the British and the French intervened militarily to wrest control of the Suez Canal from President Nasser of Egypt, Khrushchev tried unsuccessfully to convince Eisenhower that the two superpowers should jointly deploy forces to compel London and Paris to withdraw. The Soviet leader then threatened to send forces to help Egypt unilaterally and to shoot Soviet missiles at Britain and France as covering fire. Eisenhower instructed the American commander of NATO to deliver our response. In a press conference, General Gruenther, the NATO commander, described what would happen if Khrushchev followed through on his threats: âMoscow would be destroyed as night follows day.â Khrushchev backed down.
In the Berlin crisis in 1959, the Soviet Union sought to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany, which would have had the effect not only of formalizing Soviet control over the government in East Berlin in violation of wartime Allied agreements, but also of obstructing Western access to West Berlin. In a press conference,Eisenhower seemed to equivocate. He said that we were âcertainly not going to fight a ground war in Europeâ and that ânuclear war as a general thing looks to me a self-defeating thing for all of us,â but he added that we were ânever going to back up on our rights and responsibilitiesâ and that he âdidnât say that nuclear war is a complete impossibility.â Four days later, in congressional testimony, the chief of the U.S. Air Force removed all doubt as to what Eisenhower meant. He declared unequivocally that if we were challenged in Berlin we would use nuclear weapons. As a result, while Khrushchev continued his bluster over the Berlin issue, he did not follow through on his threat to act unilaterally.
In the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the nuclear diplomacy of President Kennedy, while unspoken, was the key to forcing Khrushchevâs hand. When Kennedy discovered that Khrushchev had secretly shipped missiles to Cuba, the President demanded their removal and backed up his words with a naval blockade. When confronted with the U.S. threat to board and search a Soviet freighter, Khrushchev countered by saying that this âwould make talk useless,â bring into action âthe forces of war,â and have âirretrievably fatal consequences.â Kennedy called Khrushchevâs nuclear bluff. Khrushchev backed down, though not before he extracted American promises to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey and not to support anti-Castro forces in Cuba or the United States. While some former Kennedy administration officials today contend that overwhelming American conventional, not nuclear, superiority played the decisive role, it is highly doubtful that our conventional superiority would have been persuasive enough to deter Khrushchev if it were not backed up with massive U.S. nuclear superiority.
In those four cases, the United States prevailed. In each case we had vital interests at stake, we had a margin of nuclear superiority, the President demonstrated unquestionably his will to do whatever was necessary to protect U.S. interests, and, except in Cuba, an American intervention with conventional forces either was impossible or would not have carried the day. Only American nuclear superiority made the difference. In Korea, it ended a war.In Suez, it kept the Soviets out of the Middle East. In Berlin, it prevented a superpower clash in Central Europe. In Cuba, it prevented Moscow from stationing nuclear forces ninety miles from the United States.
Those who contend that superiority is irrelevant in the nuclear age forget how useful it was when we had it. But a tale of two crises, in Iran in 1945 and Afghanistan in 1979, demonstrates its importance conclusively. In both 1945 and 1979, Moscow had overwhelming superiority in conventional forces, not only in Southwest Asia but also worldwide. In 1945, America had a nuclear monopoly. By 1979, Moscow had
In the Berlin crisis in 1959, the Soviet Union sought to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany, which would have had the effect not only of formalizing Soviet control over the government in East Berlin in violation of wartime Allied agreements, but also of obstructing Western access to West Berlin. In a press conference,Eisenhower seemed to equivocate. He said that we were âcertainly not going to fight a ground war in Europeâ and that ânuclear war as a general thing looks to me a self-defeating thing for all of us,â but he added that we were ânever going to back up on our rights and responsibilitiesâ and that he âdidnât say that nuclear war is a complete impossibility.â Four days later, in congressional testimony, the chief of the U.S. Air Force removed all doubt as to what Eisenhower meant. He declared unequivocally that if we were challenged in Berlin we would use nuclear weapons. As a result, while Khrushchev continued his bluster over the Berlin issue, he did not follow through on his threat to act unilaterally.
In the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the nuclear diplomacy of President Kennedy, while unspoken, was the key to forcing Khrushchevâs hand. When Kennedy discovered that Khrushchev had secretly shipped missiles to Cuba, the President demanded their removal and backed up his words with a naval blockade. When confronted with the U.S. threat to board and search a Soviet freighter, Khrushchev countered by saying that this âwould make talk useless,â bring into action âthe forces of war,â and have âirretrievably fatal consequences.â Kennedy called Khrushchevâs nuclear bluff. Khrushchev backed down, though not before he extracted American promises to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey and not to support anti-Castro forces in Cuba or the United States. While some former Kennedy administration officials today contend that overwhelming American conventional, not nuclear, superiority played the decisive role, it is highly doubtful that our conventional superiority would have been persuasive enough to deter Khrushchev if it were not backed up with massive U.S. nuclear superiority.
In those four cases, the United States prevailed. In each case we had vital interests at stake, we had a margin of nuclear superiority, the President demonstrated unquestionably his will to do whatever was necessary to protect U.S. interests, and, except in Cuba, an American intervention with conventional forces either was impossible or would not have carried the day. Only American nuclear superiority made the difference. In Korea, it ended a war.In Suez, it kept the Soviets out of the Middle East. In Berlin, it prevented a superpower clash in Central Europe. In Cuba, it prevented Moscow from stationing nuclear forces ninety miles from the United States.
Those who contend that superiority is irrelevant in the nuclear age forget how useful it was when we had it. But a tale of two crises, in Iran in 1945 and Afghanistan in 1979, demonstrates its importance conclusively. In both 1945 and 1979, Moscow had overwhelming superiority in conventional forces, not only in Southwest Asia but also worldwide. In 1945, America had a nuclear monopoly. By 1979, Moscow had
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