Valkyrie: The Story of the Plot to Kill Hitler, by Its Last Member by Philip Freiherr von Boeselager Page A
Authors: Philip Freiherr von Boeselager
Ads: Link
telephoned, inspected, visited the herds of horses; he observed, judged, weighed. He pestered Berlin with multiple requests, hoping to wear the officials down. The Army General Staff looked with favor on his projects, and Georg had a good contact in Major Claus von Amsberg, the officer charged with supervising the cavalry, whomhe had met on the Orient Express the preceding summer on his way to Romania.
Absorbed by his incessant activity, Georg almost forgot to eat and drink; a few eggs, a quart of coffee, or a cup of mocha seemed to be enough for him. He slept only five hours a night. He didn’t even have time to ride his own five horses every day; he had entrusted their dressage to Fritz Thiedemann. The only relaxation he allowed himself was to go hunting at dawn, often alone with his dog. Sometimes ranging over the steppe or the forests, sometimes going deep into the marshes, he rediscovered the joys of his youth, hiding in the bushes watching for game. With a rabbit or a fox in his game bag, he came back a few hours later, just as the camp was waking up. His mind cleared, he gave his orders and the day began.
According to Tresckow’s instructions, the cavalry group was supposed to have 28 officers, 160 NCOs, 920 troopers, and a few more than 1,000 horses. By the end of February, 350 Cossacks had joined the group; their integration was handled by Captain Fritz-Dietlof von der Schulenburg. The cavalry group, called the Boeselager Reiterverband, was then composed of four cavalry squadrons, a mortar battery, an intelligence detachment, and an artillery squadron. On April 6, the group was transformed into a genuine regiment composed of two battalions. The first was commanded by Captain Walther Schmidt-Salzmann. I took command of the second.
14
The Three Failed Attempts
MARCH 1943
Only a handful of officers were permitted to be in close proximity to the Führer. Among them were his personal aide-de-camp, Rudolf Schmundt, a classmate of Tresckow’s, and, of course, the marshals. But an officer below the rank of general had very few opportunities to approach the dictator and thus to assassinate him. Before any meeting, moreover, one had to remove one’s belt and one’s sidearm. Thus, Tresckow thought that it would be much easier to eliminate Hitler when he came to visit the Russian front than to seek him out in his impregnable headquarters called the Wolf’s Lair
(Wolfsschanze)
. But Army Group Center was only one of the three army groups on the eastern front. Moreover, the Führer had a temporary headquarters on the Russian front and hardly moved around among the troops at all. Tresckownonetheless succeeded in drawing Hitler into a trap. Through Schmundt, he let it be known that Kluge was violently opposed to launching Operation Citadel, the attack on the Kursk salient. To allay the marshal’s annoyance, Hitler had to visit the front and restore confidence, if not harmony. The ploy produced its intended effect: the Führer was asked to cajole the marshal, and he was tempted by the amusing prospect of manipulating and converting his detractor. It remained only to set a date for the visit.
We were not sure whether to use a firearm or explosives in our attempt on the Führer’s life. The choice of a bomb would limit the opportunities to act, besides causing more casualties beyond Hitler’s immediate entourage, including the conspirators themselves. Thus we decided on a pistol—without, however, excluding the possibility of explosives as a fail-safe. The method we adopted did not, for all that, guarantee success. Through Schmundt, Tresckow had learned that the dictator wore a thin bulletproof vest under his uniform. In addition, Baron Gersdorff had observed that the Führer’s cap was lined with metal. In short, the assassin would have to aim carefully at some chink in the armor. But we were not well-informed enough to be sure that most shots would kill him. And so we concluded that it would be necessary to shoot him
Absorbed by his incessant activity, Georg almost forgot to eat and drink; a few eggs, a quart of coffee, or a cup of mocha seemed to be enough for him. He slept only five hours a night. He didn’t even have time to ride his own five horses every day; he had entrusted their dressage to Fritz Thiedemann. The only relaxation he allowed himself was to go hunting at dawn, often alone with his dog. Sometimes ranging over the steppe or the forests, sometimes going deep into the marshes, he rediscovered the joys of his youth, hiding in the bushes watching for game. With a rabbit or a fox in his game bag, he came back a few hours later, just as the camp was waking up. His mind cleared, he gave his orders and the day began.
According to Tresckow’s instructions, the cavalry group was supposed to have 28 officers, 160 NCOs, 920 troopers, and a few more than 1,000 horses. By the end of February, 350 Cossacks had joined the group; their integration was handled by Captain Fritz-Dietlof von der Schulenburg. The cavalry group, called the Boeselager Reiterverband, was then composed of four cavalry squadrons, a mortar battery, an intelligence detachment, and an artillery squadron. On April 6, the group was transformed into a genuine regiment composed of two battalions. The first was commanded by Captain Walther Schmidt-Salzmann. I took command of the second.
14
The Three Failed Attempts
MARCH 1943
Only a handful of officers were permitted to be in close proximity to the Führer. Among them were his personal aide-de-camp, Rudolf Schmundt, a classmate of Tresckow’s, and, of course, the marshals. But an officer below the rank of general had very few opportunities to approach the dictator and thus to assassinate him. Before any meeting, moreover, one had to remove one’s belt and one’s sidearm. Thus, Tresckow thought that it would be much easier to eliminate Hitler when he came to visit the Russian front than to seek him out in his impregnable headquarters called the Wolf’s Lair
(Wolfsschanze)
. But Army Group Center was only one of the three army groups on the eastern front. Moreover, the Führer had a temporary headquarters on the Russian front and hardly moved around among the troops at all. Tresckownonetheless succeeded in drawing Hitler into a trap. Through Schmundt, he let it be known that Kluge was violently opposed to launching Operation Citadel, the attack on the Kursk salient. To allay the marshal’s annoyance, Hitler had to visit the front and restore confidence, if not harmony. The ploy produced its intended effect: the Führer was asked to cajole the marshal, and he was tempted by the amusing prospect of manipulating and converting his detractor. It remained only to set a date for the visit.
We were not sure whether to use a firearm or explosives in our attempt on the Führer’s life. The choice of a bomb would limit the opportunities to act, besides causing more casualties beyond Hitler’s immediate entourage, including the conspirators themselves. Thus we decided on a pistol—without, however, excluding the possibility of explosives as a fail-safe. The method we adopted did not, for all that, guarantee success. Through Schmundt, Tresckow had learned that the dictator wore a thin bulletproof vest under his uniform. In addition, Baron Gersdorff had observed that the Führer’s cap was lined with metal. In short, the assassin would have to aim carefully at some chink in the armor. But we were not well-informed enough to be sure that most shots would kill him. And so we concluded that it would be necessary to shoot him
Similar Books
