James Burke wrote, “It is well to remember that two unused bottles of poisoned Tylenol [the seventh and eighth bottles] were recovered as a result of the withdrawal, so lives may have been saved.” According to officials, those two bottles, which were turned in by Chicago area residents, plus one unsold bottle recovered from an Osco Drug store, were the only bottles of cyanide-laced Tylenol capsules discovered during the inspection process.
J&J executives and government officials went out of their way to ensure that they did not find bottles of cyanide-laced Tylenol capsules. J&J brought in 30 toxicologists to test Tylenol capsules at the company’s temporary lab in Lemont. The testing procedure consisted of dropping a cyanide-detecting strip of litmus paper into each bottle and then checking the litmus paper a few minutes later to see if it had turned blue. If each J&J toxicologist inspected two bottles per minute and worked twelve hours per day, then each could have tested 1,440 bottles per day. At this rate, J&J’s 30 toxicologists working at the Lemont plant could have logically tested 43,220 bottles per day, and 302,400 bottles per week. In the entire inspection period, however, they tested only about 2,857 to 3,800 bottles of Extra Strength Tylenol capsules.
Authorities also could have used the imaging machine produced by Lixi Inc., in Downers Grove, Illinois, to inspect the Tylenol capsules rapidly. The Lixi device, a low-intensity fluoroscope, could detect as little as 20 milligrams of “foreign matter” in a 500-milligram Tylenol capsule without removing the capsules from the bottles or boxes. Joseph E. Pascente , the president of Lixi , later said that his fluoroscope was used by Bristol-Myers in October 1982 to screen for tainted Excedrin after a man in Denver swallowed an Excedrin capsule that had been filled with mercuric chloride. Authorities in Seattle also used this device to inspect bottles of Excedrin and Anacin capsules after tampering incidents in June 1986 involving those products. Pascente offered the Lixi device to Illinois authorities to search out the cyanide-laced Tylenol capsules after the Chicago area poisonings, but he said “nobody listened.”
12
________
Selling the Myth
In J&J’s 1982 Annual Report, James Burke commented on the cooperation among officials during the Tylenol crisis. “The public was served well because of the extraordinary cooperation that occurred among all the responsible elements of society,” said Burke. “The regulatory agencies, the wholesale and retail parts of the distribution system; the various medical professionals, the local federal and state law enforcement agencies … all worked together with the media to alert the public to the danger and to protect them in the process.”
The cooperation between J&J, the FBI, and the FDA was, according to Burke, “A demonstration without parallel of government and business working with the news media to help protect the public.”
The victims’ families, however, did not benefit from this cooperative effort. They have never had access to pertinent information or documents related to the Tylenol murders investigation. Johnson & Johnson, on the other hand, had access to anything it wanted. The company’s executives talked daily with officials at the crime scene and at both FBI and FDA headquarters.
“ Bob Andrews [assistant director of public relations at J&J] spent maybe three to five weeks at the scene in Chicago, following the story day to day,” said Larry Foster. “He knew the reporters that were covering [the story]. He knew the FBI and the other authorities who were working on the solution, and his information - the feedback - was invaluable,” Foster said.
Johnson & Johnson hired the powerful public relations firm Burson-Marsteller to help shape public perception about its handling of the tampering incident. The firm’s chairman, Harold Burson, later praised Burke’s handling of
J&J executives and government officials went out of their way to ensure that they did not find bottles of cyanide-laced Tylenol capsules. J&J brought in 30 toxicologists to test Tylenol capsules at the company’s temporary lab in Lemont. The testing procedure consisted of dropping a cyanide-detecting strip of litmus paper into each bottle and then checking the litmus paper a few minutes later to see if it had turned blue. If each J&J toxicologist inspected two bottles per minute and worked twelve hours per day, then each could have tested 1,440 bottles per day. At this rate, J&J’s 30 toxicologists working at the Lemont plant could have logically tested 43,220 bottles per day, and 302,400 bottles per week. In the entire inspection period, however, they tested only about 2,857 to 3,800 bottles of Extra Strength Tylenol capsules.
Authorities also could have used the imaging machine produced by Lixi Inc., in Downers Grove, Illinois, to inspect the Tylenol capsules rapidly. The Lixi device, a low-intensity fluoroscope, could detect as little as 20 milligrams of “foreign matter” in a 500-milligram Tylenol capsule without removing the capsules from the bottles or boxes. Joseph E. Pascente , the president of Lixi , later said that his fluoroscope was used by Bristol-Myers in October 1982 to screen for tainted Excedrin after a man in Denver swallowed an Excedrin capsule that had been filled with mercuric chloride. Authorities in Seattle also used this device to inspect bottles of Excedrin and Anacin capsules after tampering incidents in June 1986 involving those products. Pascente offered the Lixi device to Illinois authorities to search out the cyanide-laced Tylenol capsules after the Chicago area poisonings, but he said “nobody listened.”
12
________
Selling the Myth
In J&J’s 1982 Annual Report, James Burke commented on the cooperation among officials during the Tylenol crisis. “The public was served well because of the extraordinary cooperation that occurred among all the responsible elements of society,” said Burke. “The regulatory agencies, the wholesale and retail parts of the distribution system; the various medical professionals, the local federal and state law enforcement agencies … all worked together with the media to alert the public to the danger and to protect them in the process.”
The cooperation between J&J, the FBI, and the FDA was, according to Burke, “A demonstration without parallel of government and business working with the news media to help protect the public.”
The victims’ families, however, did not benefit from this cooperative effort. They have never had access to pertinent information or documents related to the Tylenol murders investigation. Johnson & Johnson, on the other hand, had access to anything it wanted. The company’s executives talked daily with officials at the crime scene and at both FBI and FDA headquarters.
“ Bob Andrews [assistant director of public relations at J&J] spent maybe three to five weeks at the scene in Chicago, following the story day to day,” said Larry Foster. “He knew the reporters that were covering [the story]. He knew the FBI and the other authorities who were working on the solution, and his information - the feedback - was invaluable,” Foster said.
Johnson & Johnson hired the powerful public relations firm Burson-Marsteller to help shape public perception about its handling of the tampering incident. The firm’s chairman, Harold Burson, later praised Burke’s handling of
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