selection cares about. The third argument Pinker derides by stating that the Bible “is a manual for rapeand genocide and destruction.” The good book, he says, “contrary to what a majority of Americans apparently believe, is far from a source of higher moral values. Religions have given us stonings, witch burnings, crusades, inquisitions, jihads, fatwas, suicide bombings, gay bashers, abortion-clinic gunmen, and mothers who drown their sons so they can happily be united in heaven.” 66
But excesses in suppressing the schisms with which established religions are regularly challenged do not alter the fact that religion is nevertheless a source of moral values. Almost all religions encode some form of the golden rule, that of “do as you would be done by,” as well as other moral restraints, and these will be adaptive if they enhance the social fabric.
In countering the second argument, that religion could be adaptive because it fosters group cohesion, Pinker concedes that “religion certainly does bring a community together,” but says this could be achieved by other means. He asks, “Why, if there is a subgoal in evolution to have people stand together to face off common enemies, would a belief in spirits or a belief that ritual could change the future be necessary to cement a community together? Why not just emotions like trust and loyalty and friendship and solidarity? There’s no a priori reason you would expect that abelief in a soul or a ritual would be a solution to the problem of how you get a bunch of organisms to cooperate.”
But however strange religious behavior may seem, this is the means that evolution has found effective. For much of history, emotions like trust and loyalty have generally grown out of a shared religion. And belief in punitive gods, as discussed above, is highly effective at getting people to cooperate for the good of society. There is every reason to suppose the cohesion thus attained would be highly adaptive in the struggle for survival against competing societies.
If religious behavior is not adaptive, as Pinker argues is the case, how did it get to be universal? The explanation he offers is that religion flourishes because it is good for priests, however bad it may be for people. This may be true but stumbles on the fact that religion became universal long before priests existed. Hunter gatherer societies, as noted above, were egalitarian. They had religion but no religious officials, with the possible exception of shamans in certain tribes. Their rituals were communal, with everyone on an equal footing.
Pinker suggests that a trait or behavior should meet three tests before being considered adaptive. The first is that it should be shown to be innate, for example by being universal in its species and developing reliably across a range of environments. Speaking, for instance, meets this criterion but reading does not, since children learn to read only when taught to do so. Religious behavior too would seem to meet the criterion quite well, given that religion is universal and the propensity to learn it appears reliably in every culture around the age of adolescence. Children may be exposed to religion starting from much younger ages but it is rites around the age of puberty that induce an emotional commitment to supernatural beliefs.
Pinker’s second criterion is that the trait should have improved survival in the past, such as during hunter gatherer days. Religious behavior meets this criterion too. It strengthened social cohesion, and thereby a society’s moral fabric and military strength. It evidently enhanced survival so efficiently that societies which failed to inherit the behavior all perished, leaving religious behavior a universal trait of all the survivors.
The third criterion is that the trait should have engineering functionality—it should be something evolution has worked hard to perfect, like the design of the human eye or ear, even if by methods very
But excesses in suppressing the schisms with which established religions are regularly challenged do not alter the fact that religion is nevertheless a source of moral values. Almost all religions encode some form of the golden rule, that of “do as you would be done by,” as well as other moral restraints, and these will be adaptive if they enhance the social fabric.
In countering the second argument, that religion could be adaptive because it fosters group cohesion, Pinker concedes that “religion certainly does bring a community together,” but says this could be achieved by other means. He asks, “Why, if there is a subgoal in evolution to have people stand together to face off common enemies, would a belief in spirits or a belief that ritual could change the future be necessary to cement a community together? Why not just emotions like trust and loyalty and friendship and solidarity? There’s no a priori reason you would expect that abelief in a soul or a ritual would be a solution to the problem of how you get a bunch of organisms to cooperate.”
But however strange religious behavior may seem, this is the means that evolution has found effective. For much of history, emotions like trust and loyalty have generally grown out of a shared religion. And belief in punitive gods, as discussed above, is highly effective at getting people to cooperate for the good of society. There is every reason to suppose the cohesion thus attained would be highly adaptive in the struggle for survival against competing societies.
If religious behavior is not adaptive, as Pinker argues is the case, how did it get to be universal? The explanation he offers is that religion flourishes because it is good for priests, however bad it may be for people. This may be true but stumbles on the fact that religion became universal long before priests existed. Hunter gatherer societies, as noted above, were egalitarian. They had religion but no religious officials, with the possible exception of shamans in certain tribes. Their rituals were communal, with everyone on an equal footing.
Pinker suggests that a trait or behavior should meet three tests before being considered adaptive. The first is that it should be shown to be innate, for example by being universal in its species and developing reliably across a range of environments. Speaking, for instance, meets this criterion but reading does not, since children learn to read only when taught to do so. Religious behavior too would seem to meet the criterion quite well, given that religion is universal and the propensity to learn it appears reliably in every culture around the age of adolescence. Children may be exposed to religion starting from much younger ages but it is rites around the age of puberty that induce an emotional commitment to supernatural beliefs.
Pinker’s second criterion is that the trait should have improved survival in the past, such as during hunter gatherer days. Religious behavior meets this criterion too. It strengthened social cohesion, and thereby a society’s moral fabric and military strength. It evidently enhanced survival so efficiently that societies which failed to inherit the behavior all perished, leaving religious behavior a universal trait of all the survivors.
The third criterion is that the trait should have engineering functionality—it should be something evolution has worked hard to perfect, like the design of the human eye or ear, even if by methods very
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