Richmond,
pp. 44–47; Paul P. Van Riper and Harry N. Schreiber, “The Confederate Civil
Service,” Journal of Southern History,
XXV (1959), 450–451; Harrison A. Trexler, “Jefferson Davis and the Confederate Patronage,”
South Atlantic Quarterly,
XXVIII (1929), 45–58; Mary Boykin Chesnut,
A Diary from Dixie,
ed. by Ben Ames Williams (Boston, 1949), p. 68.
10 Thomas, Confederate Richmond, pp. 36–39; Bell I. Wiley, The Life of Johnny Reb: The Common Soldier of the Confederacy (New York, 1943), pp. 15–27; Chesnut, Diary, p. 75.
11 See Walker to Letcher, June 29, 1861,
War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies,
70 vols, in 127 (Washington, D.C., 1880–1901), series IV, 411–412 for Davis’ policy of accepting no more troops for periods of less than three years or “for the war.”
12 See Emory M. Thomas, The Confederacy as a Revolutionary Experience (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1971), pp. 43–57; Frank E. Vandiver, Their Tattered Flags: The Epic of the Confederacy (New York, 1970), pp. 120–121; and Rüssel F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United Stales Military Strategy and Policy (New York, 1973), pp. 96–97.
13 See Frank E. Vandiver,
Rebel Brass: The Confederate Command System
(Baton Rouge, La., 1956), pp. 3–8.
14
Ibid.
, pp. 16–17.
15 T. Harry Williams,
Americans at War: The Development of the American Military System
(Baton Rouge, La., 1960), pp. 54–55, catalogs the reasons for defense, but wonders, as have others, whether an early offensive would not have been successful and decisive.
16 For assessments ofjomini’s influence see T. Harry Williams “The Military Leadership of North and South,” in David Donald (ed.),
Why the North Won the Civil War
(Baton Rouge, La., 1960); Archer Jones, “Jomini and the Strategy of the American Civil War, a Reinterpretation,”
Military Affairs,
XXXIV (1970), 127–131; and Thomas Lawrence Connelly and Archer Jones,
The Politics of Command: Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy
(Baton Rouge, La., 1973), pp. 3–30. On the importance of railroads see Robert C. Black,
The Railroads of the Confederacy
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1952).
17 Davis used the term “offensive-defensive"; see Hudson Strode,
Jefferson Davis,
3 vols. (New York, 1955–1964) I, 134. Perhaps the more correct term is “annihilation” (Weigley,
American Way of War,
p. 127).
18 Vandiver is only slightly hyperbolic when he remarks about Confederate “geographical determinism” that “wedded irrevocably to the ground, they buried themselves in it.”
(Rebel Brass,
p. 17); see also Vandiver,
Flags,
pp. 58–61.
19 Weigley, American Way of War, pp. 92-127; William L. Barney, Flawed l’ictory: A New Perspective on the Civil War (New York, 1975), pp. 7-9; Albert Manucy, Artillery Through the Ages (Washington, D.C., 1949), pp. 17-20.
20 For explanations and critiques of the departmental system see especially Williams,
American at War,
pp. 62–64; and Connelly and Jones,
Politics of Command,
pp. 87–136. The following list of departments and geographically designated field armies (having essentially the same function as departments) from September 1861, is indicative of the Confederate command structure during the first two years of the war.
21 One of the clearest and best summaries of military operations is Vincent J. Esposito (ed.),
The West Point Atlas of American Wars,
2 vols. (New York, 1959); for the Bull Run (Manassas) campaign see I, maps 18–24. The standard camapaign study, R. M.Johnston,
Bull Run: Its Strategy and Tactics
(Boston, 1913), has been supplanted by William C. Davis,
Battle at Bull Run: A History of the First Major Campaign of the Civil War
(Garden City, N.Y., 1977). Also helpful are T. Harry Williams,
P. G. T. Beauregard: Napoleon in Gray
(Baton Rouge, La., 1955), pp. 66–80; and Douglas S. Freeman,
Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command,
3 vols. (New York, 1942–1944), I, 38–80.
