it was much bigger than it actually was, and they reacted very rapidly, with devasting force. We were in diapers, with lots of problems, and never really had the opportunity to do what we set out to do,” said René Valenzuela, a Chilean who was one of the JCR’s chief operatives in Europe.
Those dismal reflections are hindsight. From the point of view of late 1973, the JCR was a burst of earnest energy and revolutionary optimism. “We imagined a sort of an embryonic Vietnam in all of Latin America,” said Luis Mattini. “We were going to take the idea of the JCR to Brazil, Peru, Mexico, Caracas. We thought the revolution was about to start in all of Latin America.”
Although the JCR agreement already existed before the Chilean coup, the meeting in Buenos Aires was the beginning of concrete action. There was much to be done. As described by participants, the meeting produced a strategy and an ambitious agenda to be accomplished in the coming months.
The immediate priority was support of MIR in Chile. The groups urged MIR to launch a military counterattack as soon as possible. The JCR would provide material support—money and arms—to generate solidarity for Chile and propaganda against the Pinochet dictatorship.
The overall military strategy of the JCR reflected the strong militaristic views of ERP leader Roberto Santucho. Members would coordinate the timing and location of military offensives to create maximum mutual support. The ERP would go first. A band of guerrillas was trained, armed, and ready to launch guerrilla warfare in the mountains of Tucumán Province in northwestern Argentina. Bolivia’s ELN and MIR would open supporting offensives across nearby borders—Chile in the south around Neuquén and Temuco, and Bolivia in Tarija Province to the north. Tupamaros, following the directives of their leaders imprisoned in Uruguay, were to strike with a counteroffensive planned for May Day 1974. With wars breaking out almost simultaneously in four countries, it was thought, the military would face internal rebellion, be thrown on the defensive, and eventually collapse.
For the Tupamaros and the ELN, the first task was to reorganize inside their respective countries to prepare their militants for armed struggle. Both groups had been decimated by the military crackdowns of the past two years, and their networks of militants were in fearful disarray. To reconnect the cells and mobilize them for action, the groups needed to build the basic infrastructureof clandestine urban warfare: a secure communications system of couriers, codes, and “ berretines ” (camouflaged hiding places for people, arms, and messages). They needed top quality forged documents, credible front businesses to handle financial transactions and provide cover jobs, and they needed to rent or buy hundreds of secure houses and apartments for operations and living quarters.
Such grandiose goals demanded enormous amounts of money and weapons. The JCR would provide both. The ERP, already the richest of the organizations, was carrying out a series of kidnappings and proposed to dedicate most of the ransom money to JCR projects. The JCR budget was to exceed $20 million.
Acquiring and stockpiling weapons was the most difficult task. In the years before narcotics trafficking, there was no large-scale international arms market in South America, and shipping to the southern parts of South America involved enormous distances and vulnerability to military surveillance. MIR had a practical contribution it was proud to offer to the JCR: a weapons factory. A team of Chilean engineers and metal workers had meticulously copied the design of the Swedish submachine gun, the Karl Gustav, which was a standard-issue weapon to Chile’s Carabinero police. Capable of automatic fire, it used relatively easy to obtain nine-millimeter bullets in a thirty-shot magazine. The MIR technicians also had worked up the manufacturing specifications for hand grenades, a grenade
Those dismal reflections are hindsight. From the point of view of late 1973, the JCR was a burst of earnest energy and revolutionary optimism. “We imagined a sort of an embryonic Vietnam in all of Latin America,” said Luis Mattini. “We were going to take the idea of the JCR to Brazil, Peru, Mexico, Caracas. We thought the revolution was about to start in all of Latin America.”
Although the JCR agreement already existed before the Chilean coup, the meeting in Buenos Aires was the beginning of concrete action. There was much to be done. As described by participants, the meeting produced a strategy and an ambitious agenda to be accomplished in the coming months.
The immediate priority was support of MIR in Chile. The groups urged MIR to launch a military counterattack as soon as possible. The JCR would provide material support—money and arms—to generate solidarity for Chile and propaganda against the Pinochet dictatorship.
The overall military strategy of the JCR reflected the strong militaristic views of ERP leader Roberto Santucho. Members would coordinate the timing and location of military offensives to create maximum mutual support. The ERP would go first. A band of guerrillas was trained, armed, and ready to launch guerrilla warfare in the mountains of Tucumán Province in northwestern Argentina. Bolivia’s ELN and MIR would open supporting offensives across nearby borders—Chile in the south around Neuquén and Temuco, and Bolivia in Tarija Province to the north. Tupamaros, following the directives of their leaders imprisoned in Uruguay, were to strike with a counteroffensive planned for May Day 1974. With wars breaking out almost simultaneously in four countries, it was thought, the military would face internal rebellion, be thrown on the defensive, and eventually collapse.
For the Tupamaros and the ELN, the first task was to reorganize inside their respective countries to prepare their militants for armed struggle. Both groups had been decimated by the military crackdowns of the past two years, and their networks of militants were in fearful disarray. To reconnect the cells and mobilize them for action, the groups needed to build the basic infrastructureof clandestine urban warfare: a secure communications system of couriers, codes, and “ berretines ” (camouflaged hiding places for people, arms, and messages). They needed top quality forged documents, credible front businesses to handle financial transactions and provide cover jobs, and they needed to rent or buy hundreds of secure houses and apartments for operations and living quarters.
Such grandiose goals demanded enormous amounts of money and weapons. The JCR would provide both. The ERP, already the richest of the organizations, was carrying out a series of kidnappings and proposed to dedicate most of the ransom money to JCR projects. The JCR budget was to exceed $20 million.
Acquiring and stockpiling weapons was the most difficult task. In the years before narcotics trafficking, there was no large-scale international arms market in South America, and shipping to the southern parts of South America involved enormous distances and vulnerability to military surveillance. MIR had a practical contribution it was proud to offer to the JCR: a weapons factory. A team of Chilean engineers and metal workers had meticulously copied the design of the Swedish submachine gun, the Karl Gustav, which was a standard-issue weapon to Chile’s Carabinero police. Capable of automatic fire, it used relatively easy to obtain nine-millimeter bullets in a thirty-shot magazine. The MIR technicians also had worked up the manufacturing specifications for hand grenades, a grenade
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