in Soweto than Winnie Mandela, and we had helped to get her son, Zwelakhe, released from detention.
The Prime Minister met her in Downing Street on 12 July. The UDF activist Azhar Cachalia, who was accompanying Albertina, felt that Thatcher lectured, while President Bush, whom they had met in Washington, listened. Albertina was struck by Thatcherâs confidence that, after the elections, her husband and Mandela would be released. (Great admirer as I am of George Bush senior, he did not make anything like as strenuous an effort as Thatcher did to bombard the South African government with demands for reform and the release of Mandela. At this time, he and Secretary of State James Baker were preoccupied with the looming collapse of the Soviet Union and, later, the reunification of Germany. South Africa did not figure in GeorgeBushâs principal memoir of his time in the White House and barely registers in those of Baker. 18 )
August 1989
It did not take much longer for matters to come to a head with PW Botha. He reacted furiously to an announcement that De Klerk would be meeting President Kaunda in Lusaka, about which he claimed publicly that he had not been consulted, though he had in fact been informed. De Klerk and the cabinet had had enough. In a meeting with President Botha on 14 August, they asked him to retire gracefully, which he declined to do, berating his colleagues instead, displaying in De Klerkâs words his âirascible and cantankerous natureâ. 19 They thereupon insisted unanimously on his immediate resignation. The Prime Minister congratulated De Klerk on taking over as President.
September 1989
In the elections, the National Party won ninety-three of the seats, giving them a clear majority in parliament, but lost ground to the Conservative Party, which won thirty-nine seats and around 40 per cent of the Afrikaner votes. The Democratic Party, successor to the Progressive Federal Party, won thirty-three seats.
The election had otherwise been peaceful, but on election day, 6 September, a number of coloured youths were killed in clashes with the police in the Cape townships. Two days later, Archbishop Tutu called for a protest march in Cape Town, on 13 September. Tutu asked me to meet him at Bishopscourt, where he gave me a message for the Prime Minister, urging her to help get the march permitted. AllanBoesak was also present, sounding as usual more militant than Tutu. From Bishopscourt, I went to see Van Heerden and Pik Botha, who needed no convincing that the march should be authorised; if it were banned, De Klerkâs presidency would get off to the worst possible start. But the security chiefs, as usual, were opposed.
Next morning, as I continued my lobbying of the South African government, Johan Heyns walked into my office, accompanied by several other leaders of the Dutch Reformed Church. They had flown down from Pretoria and had heard that we were trying to get the demonstration permitted.
They went off to see De Klerk, determined that he should not start his presidency on the same footing as PW Botha. Overruling the police chiefs, De Klerk agreed to authorise the demonstration. I was asked to help get assurances from the church leaders that, if the police stayed on the sidelines, they would help to guarantee that the demonstration was peaceful. When it took place, we held our breath as a huge crowd assembled. The church and UDF leaders managed effectively to marshal the demonstration, which passed off peacefully. 20
The Peace March, as it was called, was one of the largest public demonstrations ever in the Cape. It was a turning point in South Africaâs history, as De Klerk proceeded to authorise demonstrations in the other major cities. In his first decision as President, he had banned use by the police of the
sjambok
â the hide whips the South African police had employed for decades as one of their favourite methods of crowd control.
In response to Desmond Tutuâs
The Prime Minister met her in Downing Street on 12 July. The UDF activist Azhar Cachalia, who was accompanying Albertina, felt that Thatcher lectured, while President Bush, whom they had met in Washington, listened. Albertina was struck by Thatcherâs confidence that, after the elections, her husband and Mandela would be released. (Great admirer as I am of George Bush senior, he did not make anything like as strenuous an effort as Thatcher did to bombard the South African government with demands for reform and the release of Mandela. At this time, he and Secretary of State James Baker were preoccupied with the looming collapse of the Soviet Union and, later, the reunification of Germany. South Africa did not figure in GeorgeBushâs principal memoir of his time in the White House and barely registers in those of Baker. 18 )
August 1989
It did not take much longer for matters to come to a head with PW Botha. He reacted furiously to an announcement that De Klerk would be meeting President Kaunda in Lusaka, about which he claimed publicly that he had not been consulted, though he had in fact been informed. De Klerk and the cabinet had had enough. In a meeting with President Botha on 14 August, they asked him to retire gracefully, which he declined to do, berating his colleagues instead, displaying in De Klerkâs words his âirascible and cantankerous natureâ. 19 They thereupon insisted unanimously on his immediate resignation. The Prime Minister congratulated De Klerk on taking over as President.
September 1989
In the elections, the National Party won ninety-three of the seats, giving them a clear majority in parliament, but lost ground to the Conservative Party, which won thirty-nine seats and around 40 per cent of the Afrikaner votes. The Democratic Party, successor to the Progressive Federal Party, won thirty-three seats.
The election had otherwise been peaceful, but on election day, 6 September, a number of coloured youths were killed in clashes with the police in the Cape townships. Two days later, Archbishop Tutu called for a protest march in Cape Town, on 13 September. Tutu asked me to meet him at Bishopscourt, where he gave me a message for the Prime Minister, urging her to help get the march permitted. AllanBoesak was also present, sounding as usual more militant than Tutu. From Bishopscourt, I went to see Van Heerden and Pik Botha, who needed no convincing that the march should be authorised; if it were banned, De Klerkâs presidency would get off to the worst possible start. But the security chiefs, as usual, were opposed.
Next morning, as I continued my lobbying of the South African government, Johan Heyns walked into my office, accompanied by several other leaders of the Dutch Reformed Church. They had flown down from Pretoria and had heard that we were trying to get the demonstration permitted.
They went off to see De Klerk, determined that he should not start his presidency on the same footing as PW Botha. Overruling the police chiefs, De Klerk agreed to authorise the demonstration. I was asked to help get assurances from the church leaders that, if the police stayed on the sidelines, they would help to guarantee that the demonstration was peaceful. When it took place, we held our breath as a huge crowd assembled. The church and UDF leaders managed effectively to marshal the demonstration, which passed off peacefully. 20
The Peace March, as it was called, was one of the largest public demonstrations ever in the Cape. It was a turning point in South Africaâs history, as De Klerk proceeded to authorise demonstrations in the other major cities. In his first decision as President, he had banned use by the police of the
sjambok
â the hide whips the South African police had employed for decades as one of their favourite methods of crowd control.
In response to Desmond Tutuâs
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