had been a Disneyland guide and a Haldeman aide in an advertising agency. Not to name a working reporter for the post marked a dramatic departure for a new Administration, although LBJ had done the same late in his presidency.
Herb Klein may have realized that Nixon intended to bypass him for his obvious role as Press Secretary, or he may have hoped the President had some more important job in mind for him. In any case, Klein proposed the creation of a wholly new White House post: Director of Communications, with himself as the obvious candidate. Klein’s scheme provided that theDirector of Communications would report directly to the President, attend Cabinet meetings and other White House staff gatherings, and serve as the President’s liaison to the newspapers and television networks. Klein envisioned an official in touch with network executives, anchormen, publishers, and leading columnists. Day-to-day news and briefings would be left to Ziegler. Significantly, Klein did not provide that the Director of Communications would direct Ziegler’s office; he wisely sensed that would be the domain of the President and Haldeman. For Klein, however, it was a fatal omission in terms of his authority and effectiveness. 2
The choice of Press Secretary, even the creation of a Communications Director, were somewhat immaterial. Nixon, determined as always to be the “man in charge,” often demonstrated that
he
would decide what information the White House dispensed. For example, in November 1970, he prepared an elaborate ten-page memorandum for Haldeman, dictating answers to questions submitted for a later, “intimate, spontaneous” interview. 3
In anticipation of the 1960 campaign, Nixon had told his staff that the only way to change the media was “not to cooperate with them.” Ten years later his aides prepared memoranda listing various reporters “who should receive special treatment.” On March 2, 1970, Nixon dispatched to Haldeman a flurry of directives relating to the press. In one, he called for “an all-out, slam-bang attack on the fact that the news people are overwhelmingly for Muskie, Kennedy, any liberal position.… I want a game plan on my desk.” The same day he told Haldeman to arrange a private session with
Time
magazine correspondent Hugh Sidey. “Leave the time open so that I can talk to him as long as I feel it is worthwhile.” Two years later, however, Nixon wanted Sidey “cut off in as effective a way as possible.” The President directed his staff to treat the media with “the courteous, cool contempt which has been my policy over the last few years.” Yet he took the trouble to write to another reporter, “I always will appreciate your objective coverage of my activities over the years,” and at Nixon’s direction, Haldeman privately pressed Time-Life executives to restrain their writers from going “beyond … normal objective criticism.” 4
Thus the President’s mood toward the news media vacillated, usually in response to momentary externals. He perceived the media as a mixed bag of friendlies and unfriendlies. They were like any other interest group—to be courted and wooed as occasion dictated and to be fought when necessary.
The problem of Nixon’s relations with the media, as the President often saw it, was not his, but theirs. He was delighted when Henry Kissinger turned the tables on James Reston’s question as to why Nixon did not get along better with the press. Kissinger suggested to Reston that maybe the fault lay with the press. Nixon directed Haldeman to get a friendly columnist to explore the theme. Shortly afterward, however, the
New York Times
published the Pentagon Papers, and Nixon was in a frenzy. He told Haldemanthat “under absolutely no circumstances” was anyone in the White House to give an interview or respond to any queries from the
Times
—“unless I give express permission (and I do not expect to give such permission in the foreseeable
Herb Klein may have realized that Nixon intended to bypass him for his obvious role as Press Secretary, or he may have hoped the President had some more important job in mind for him. In any case, Klein proposed the creation of a wholly new White House post: Director of Communications, with himself as the obvious candidate. Klein’s scheme provided that theDirector of Communications would report directly to the President, attend Cabinet meetings and other White House staff gatherings, and serve as the President’s liaison to the newspapers and television networks. Klein envisioned an official in touch with network executives, anchormen, publishers, and leading columnists. Day-to-day news and briefings would be left to Ziegler. Significantly, Klein did not provide that the Director of Communications would direct Ziegler’s office; he wisely sensed that would be the domain of the President and Haldeman. For Klein, however, it was a fatal omission in terms of his authority and effectiveness. 2
The choice of Press Secretary, even the creation of a Communications Director, were somewhat immaterial. Nixon, determined as always to be the “man in charge,” often demonstrated that
he
would decide what information the White House dispensed. For example, in November 1970, he prepared an elaborate ten-page memorandum for Haldeman, dictating answers to questions submitted for a later, “intimate, spontaneous” interview. 3
In anticipation of the 1960 campaign, Nixon had told his staff that the only way to change the media was “not to cooperate with them.” Ten years later his aides prepared memoranda listing various reporters “who should receive special treatment.” On March 2, 1970, Nixon dispatched to Haldeman a flurry of directives relating to the press. In one, he called for “an all-out, slam-bang attack on the fact that the news people are overwhelmingly for Muskie, Kennedy, any liberal position.… I want a game plan on my desk.” The same day he told Haldeman to arrange a private session with
Time
magazine correspondent Hugh Sidey. “Leave the time open so that I can talk to him as long as I feel it is worthwhile.” Two years later, however, Nixon wanted Sidey “cut off in as effective a way as possible.” The President directed his staff to treat the media with “the courteous, cool contempt which has been my policy over the last few years.” Yet he took the trouble to write to another reporter, “I always will appreciate your objective coverage of my activities over the years,” and at Nixon’s direction, Haldeman privately pressed Time-Life executives to restrain their writers from going “beyond … normal objective criticism.” 4
Thus the President’s mood toward the news media vacillated, usually in response to momentary externals. He perceived the media as a mixed bag of friendlies and unfriendlies. They were like any other interest group—to be courted and wooed as occasion dictated and to be fought when necessary.
The problem of Nixon’s relations with the media, as the President often saw it, was not his, but theirs. He was delighted when Henry Kissinger turned the tables on James Reston’s question as to why Nixon did not get along better with the press. Kissinger suggested to Reston that maybe the fault lay with the press. Nixon directed Haldeman to get a friendly columnist to explore the theme. Shortly afterward, however, the
New York Times
published the Pentagon Papers, and Nixon was in a frenzy. He told Haldemanthat “under absolutely no circumstances” was anyone in the White House to give an interview or respond to any queries from the
Times
—“unless I give express permission (and I do not expect to give such permission in the foreseeable
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