Il reputedly developed relations with the strong-minded and ambitious Kim Ok, his former secretary. Her somewhat special standing was confirmed when Kim Ok appeared at some funeral ceremonies after Kim Jong Il’s death in December 2011.
It was against such a backdrop that in late 2008, Kim Jong Il finally chose his third son, Kim Jong Un, as his successor. At the time of writing it appears that Kim Kyong Hee, Kim Jong Il’s younger sister, and her husband are expected to act as regents if the Dear Leader dies too soon. But such arrangements are always a murky business and the same can be said about dynastic politics in general.
Finally, Kim Jong Un broke with all conventions when in July 2012 he began to appear in public with his young and stunningly beautiful wife Ri Sol Ju, of whose background not much is known (it is, however, known that she loves expensive Dior handbags).
----
Much in line with this old approach, in 2011 the North Korean media published a worldwide rating of happiness. It stated that the happiest people live in China, with North Koreans coming in second (obviously, they were so moderate in their claims because by that time North Koreans became aware that China had much higher standards of living). Needless to say, the two lowest places in this curious rating were taken by the United States and South Korea.
Indeed, there was a striking contrast between Korea and the outside world. Predictably, the Communist nations were assumed to be relatively prosperous. Even so, the propaganda of Kim Il Sung’s era did not spend much time eulogizing the achievements of Soviet cosmonauts or Hungarian milkmaids. In this regard it was remarkably different from other nations of the Communist bloc: as we remember, Kim Il Sung’s leadership saw other Communist countries as dangerously liberal, a source of ideological corruption, and hence did not want to encourage excessive attention to their real or alleged achievements.
Propagandists also presented the countries of the Third World, especially those who styled themselves as Socialist, in a favorable light. When it covered the developing world, the North Korean media loved to dwell on the great popularity of the Juche Idea across Asia, Africa, and LatinAmerica. If
Nodong sinmun
of the 1970s was to be believed, perusing works of Kim Il Sung was a favorite pastime of many an African villager.
For a brief while, attempts to create a worldwide Jucheist movement were an important part of North Korea’s internal and external propaganda. Nearly all of these propaganda operations took place in the Third World. In the developed West such an ideological offering would have few takers, while maintaining such a movement there would be costly. In the Communist bloc, Juche propaganda had an even lower chance of success than in London or Geneva. After all, the surveillance apparatus in these Communist countries was powerful enough to ensure obedience to the most correct brand of Communist ideology—that is, the brand currently accepted by the local leaders. Ordinary people in Communist countries also tended to be unsympathetic toward Juche, which they typically saw as a rude caricature of their own official ideologies.
Thus, North Korean diplomats and spies concentrated their efforts in the developing world. In the 1970s they created a network of study groups and research institutes there, dedicated to the propagation of Kim Il Sung’s ideology and heavily subsidized by Pyongyang.
Meanwhile, Kim Jong Il would fall in love with another beauty, Ko Y ǒ ng–h ǔ i, a dancer from a family of ethnic Koreans in Japan. She had two sons, Kim Jong Chol and Kim Jong Un. For a while in the late 1990s Ko acquired minor political clout, but like her predecessor she died at a relatively young age in 2004.
After Ko Y ǒ ng–h ǔ i death, Kim Jong Il reputedly developed relations with the strong-minded and ambitious Kim Ok, his former secretary. Her somewhat special standing was confirmed when Kim Ok appeared at some funeral ceremonies after Kim Jong Il’s death in December 2011.
It was against such a backdrop that in late 2008, Kim Jong Il finally chose his third son, Kim Jong Un, as his successor. At the time of writing it appears that Kim Kyong Hee, Kim Jong Il’s younger sister, and her husband are expected to act as regents if the Dear Leader dies too soon. But such arrangements are always a murky business and the same can be said about dynastic politics in general.
Finally, Kim Jong Un broke with all conventions when in July 2012 he began to appear in public with his young and stunningly beautiful wife Ri Sol Ju, of whose background not much is known (it is, however, known that she loves expensive Dior handbags).
----
Much in line with this old approach, in 2011 the North Korean media published a worldwide rating of happiness. It stated that the happiest people live in China, with North Koreans coming in second (obviously, they were so moderate in their claims because by that time North Koreans became aware that China had much higher standards of living). Needless to say, the two lowest places in this curious rating were taken by the United States and South Korea.
Indeed, there was a striking contrast between Korea and the outside world. Predictably, the Communist nations were assumed to be relatively prosperous. Even so, the propaganda of Kim Il Sung’s era did not spend much time eulogizing the achievements of Soviet cosmonauts or Hungarian milkmaids. In this regard it was remarkably different from other nations of the Communist bloc: as we remember, Kim Il Sung’s leadership saw other Communist countries as dangerously liberal, a source of ideological corruption, and hence did not want to encourage excessive attention to their real or alleged achievements.
Propagandists also presented the countries of the Third World, especially those who styled themselves as Socialist, in a favorable light. When it covered the developing world, the North Korean media loved to dwell on the great popularity of the Juche Idea across Asia, Africa, and LatinAmerica. If
Nodong sinmun
of the 1970s was to be believed, perusing works of Kim Il Sung was a favorite pastime of many an African villager.
For a brief while, attempts to create a worldwide Jucheist movement were an important part of North Korea’s internal and external propaganda. Nearly all of these propaganda operations took place in the Third World. In the developed West such an ideological offering would have few takers, while maintaining such a movement there would be costly. In the Communist bloc, Juche propaganda had an even lower chance of success than in London or Geneva. After all, the surveillance apparatus in these Communist countries was powerful enough to ensure obedience to the most correct brand of Communist ideology—that is, the brand currently accepted by the local leaders. Ordinary people in Communist countries also tended to be unsympathetic toward Juche, which they typically saw as a rude caricature of their own official ideologies.
Thus, North Korean diplomats and spies concentrated their efforts in the developing world. In the 1970s they created a network of study groups and research institutes there, dedicated to the propagation of Kim Il Sung’s ideology and heavily subsidized by Pyongyang.
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