22
pp. 44–47; Paul P. Van Riper and Harry N. Schreiber, “The Confederate Civil
Service,” Journal of Southern History,
XXV (1959), 450–451; Harrison A. Trexler, “Jefferson Davis and the Confederate Patronage,”
South Atlantic Quarterly,
XXVIII (1929), 45–58; Mary Boykin Chesnut,
A Diary from Dixie,
ed. by Ben Ames Williams (Boston, 1949), p. 68.
10 Thomas, Confederate Richmond, pp. 36–39; Bell I. Wiley, The Life of Johnny Reb: The Common Soldier of the Confederacy (New York, 1943), pp. 15–27; Chesnut, Diary, p. 75.
11 See Walker to Letcher, June 29, 1861,
War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies,
70 vols, in 127 (Washington, D.C., 1880–1901), series IV, 411–412 for Davis’ policy of accepting no more troops for periods of less than three years or “for the war.”
12 See Emory M. Thomas, The Confederacy as a Revolutionary Experience (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1971), pp. 43–57; Frank E. Vandiver, Their Tattered Flags: The Epic of the Confederacy (New York, 1970), pp. 120–121; and Rüssel F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United Stales Military Strategy and Policy (New York, 1973), pp. 96–97.
13 See Frank E. Vandiver,
Rebel Brass: The Confederate Command System
(Baton Rouge, La., 1956), pp. 3–8.
14
Ibid.
, pp. 16–17.
15 T. Harry Williams,
Americans at War: The Development of the American Military System
(Baton Rouge, La., 1960), pp. 54–55, catalogs the reasons for defense, but wonders, as have others, whether an early offensive would not have been successful and decisive.
16 For assessments ofjomini’s influence see T. Harry Williams “The Military Leadership of North and South,” in David Donald (ed.),
Why the North Won the Civil War
(Baton Rouge, La., 1960); Archer Jones, “Jomini and the Strategy of the American Civil War, a Reinterpretation,”
Military Affairs,
XXXIV (1970), 127–131; and Thomas Lawrence Connelly and Archer Jones,
The Politics of Command: Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy
(Baton Rouge, La., 1973), pp. 3–30. On the importance of railroads see Robert C. Black,
The Railroads of the Confederacy
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1952).
17 Davis used the term “offensive-defensive"; see Hudson Strode,
Jefferson Davis,
3 vols. (New York, 1955–1964) I, 134. Perhaps the more correct term is “annihilation” (Weigley,
American Way of War,
p. 127).
18 Vandiver is only slightly hyperbolic when he remarks about Confederate “geographical determinism” that “wedded irrevocably to the ground, they buried themselves in it.”
(Rebel Brass,
p. 17); see also Vandiver,
Flags,
pp. 58–61.
19 Weigley, American Way of War, pp. 92-127; William L. Barney, Flawed l’ictory: A New Perspective on the Civil War (New York, 1975), pp. 7-9; Albert Manucy, Artillery Through the Ages (Washington, D.C., 1949), pp. 17-20.
20 For explanations and critiques of the departmental system see especially Williams,
American at War,
pp. 62–64; and Connelly and Jones,
Politics of Command,
pp. 87–136. The following list of departments and geographically designated field armies (having essentially the same function as departments) from September 1861, is indicative of the Confederate command structure during the first two years of the war.
21 One of the clearest and best summaries of military operations is Vincent J. Esposito (ed.),
The West Point Atlas of American Wars,
2 vols. (New York, 1959); for the Bull Run (Manassas) campaign see I, maps 18–24. The standard camapaign study, R. M.Johnston,
Bull Run: Its Strategy and Tactics
(Boston, 1913), has been supplanted by William C. Davis,
Battle at Bull Run: A History of the First Major Campaign of the Civil War
(Garden City, N.Y., 1977). Also helpful are T. Harry Williams,
P. G. T. Beauregard: Napoleon in Gray
(Baton Rouge, La., 1955), pp. 66–80; and Douglas S. Freeman,
Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command,
3 vols. (New York, 1942–1944), I, 38–80.
22
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