acquired territories in the west. Some,
such as Shaposhnikov, urged defense in depth, which meant retention of
the old fortifications so as to be able to fall back on them in the face of a Ger-
man assault. This view was anathema to Stalin, who did not wish to give up
a single vershok of the new land (a Russian unit of measurement equal to a
few centimeters). Indeed, motivated entirely by his desire to demonstrate
that Soviet power had advanced westward, Stalin would insist that for-
tifications in the western oblasts be constructed along the line of the new
border. This decision meant that German observers were able to follow the
progress of construction and pinpoint weaknesses, but Stalin, until the real
blow fell, was never one to be concerned with military details that coun-
tered his own views. Consequently, it was decided to shut down the Stalin
Line fortifications and remove their weapons for use in the new system.35
What actually happened? In the first place, all was not well with the
fortified areas of the original Stalin Line. On January 11, 1939, some time
SOVIET BORDERS MOVE WESTWARD
45
before the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact and its secret
protocol, the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR informed the Central Commit-
tee of the Ukrainian Communist Party of the poor condition of the Kiev
Fortified Area: ‘‘Of the 257 structures in the area, only five are prepared for
combat action. They consist primarily of machine gun emplacements but
do not have special equipment such as communications, chemical protec-
tion, water, heating, light, etc. . . . At 175 of the 257 structures the natural
relief (mounds, hills, dense woods, bushes) limits the horizon of fire. The
forward sector of the permanent fortifications is only 15 kilometers from
Kiev which would permit enemy artillery to bombard Kiev without ap-
proaching the fortified area. . . . Hermetic seals around machine gun em-
brasures date from the years 1929–1930.’’ The list of deficiencies goes on
and on. ‘‘The Special Department of the Kiev Special Military District has
informed the command of the Kiev SMD of the fact that the Kiev Fortified
Area is not combat ready, but despite this nothing has been done,’’ the
report concluded. A similar report, on deficiencies at the Tiraspol Fortified
Area, was submitted to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Commu-
nist Party the same day. First Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev inserted this
resolution in the report: ‘‘Comrade Timoshenko. This is an important ques-
tion. It must be checked and discussed at the Military Council.’’ Khru-
shchev’s order did not carry much weight with Timoshenko because on
January 16, 1939, a third report on fortified area deficiencies was sent to
Kiev by the USSR NKVD. This time it was about the Mogilev-Yampolsky
Fortified Area. Apart from the usual design and equipment problems, the
area was criticized for its personnel shortages at the command level. Here
again, the report concluded by noting that the Special Department of the
Kiev Special Military District had brought this issue to the attention of the
commanding general, S. K. Timoshenko. Nothing was done.36
In November 1939, after the acquisition of the new territories, the
original fortified areas were abolished, the equipment put in long-term
storage, and the personnel reassigned. It seemed doubtful, given their de-
plorable state in early 1939, that the preservation of the older fortifications
would be carried out effectively. Indeed, when retreating Red Army units
tried to organize defensive positions in these fortified areas in July 1941,
they found them abandoned and overgrown with tall grass and weeds.37
It would not be until 1940 that construction would begin on fortified
areas along the new western border. Although in March 1941 responsi-
bility for the program would be given to Boris M. Shaposhnikov, for-
mer chief of the general staff, it was
such as Shaposhnikov, urged defense in depth, which meant retention of
the old fortifications so as to be able to fall back on them in the face of a Ger-
man assault. This view was anathema to Stalin, who did not wish to give up
a single vershok of the new land (a Russian unit of measurement equal to a
few centimeters). Indeed, motivated entirely by his desire to demonstrate
that Soviet power had advanced westward, Stalin would insist that for-
tifications in the western oblasts be constructed along the line of the new
border. This decision meant that German observers were able to follow the
progress of construction and pinpoint weaknesses, but Stalin, until the real
blow fell, was never one to be concerned with military details that coun-
tered his own views. Consequently, it was decided to shut down the Stalin
Line fortifications and remove their weapons for use in the new system.35
What actually happened? In the first place, all was not well with the
fortified areas of the original Stalin Line. On January 11, 1939, some time
SOVIET BORDERS MOVE WESTWARD
45
before the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact and its secret
protocol, the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR informed the Central Commit-
tee of the Ukrainian Communist Party of the poor condition of the Kiev
Fortified Area: ‘‘Of the 257 structures in the area, only five are prepared for
combat action. They consist primarily of machine gun emplacements but
do not have special equipment such as communications, chemical protec-
tion, water, heating, light, etc. . . . At 175 of the 257 structures the natural
relief (mounds, hills, dense woods, bushes) limits the horizon of fire. The
forward sector of the permanent fortifications is only 15 kilometers from
Kiev which would permit enemy artillery to bombard Kiev without ap-
proaching the fortified area. . . . Hermetic seals around machine gun em-
brasures date from the years 1929–1930.’’ The list of deficiencies goes on
and on. ‘‘The Special Department of the Kiev Special Military District has
informed the command of the Kiev SMD of the fact that the Kiev Fortified
Area is not combat ready, but despite this nothing has been done,’’ the
report concluded. A similar report, on deficiencies at the Tiraspol Fortified
Area, was submitted to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Commu-
nist Party the same day. First Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev inserted this
resolution in the report: ‘‘Comrade Timoshenko. This is an important ques-
tion. It must be checked and discussed at the Military Council.’’ Khru-
shchev’s order did not carry much weight with Timoshenko because on
January 16, 1939, a third report on fortified area deficiencies was sent to
Kiev by the USSR NKVD. This time it was about the Mogilev-Yampolsky
Fortified Area. Apart from the usual design and equipment problems, the
area was criticized for its personnel shortages at the command level. Here
again, the report concluded by noting that the Special Department of the
Kiev Special Military District had brought this issue to the attention of the
commanding general, S. K. Timoshenko. Nothing was done.36
In November 1939, after the acquisition of the new territories, the
original fortified areas were abolished, the equipment put in long-term
storage, and the personnel reassigned. It seemed doubtful, given their de-
plorable state in early 1939, that the preservation of the older fortifications
would be carried out effectively. Indeed, when retreating Red Army units
tried to organize defensive positions in these fortified areas in July 1941,
they found them abandoned and overgrown with tall grass and weeds.37
It would not be until 1940 that construction would begin on fortified
areas along the new western border. Although in March 1941 responsi-
bility for the program would be given to Boris M. Shaposhnikov, for-
mer chief of the general staff, it was
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