report in October 1956 that Israel was planning to attack Egypt, Angleton told his boss that the information was not accurate. Intentionally or not, Israel’s great friend in Washington helped to maintain the smoke screen that cloaked the preparations for the Suez invasion.
Cooperation between the CIA and Shin Bet extended from the Eastern bloc to the Western Hemisphere. Nir Baruch, a Bulgarian-born Israeli operative, played his part. First, he joined the Jewish immigration agency Nativ and served as its emissary, under diplomatic cover, in Sofia, Bulgaria. Later, he would join Shin Bet, and in 1961 he was assigned—again, listed as a diplomat—to the Israeli embassy in Havana, Cuba, as deputy chief of mission.
“Manor told me that my main task would be to collect information which would be conveyed to the CIA,” he recalled half a century later. “You could say I was an authorized Israeli spy for the CIA.” Baruch revealed that he had done the same thing in Bulgaria earlier, photographing military bases; he knew that Manor was giving the photos to the United States.
Baruch arrived in Havana two weeks before the ill-fated, CIA-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion aimed at toppling Fidel Castro, “so I didn’t have enough proper time to fulfill my mission. But after the invasion, I started my secret work. I filmed missile sites. I reported about Russians who arrived on the island. I sent my reports directly to the Mossad representatives working at the Israeli embassy in Washington, DC. They handed it over to Angleton and his people. At a certain stage, the CIA supplied me with a better code machine to speed up my reports. Every few months, I would travel to Washington to meet with Angleton and his assistants. I would brief them in more detail and then return to Cuba.
“A few times, the Americans asked me to serve as a courier and meet one of their agents in Cuba, but I refused. I thought that that was too risky. One of my sources was an aide to Castro, and I convinced Angleton it would be a pity to put my relationship with the aide at risk.
“What impressed me more than anything was Angleton’s capacity for drinking. He drank and drank for hours, then would rest on the bed in the hotel room where we met, and after a few minutes he would get up fresh. Of course, I reported all this to Amos Manor.”
Manor, as a frequent eyewitness, already knew.
Angleton became truly captivated by the magic of Israeli intelligence, and in Washington he zealously insisted on being the sole handler of the account. Angleton was furious when others in the agency tried to make contact with the Israelis without his knowledge.
“Angleton had one major responsibility other than counterintelligence—Israel—which he traditionally handled in the same totally compartmented fashion as counterintelligence,” according to a later CIA director.
Israelis who worked with Angleton admitted that he had an unusual or even “kooky” personality, but they appreciated him for shattering the American wall of suspicion about Israel while paving the way for vital strategic cooperation.
In November 1987, a year after Angleton died, Israel dedicated a memorial corner to its valued American friend. Within sight of the luxurious King David Hotel, where he loved to stay during his dozens of visits to Jerusalem, an inscription on a large stone was carved in Hebrew, English, and Arabic: “In memory of a dear friend, James (Jim) Angleton.” It was unveiled at a gathering attended by present and former heads of the Israeli intelligence community.
By investing energy into improving bilateral relations with American and other Western security agencies, Israeli intelligence was also enhancing Israel’s posture as an important and unignorable ally in the Middle East. The country was young and tiny, but it could be highly useful as the West pursued its interests in the region: ensuring the flow of oil, supporting conservative regimes, and blocking the
Cooperation between the CIA and Shin Bet extended from the Eastern bloc to the Western Hemisphere. Nir Baruch, a Bulgarian-born Israeli operative, played his part. First, he joined the Jewish immigration agency Nativ and served as its emissary, under diplomatic cover, in Sofia, Bulgaria. Later, he would join Shin Bet, and in 1961 he was assigned—again, listed as a diplomat—to the Israeli embassy in Havana, Cuba, as deputy chief of mission.
“Manor told me that my main task would be to collect information which would be conveyed to the CIA,” he recalled half a century later. “You could say I was an authorized Israeli spy for the CIA.” Baruch revealed that he had done the same thing in Bulgaria earlier, photographing military bases; he knew that Manor was giving the photos to the United States.
Baruch arrived in Havana two weeks before the ill-fated, CIA-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion aimed at toppling Fidel Castro, “so I didn’t have enough proper time to fulfill my mission. But after the invasion, I started my secret work. I filmed missile sites. I reported about Russians who arrived on the island. I sent my reports directly to the Mossad representatives working at the Israeli embassy in Washington, DC. They handed it over to Angleton and his people. At a certain stage, the CIA supplied me with a better code machine to speed up my reports. Every few months, I would travel to Washington to meet with Angleton and his assistants. I would brief them in more detail and then return to Cuba.
“A few times, the Americans asked me to serve as a courier and meet one of their agents in Cuba, but I refused. I thought that that was too risky. One of my sources was an aide to Castro, and I convinced Angleton it would be a pity to put my relationship with the aide at risk.
“What impressed me more than anything was Angleton’s capacity for drinking. He drank and drank for hours, then would rest on the bed in the hotel room where we met, and after a few minutes he would get up fresh. Of course, I reported all this to Amos Manor.”
Manor, as a frequent eyewitness, already knew.
Angleton became truly captivated by the magic of Israeli intelligence, and in Washington he zealously insisted on being the sole handler of the account. Angleton was furious when others in the agency tried to make contact with the Israelis without his knowledge.
“Angleton had one major responsibility other than counterintelligence—Israel—which he traditionally handled in the same totally compartmented fashion as counterintelligence,” according to a later CIA director.
Israelis who worked with Angleton admitted that he had an unusual or even “kooky” personality, but they appreciated him for shattering the American wall of suspicion about Israel while paving the way for vital strategic cooperation.
In November 1987, a year after Angleton died, Israel dedicated a memorial corner to its valued American friend. Within sight of the luxurious King David Hotel, where he loved to stay during his dozens of visits to Jerusalem, an inscription on a large stone was carved in Hebrew, English, and Arabic: “In memory of a dear friend, James (Jim) Angleton.” It was unveiled at a gathering attended by present and former heads of the Israeli intelligence community.
By investing energy into improving bilateral relations with American and other Western security agencies, Israeli intelligence was also enhancing Israel’s posture as an important and unignorable ally in the Middle East. The country was young and tiny, but it could be highly useful as the West pursued its interests in the region: ensuring the flow of oil, supporting conservative regimes, and blocking the
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