it would be sufficient to carry on 2–4 on-site inspections each year on the territory of the Soviet Union.” (Khrushchev to Kennedy, December 19, 1962, in
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
, volume VI,
Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges
[Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996], Document 85).
Chapter 7
.
CONFIRMING THE TREATY
JOHN F . KENNEDY WAS aware that negotiating and signing the treaty was just half the battle. The ratification by two-thirds of the U.S. Senate was the other half. The Senate defended its constitutional prerogatives like a hawk. On many occasions the Senate had dashed the best hopes of a president after a major treaty was signed. Kennedy would again draw on his vast powers of oratory and persuasion to seal the deal.
Woodrow Wilson’s failure with the League of Nations offered lessons for every subsequent president, and the lessons were especially relevant for Kennedy. He hailed from the same party as Wilson, and was an heir of Wilsonian idealism, the belief in international institutions and treaties as the basis for international peace. Kennedy was above all intent on avoiding Wilson’s mistakes in dealing with the public and the Senate. He was determined from the start of the peace campaign to ensure that everything agreed upon in negotiations would also be confirmed in the Senate.
Norman Cousins later recalled what Kennedy had said aboutWilson when he met with a small group of opinion leaders to strategize about the campaign to win Senate ratification:
Ever since Woodrow Wilson, he said, a President had to be cautious about bringing a treaty to the Senate unless he had a fairly good idea where the votes would come from. To get two-thirds of the Senate behind any issue was a difficult and dubious undertaking; to get it on a controversial treaty was almost in the nature of a miracle. He said that he could name fifteen senators who would probably vote against anything linked to Kennedy’s name—“and not all of them are Republicans.” 1
Speaking to the Nation
The campaign for peace was based on winning the public’s support for the treaty, and thereby pushing the Senate into agreement as well. Kennedy therefore began the campaign with a speech to the country and kept the public informed through press conferences, coverage of the Europe trip, and another major televised address on July 26, just one day after the treaty was initialed in Moscow. Beyond that, Kennedy met with national opinion leaders and actively supported the formation of the Citizens’ Committee for a Nuclear Test Ban. 2 After serving as a go-between of Kennedy and Khrushchev in the spring, Norman Cousins helped to coordinate the campaign for public support in the summer. Cousins related a meeting with Kennedy:
He reiterated the need for important business support and suggested a dozen names. He said that scientists such as James R. Killian [of MIT] and George Kistiakowsky [of Harvard] would be especially effective ifthey could be recruited. He felt that religious figures, farmers, educators, and labor leaders all had key roles to play and mentioned a half dozen or more names in each category. Then he went down the list of states in which he felt extra effort was required. 3
Kennedy played a very active role in strategizing and marshaling support from a wide cross-section of public figures. Most important, Kennedy spoke publicly, spoke compellingly, and spoke often. He used the presidential bully pulpit exquisitely.
With the treaty agreed upon in Moscow on July 25, Kennedy turned to the nation in a televised address. 4 Kennedy had mastered the medium, and used it to place himself directly in the living rooms and kitchens of families across the country. His remarks still radiate a power of intimacy and persuasion half a century later. He looked into the lens of the camera and the eyes of his countrymen.
“Good evening, my fellow citizens,” he began. “I speak to you tonight in a
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
, volume VI,
Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges
[Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996], Document 85).
Chapter 7
.
CONFIRMING THE TREATY
JOHN F . KENNEDY WAS aware that negotiating and signing the treaty was just half the battle. The ratification by two-thirds of the U.S. Senate was the other half. The Senate defended its constitutional prerogatives like a hawk. On many occasions the Senate had dashed the best hopes of a president after a major treaty was signed. Kennedy would again draw on his vast powers of oratory and persuasion to seal the deal.
Woodrow Wilson’s failure with the League of Nations offered lessons for every subsequent president, and the lessons were especially relevant for Kennedy. He hailed from the same party as Wilson, and was an heir of Wilsonian idealism, the belief in international institutions and treaties as the basis for international peace. Kennedy was above all intent on avoiding Wilson’s mistakes in dealing with the public and the Senate. He was determined from the start of the peace campaign to ensure that everything agreed upon in negotiations would also be confirmed in the Senate.
Norman Cousins later recalled what Kennedy had said aboutWilson when he met with a small group of opinion leaders to strategize about the campaign to win Senate ratification:
Ever since Woodrow Wilson, he said, a President had to be cautious about bringing a treaty to the Senate unless he had a fairly good idea where the votes would come from. To get two-thirds of the Senate behind any issue was a difficult and dubious undertaking; to get it on a controversial treaty was almost in the nature of a miracle. He said that he could name fifteen senators who would probably vote against anything linked to Kennedy’s name—“and not all of them are Republicans.” 1
Speaking to the Nation
The campaign for peace was based on winning the public’s support for the treaty, and thereby pushing the Senate into agreement as well. Kennedy therefore began the campaign with a speech to the country and kept the public informed through press conferences, coverage of the Europe trip, and another major televised address on July 26, just one day after the treaty was initialed in Moscow. Beyond that, Kennedy met with national opinion leaders and actively supported the formation of the Citizens’ Committee for a Nuclear Test Ban. 2 After serving as a go-between of Kennedy and Khrushchev in the spring, Norman Cousins helped to coordinate the campaign for public support in the summer. Cousins related a meeting with Kennedy:
He reiterated the need for important business support and suggested a dozen names. He said that scientists such as James R. Killian [of MIT] and George Kistiakowsky [of Harvard] would be especially effective ifthey could be recruited. He felt that religious figures, farmers, educators, and labor leaders all had key roles to play and mentioned a half dozen or more names in each category. Then he went down the list of states in which he felt extra effort was required. 3
Kennedy played a very active role in strategizing and marshaling support from a wide cross-section of public figures. Most important, Kennedy spoke publicly, spoke compellingly, and spoke often. He used the presidential bully pulpit exquisitely.
With the treaty agreed upon in Moscow on July 25, Kennedy turned to the nation in a televised address. 4 Kennedy had mastered the medium, and used it to place himself directly in the living rooms and kitchens of families across the country. His remarks still radiate a power of intimacy and persuasion half a century later. He looked into the lens of the camera and the eyes of his countrymen.
“Good evening, my fellow citizens,” he began. “I speak to you tonight in a
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