The Billion Dollar Spy: A True Story of Cold War Espionage and Betrayal by David E. Hoffman Page B
Authors: David E. Hoffman
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again cast doubt, warning that even if Tolkachev’s initial approach the year before had been genuine, he might have been noticed by the KGB during his attempts to contact the CIA. He could be carrying out a KGB deception operation, designed to fool the Americans. The review concluded there was only a 50 percent chance that the Tolkachev operation was valid. Such a conclusion was a big red flag for the CIA leadership that made it even harder for Hathaway to proceed.
Turner, the CIA director, was briefed on May 7. Two days later, in Moscow, Guilsher called Tolkachev and told him to wait for two or three more weeks and that after that he’d be needed for about an hour on the appointed day. Tolkachev said he had no plans for vacation.
He would wait.
Then, in May 1978, headquarters began to see things in a more favorable light. One of Tolkachev’s handwritten notes was passed to the CIA’s Office of Technical Service for analysis by handwriting experts. The experts observed, “The writer is intelligent, purposeful, and generally self-confident. He is self-disciplined but not overly rigid. He has well above average intelligence and has a good organizing ability. He is observant and conscientious and pays meticulous attention to details. He is quite self-assured and may plow ahead at times in a way which is not discreet or subtle. All in all, he is a reasonable, well-adjusted individual and appears intellectually and psychologically equipped to become a useful, versatile asset.” 18
On May 17, headquarters sent a cable to the Moscow station that contained a far more positive evaluation of the Tolkachev material. The CIA’s analysts found nothing to contradict what Tolkachev had passed them so far. The evaluation concluded that “many of the details in the reports agree with data from other sources and available technical analysis” and “there do not appear to be any other data which conflict with details in the reports.” So, the cable went on, headquarters was feeling “a strong temptation” to accept the new information Tolkachev had provided, not the least because it tended to confirm their own previous speculation about Soviet fighter developments. But at the same time, doubts at headquarters lingered. The cable reported, “Since the data would have a major impact on our assessments of air defense capabilities, we are resisting, at least until bona fides are established, the temptations to accept in toto the contents of the reports.” 19
It was progress—but still not a green light for the kind of operation Hathaway wanted to carry out. He was impatient. Nearly a year and a half had already gone by since Tolkachev’s first approach at the gas station, and they still did not have a working relationship with him.
With Guilsher and others in the station, Hathaway began planning what they would give the agent in their first package. If there was to be a list of intelligence questions, how should they be phrased so they would not appear too blunt? Where to put down the package so it could easily be retrieved by Tolkachev but not discovered by the KGB? What should Tolkachev do in response?
The Moscow station planned to use a dead drop, the classic impersonal exchange. Inside the package would be instructions for preparing three letters in “secret writing” to the CIA. On one side of the letter—the “cover” side—the CIA had penned what would appear to be a letter from an excited Western tourist, in a flowery and feminine handwriting. “Dear Gramps,” it began. “Zounds! I can’t really believe it. But here I am in Russia! Thank you, thank you—a million times thank you for convincing Mikey and me to include Russia on our itinerary. It is absolutely fantastic.” But on the reverse or “secret” side, Tolkachev was told, he could use concealed writing, answering the CIA’s questions and providing more intelligence. The secret writing was imprinted by use of a specially treated carbon paper that
Turner, the CIA director, was briefed on May 7. Two days later, in Moscow, Guilsher called Tolkachev and told him to wait for two or three more weeks and that after that he’d be needed for about an hour on the appointed day. Tolkachev said he had no plans for vacation.
He would wait.
Then, in May 1978, headquarters began to see things in a more favorable light. One of Tolkachev’s handwritten notes was passed to the CIA’s Office of Technical Service for analysis by handwriting experts. The experts observed, “The writer is intelligent, purposeful, and generally self-confident. He is self-disciplined but not overly rigid. He has well above average intelligence and has a good organizing ability. He is observant and conscientious and pays meticulous attention to details. He is quite self-assured and may plow ahead at times in a way which is not discreet or subtle. All in all, he is a reasonable, well-adjusted individual and appears intellectually and psychologically equipped to become a useful, versatile asset.” 18
On May 17, headquarters sent a cable to the Moscow station that contained a far more positive evaluation of the Tolkachev material. The CIA’s analysts found nothing to contradict what Tolkachev had passed them so far. The evaluation concluded that “many of the details in the reports agree with data from other sources and available technical analysis” and “there do not appear to be any other data which conflict with details in the reports.” So, the cable went on, headquarters was feeling “a strong temptation” to accept the new information Tolkachev had provided, not the least because it tended to confirm their own previous speculation about Soviet fighter developments. But at the same time, doubts at headquarters lingered. The cable reported, “Since the data would have a major impact on our assessments of air defense capabilities, we are resisting, at least until bona fides are established, the temptations to accept in toto the contents of the reports.” 19
It was progress—but still not a green light for the kind of operation Hathaway wanted to carry out. He was impatient. Nearly a year and a half had already gone by since Tolkachev’s first approach at the gas station, and they still did not have a working relationship with him.
With Guilsher and others in the station, Hathaway began planning what they would give the agent in their first package. If there was to be a list of intelligence questions, how should they be phrased so they would not appear too blunt? Where to put down the package so it could easily be retrieved by Tolkachev but not discovered by the KGB? What should Tolkachev do in response?
The Moscow station planned to use a dead drop, the classic impersonal exchange. Inside the package would be instructions for preparing three letters in “secret writing” to the CIA. On one side of the letter—the “cover” side—the CIA had penned what would appear to be a letter from an excited Western tourist, in a flowery and feminine handwriting. “Dear Gramps,” it began. “Zounds! I can’t really believe it. But here I am in Russia! Thank you, thank you—a million times thank you for convincing Mikey and me to include Russia on our itinerary. It is absolutely fantastic.” But on the reverse or “secret” side, Tolkachev was told, he could use concealed writing, answering the CIA’s questions and providing more intelligence. The secret writing was imprinted by use of a specially treated carbon paper that
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