attained nuclear parity with the United States and even had acquired a decisive superiority in land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.
In 1945, at a time when wartime agreements required the withdrawal of Soviet, British, and American forces from Iran, Stalin attempted to carve off two provinces for eventual incorporation into the Soviet empire. He engineered proclamations of independence by the Kurdish Peopleâs Republic and the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaidzhan. President Truman, who had learned his lesson very early in trusting the Soviets in Europe, sent Stalin a back-channel message threatening grave consequences if Soviet forces did not leave Iran. Given the American monopoly in nuclear weapons, Stalin had little choice but to comply and did so within months. The United States had no conventional forces to compel Moscow to withdraw, for Washington had already pulled its troops out of Iran and was demobilizing most of its forces from World War II. That meant Stalin could only have been reacting to U.S. nuclear superiority.
In 1979, as the communist government of Afghanistan neared the brink of collapse in the face of an anticommunist insurrection, the Soviet Union rapidly built up its invasion forces on the SovietâAfghan border. Though slow in recognizing the growing danger, the Carter administration finally warned Moscow that a Soviet intervention in Afghanistan would bring grave consequences. But President Carter had neither the conventional nor the nuclear forces to back up that threat. Kremlin leaders knew that the only immediate options the President could choose were a total nuclearwar on the one hand or a set of political and economic measures on the other. Moscow concluded that this choice was no choice and ordered 85,000 troops to invade Afghanistan.
Only one conclusion is possible: When the United States had nuclear superiority, it could deter Soviet expansionism. Once the Soviet Union erased our nuclear advantage, it was free to exploit its own massive superiority in conventional forces. Like Sherlock Holmesâs dog that did not bark, the critical clue to understanding the importance of nuclear superiority in the case of Afghanistan was the threat the United States could not make.
The key lesson we must learn is that if superiority was so decisive in our hands it would be no less decisive in Moscowâs. But the danger is that for the last twenty years the United States has been slipping toward nuclear inferiority.
Official views on nuclear weapons inside the Kremlin differ strikingly from those inside the Washington beltway. Americans believe that nuclear war is unthinkable. In its two-hundred-year history the United States has lost a total of 650,000 lives in war. Therefore, in the minds of Americans, no rational leader could contemplate starting a war that would kill tens of millions of people.
But the leaders of the Soviet Union, which has lost over 100 million lives in civil war, two world wars, purges, and famines in this century, have a different perspective. Kremlin leaders put an entirely different value on human life. The Soviet government, after all, killed tens of millions of its own citizens just for the sake of creating collective farms. While the Soviet Union has been a victim in war, its government has made victims of millions of its own people. Also, while those who have experienced such great wartime suffering cannot be eager to repeat it, they do know it can be survived. They also know, since it happened once, that it could happen again. That means Kremlin leaders, unlike Americans, think seriously about the unthinkable and plan for it. While the current Soviet propaganda line is that a nuclear war is unthinkable, Moscow intends to take whatever measures will help it prevail if the unthinkable ever occurs.
As a result, after the Cuban missile crisis, superpower strategies totally diverged. Washington made a conscious decision to relinquish its nuclear
In 1945, at a time when wartime agreements required the withdrawal of Soviet, British, and American forces from Iran, Stalin attempted to carve off two provinces for eventual incorporation into the Soviet empire. He engineered proclamations of independence by the Kurdish Peopleâs Republic and the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaidzhan. President Truman, who had learned his lesson very early in trusting the Soviets in Europe, sent Stalin a back-channel message threatening grave consequences if Soviet forces did not leave Iran. Given the American monopoly in nuclear weapons, Stalin had little choice but to comply and did so within months. The United States had no conventional forces to compel Moscow to withdraw, for Washington had already pulled its troops out of Iran and was demobilizing most of its forces from World War II. That meant Stalin could only have been reacting to U.S. nuclear superiority.
In 1979, as the communist government of Afghanistan neared the brink of collapse in the face of an anticommunist insurrection, the Soviet Union rapidly built up its invasion forces on the SovietâAfghan border. Though slow in recognizing the growing danger, the Carter administration finally warned Moscow that a Soviet intervention in Afghanistan would bring grave consequences. But President Carter had neither the conventional nor the nuclear forces to back up that threat. Kremlin leaders knew that the only immediate options the President could choose were a total nuclearwar on the one hand or a set of political and economic measures on the other. Moscow concluded that this choice was no choice and ordered 85,000 troops to invade Afghanistan.
Only one conclusion is possible: When the United States had nuclear superiority, it could deter Soviet expansionism. Once the Soviet Union erased our nuclear advantage, it was free to exploit its own massive superiority in conventional forces. Like Sherlock Holmesâs dog that did not bark, the critical clue to understanding the importance of nuclear superiority in the case of Afghanistan was the threat the United States could not make.
The key lesson we must learn is that if superiority was so decisive in our hands it would be no less decisive in Moscowâs. But the danger is that for the last twenty years the United States has been slipping toward nuclear inferiority.
Official views on nuclear weapons inside the Kremlin differ strikingly from those inside the Washington beltway. Americans believe that nuclear war is unthinkable. In its two-hundred-year history the United States has lost a total of 650,000 lives in war. Therefore, in the minds of Americans, no rational leader could contemplate starting a war that would kill tens of millions of people.
But the leaders of the Soviet Union, which has lost over 100 million lives in civil war, two world wars, purges, and famines in this century, have a different perspective. Kremlin leaders put an entirely different value on human life. The Soviet government, after all, killed tens of millions of its own citizens just for the sake of creating collective farms. While the Soviet Union has been a victim in war, its government has made victims of millions of its own people. Also, while those who have experienced such great wartime suffering cannot be eager to repeat it, they do know it can be survived. They also know, since it happened once, that it could happen again. That means Kremlin leaders, unlike Americans, think seriously about the unthinkable and plan for it. While the current Soviet propaganda line is that a nuclear war is unthinkable, Moscow intends to take whatever measures will help it prevail if the unthinkable ever occurs.
As a result, after the Cuban missile crisis, superpower strategies totally diverged. Washington made a conscious decision to relinquish its nuclear
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