The Billion Dollar Spy: A True Story of Cold War Espionage and Betrayal by David E. Hoffman Page A

means to send messages back and forth to the CIA, allowing them to probe deeper into what he knew and what he might be able to give them. Inside the package, Hathaway proposed to include an operations note, known as an ops note, providing Tolkachev instructions on what to do next. Hathaway felt a personal meeting was the fastest way to get answers, and he very much wanted a personal meeting. But it was also the riskiest way. 13 More than one uncertainty hung over the plan. The station did not yet know much about their agent, what he wanted, or what he could do. 14
    In a reflective cable to headquarters, Hathaway wrote of Tolkachev,
    Obviously, his demands or preconditions will have bearing on our choices in how to handle operation. Does he wish to exchange info for money? One time or indefinitely and continuously? Is exfiltration a demand? Non-negotiable? By when? In sum, without first knowing just what he has in view, it will be difficult to make detailed or long-run plans for him. Our impression, however, is that despite his “Belenko” remark, he is thinking about passing info over a period of time, wants a camera to maximize his productivity, and is eager to establish ongoing long-term relationship. Thus, while we must be prepared to be flexible until we learn just what cksphere ’s terms are, we feel our best bet for now is to proceed with plans for straightforward ongoing communication with motivated agent whose needs can be reasonably and effectively satisfied. At the same time, we would try to learn early on what cksphere ’s needs are, and make necessary adjustments of plans to satisfy them. 15
    In the same message, Hathaway also raised the question of whether to issue a CIA miniature camera to Tolkachev at this early stage in an operation. A camera could make it easier for him to copy documents, but there were serious dangers if caught. A spy camera could easily incriminate him. “When do we give him one, and what kind do we give him?” Hathaway asked headquarters. “Obviously, the sooner we give cksphere a photo capability, and thereby the means to deliver bulk intel, the sooner we can resolve the bona fides question”—a reference to the CIA’s need for Tolkachev to prove his credentials.
    But headquarters remained reluctant. Hathaway was instructed to use “as simple an approach as possible.” For now, there would be no document camera nor a personal meeting.
    A cable from headquarters on March 24 acknowledged that the intelligence Tolkachev had provided so far “goes beyond what the Soviets would pass to us if this were a controlled case,” or a dangle. That was good news; at least Tolkachev’s information had passed the first hurdle. The CIA’s usual approach to testing the bona fides of an unknown source would be to check any new information and look for that which could be confirmed by what was already known from other sources. However, Tolkachev’s notes contained intelligence so new that it could not be verified. It might be a windfall, but it might be a trap; the question could not be easily resolved. 16
    Hathaway had no choice but to take it slowly, one step at a time. He and Guilsher put together a new plan. The main purpose would be to clear up the uncertainty about the agent’s true identity and access and secondarily to see what more he could obtain in “positive intelligence,” the agency’s jargon for the fruits of spying. Hathaway and Guilsher wrote that they hoped to set up the communications with Tolkachev “in such a way as to minimize risk to us” but at the same time “we wish to reduce risk to cksphere to the bare minimum consistent with our own protection.” They added, “Unfortunately, here we confront a tradeoff: what is safest for us may be most risky for him, and vice versa. What we are looking for, then, is optimum balance of protection to both ourselves and agent.” 17
    Still, headquarters was stubbornly doubtful. An internal review at Langley on April 13