western borders were moved
as much 400 kilometers westward. What was missing was the military
infrastructure that had taken many years to create along the old frontier.
The capacities of the road nets and railroads had to be increased; the latter
needed to convert their tracks to the broader Russian gauge. Although
existing structures such as barracks or warehouses could be adapted to
military needs, many had to be built from scratch. The most difficult prob-
lem, though, was the total absence of the kinds of fortifications, known as
the Stalin Line, that had already been constructed along the former state
frontier. Here is a description of fortifications along that line:
The original fortified areas, in Russian ukreplennye raiony, were be-
tween 50 and 140 kilometers in length, straddled major lines of com-
munications, and tended to have one or both flanks anchored on a
natural obstacle. The Kiev Fortified Area, for example, formed an
arc west of the city whose ends rested on the Dnepr River. The gen-
eral arrangement called for a support zone with a depth of ten to
twelve kilometers to precede a fortified area’s main defense zone;
the support zone’s scattered outposts and obstacles were supposed
to report, harass, and delay an enemy’s advance. Behind it, the block-
houses and pill boxes in the main defense zone were scattered across
a swath with a depth of three to four kilometers. Within it, a group-
ing of several fortifications formed a support point; a cluster of
three to five support points comprised a battalion defense area as-
signed to a machine gun battalion. The battalion defense area was
positioned so that its fixed weaponry dominated the routes through
(Map opposite page) On the basis of the August 23, 1939, nonaggression
pact and its secret protocols, the USSR acquired eastern districts of
Poland that were incorporated into the Belorussian and Ukrainian
SSRs. Romania also ceded Bessarabia to the USSR. It was incorporated
into the Moldavian SSR. The acquisition of northern Bukovina and its
transfer to the Ukrainian SSR, as well as the incorporation of the Baltic
States into the USSR in 1940, were unilateral Soviet actions.
44
SOVIET BORDERS MOVE WESTWARD
the sector being protected. The two-story blockhouses and single-
story pillboxes typically were armed with machine guns mounted
in casemates. Embrasures with armored coverings enabled these
weapons to be fired to an emplacement’s front and sides. Fortifica-
tions were equipped with air filtration systems for protection against
chemical weapons, water storage tanks, generators, and land line
communications. The outfitting process was neither smooth nor
uniformly effective; for example, battalion defense areas were often
linked by unprotected open wire or tactical field cables because of
the failings of the buried cable industry. In addition to weapon em-
placements, there were command posts, communications centers,
personnel shelters, and depots distributed throughout a fortified
area. The fortifications themselves obtained additional protection
from anti-tank ditches, wire entanglements, and the minefields that
would be laid upon mobilization.34
Defensive operations were to provide only a brief interlude that al-
lowed for completion of mobilization and a rapid transition to the offen-
sive, in which the enemy would be decisively defeated, his homeland oc-
cupied, and socialism triumphant. This offensive spirit dominated Soviet
military thought in the 1930s. It, and the inability of Soviet military leaders
to rid themselves of the idea that the opening phases of the next war would
follow the leisurely pattern of previous wars, would make it difficult for the
Red Army to decide how to defend the new territories.
The issue now faced by Stalin and the general staff was what to do with
the existing fortified areas covering the old frontier and how and where to
build fortifications in the newly
as much 400 kilometers westward. What was missing was the military
infrastructure that had taken many years to create along the old frontier.
The capacities of the road nets and railroads had to be increased; the latter
needed to convert their tracks to the broader Russian gauge. Although
existing structures such as barracks or warehouses could be adapted to
military needs, many had to be built from scratch. The most difficult prob-
lem, though, was the total absence of the kinds of fortifications, known as
the Stalin Line, that had already been constructed along the former state
frontier. Here is a description of fortifications along that line:
The original fortified areas, in Russian ukreplennye raiony, were be-
tween 50 and 140 kilometers in length, straddled major lines of com-
munications, and tended to have one or both flanks anchored on a
natural obstacle. The Kiev Fortified Area, for example, formed an
arc west of the city whose ends rested on the Dnepr River. The gen-
eral arrangement called for a support zone with a depth of ten to
twelve kilometers to precede a fortified area’s main defense zone;
the support zone’s scattered outposts and obstacles were supposed
to report, harass, and delay an enemy’s advance. Behind it, the block-
houses and pill boxes in the main defense zone were scattered across
a swath with a depth of three to four kilometers. Within it, a group-
ing of several fortifications formed a support point; a cluster of
three to five support points comprised a battalion defense area as-
signed to a machine gun battalion. The battalion defense area was
positioned so that its fixed weaponry dominated the routes through
(Map opposite page) On the basis of the August 23, 1939, nonaggression
pact and its secret protocols, the USSR acquired eastern districts of
Poland that were incorporated into the Belorussian and Ukrainian
SSRs. Romania also ceded Bessarabia to the USSR. It was incorporated
into the Moldavian SSR. The acquisition of northern Bukovina and its
transfer to the Ukrainian SSR, as well as the incorporation of the Baltic
States into the USSR in 1940, were unilateral Soviet actions.
44
SOVIET BORDERS MOVE WESTWARD
the sector being protected. The two-story blockhouses and single-
story pillboxes typically were armed with machine guns mounted
in casemates. Embrasures with armored coverings enabled these
weapons to be fired to an emplacement’s front and sides. Fortifica-
tions were equipped with air filtration systems for protection against
chemical weapons, water storage tanks, generators, and land line
communications. The outfitting process was neither smooth nor
uniformly effective; for example, battalion defense areas were often
linked by unprotected open wire or tactical field cables because of
the failings of the buried cable industry. In addition to weapon em-
placements, there were command posts, communications centers,
personnel shelters, and depots distributed throughout a fortified
area. The fortifications themselves obtained additional protection
from anti-tank ditches, wire entanglements, and the minefields that
would be laid upon mobilization.34
Defensive operations were to provide only a brief interlude that al-
lowed for completion of mobilization and a rapid transition to the offen-
sive, in which the enemy would be decisively defeated, his homeland oc-
cupied, and socialism triumphant. This offensive spirit dominated Soviet
military thought in the 1930s. It, and the inability of Soviet military leaders
to rid themselves of the idea that the opening phases of the next war would
follow the leisurely pattern of previous wars, would make it difficult for the
Red Army to decide how to defend the new territories.
The issue now faced by Stalin and the general staff was what to do with
the existing fortified areas covering the old frontier and how and where to
build fortifications in the newly
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