Secret Journey to Planet Serpo by Len Kasten Page B
Authors: Len Kasten
Tags: UFOs/Conspiracy
Ads: Link
buried.â
DIA Headquarters in Washington, D.C.
DIA emblem
In view of these rivalries, it is safe to conclude that whatever information the DIA obtained from the other intelligence agencies about events prior to its creation was probably given to them only reluctantly. Consequently, whatever intelligence it garnered about alien interactions in the period between 1947 and 1961 was almost certainly incomplete and unreliable, and possibly even included disinformation. DIA operatives had to depend mainly on MJ-12 for that information. So, if MJ-12 decided to withhold what they knew in the interests of compartmentalization, or if they shared any sort of anti-Kennedy bias, the DIA would be left completely uninformed and would be forced to start its operations in 1962 with a clean slate. And that seems to be what happened.
THE KENNEDY DIRECTIVE
Anonymous tells us that President Kennedy issued the directive for the Eben exchange program about six months into the planning for the return visit. That would have been around September 1962. That means that he was probably briefed on the EbenâLos Alamos communications history by MJ-12 around that time. As we noted earlier, the suggestion of an exchange program was first advanced in the fifth message to Serpo sent by Ebe1 in 1952, at the urging of the alienâs military handlers, but presumably ultimately at the prompting of President Eisenhower. So this idea did not originate with Kennedy. In fact, he may have been persuaded to push this agenda by MJ-12. And that explains how the DIA came to be involved in the operation. Certainly, Kennedy would have wanted his new intelligence agency, firmly under the control of himself and Robert McNamara, to take over such a momentous and dangerous operation. It is perfectly understandable that he would have bypassed his old Bay of Pigs adversaries at the CIA to gain this control, even though he had already fired Director Allen Dulles and Deputy Director General Charles Cabell a year earlier. But there may have been a very important, but less obvious reason. There is evidence that Kennedyâs distrust of the CIA had deeper rootsâthat he believed they did not necessarily serve the interests of any administration, but followed more of an independent agenda because they outlasted presidential terms. Although they did answer to congressional oversight, they had such a broad, international overview and so many deep secrets buried in their vaults that they were really powerful enough to do whatever they wanted. Because the DIA was new and was entirely Kennedyâs creation, the president could be certain that this amazing story about space travel would not be used in the service of that independent agenda, but would eventually be given to the American people, who had the right to know about it.
But also, from what he knew, Kennedy may have considered the Ebens to be potential enemies at that point, so that makes DIA involvement very logical. After all, the DIA was charged with obtaining enemy intelligence, whether on or off this planet. And it may very well have been their recommendation that convinced Kennedy to agree to the exchange program in order to get as much information as possible about the Ebensâ weaponry and motives. If Kennedy did harbor that mistrust, it is further evidence that he was not informed about the Kingman âcrashâ in 1953, and the subsequent interactions with the Ebens that took place under Eisenhower. That would also explain why none of that information was known by the DIA and released by Anonymous with the Serpo material in 2005. The DIA part of the narrative picks up with the training of the Serpo team in 1963. At that point, the agency was two years old, and had evidently just been brought into the operation by McNamara and Kennedy, so they would have had only those records in their archives.
If this assumption is correct, then Kennedy would have been led to believe that the return visit
DIA Headquarters in Washington, D.C.
DIA emblem
In view of these rivalries, it is safe to conclude that whatever information the DIA obtained from the other intelligence agencies about events prior to its creation was probably given to them only reluctantly. Consequently, whatever intelligence it garnered about alien interactions in the period between 1947 and 1961 was almost certainly incomplete and unreliable, and possibly even included disinformation. DIA operatives had to depend mainly on MJ-12 for that information. So, if MJ-12 decided to withhold what they knew in the interests of compartmentalization, or if they shared any sort of anti-Kennedy bias, the DIA would be left completely uninformed and would be forced to start its operations in 1962 with a clean slate. And that seems to be what happened.
THE KENNEDY DIRECTIVE
Anonymous tells us that President Kennedy issued the directive for the Eben exchange program about six months into the planning for the return visit. That would have been around September 1962. That means that he was probably briefed on the EbenâLos Alamos communications history by MJ-12 around that time. As we noted earlier, the suggestion of an exchange program was first advanced in the fifth message to Serpo sent by Ebe1 in 1952, at the urging of the alienâs military handlers, but presumably ultimately at the prompting of President Eisenhower. So this idea did not originate with Kennedy. In fact, he may have been persuaded to push this agenda by MJ-12. And that explains how the DIA came to be involved in the operation. Certainly, Kennedy would have wanted his new intelligence agency, firmly under the control of himself and Robert McNamara, to take over such a momentous and dangerous operation. It is perfectly understandable that he would have bypassed his old Bay of Pigs adversaries at the CIA to gain this control, even though he had already fired Director Allen Dulles and Deputy Director General Charles Cabell a year earlier. But there may have been a very important, but less obvious reason. There is evidence that Kennedyâs distrust of the CIA had deeper rootsâthat he believed they did not necessarily serve the interests of any administration, but followed more of an independent agenda because they outlasted presidential terms. Although they did answer to congressional oversight, they had such a broad, international overview and so many deep secrets buried in their vaults that they were really powerful enough to do whatever they wanted. Because the DIA was new and was entirely Kennedyâs creation, the president could be certain that this amazing story about space travel would not be used in the service of that independent agenda, but would eventually be given to the American people, who had the right to know about it.
But also, from what he knew, Kennedy may have considered the Ebens to be potential enemies at that point, so that makes DIA involvement very logical. After all, the DIA was charged with obtaining enemy intelligence, whether on or off this planet. And it may very well have been their recommendation that convinced Kennedy to agree to the exchange program in order to get as much information as possible about the Ebensâ weaponry and motives. If Kennedy did harbor that mistrust, it is further evidence that he was not informed about the Kingman âcrashâ in 1953, and the subsequent interactions with the Ebens that took place under Eisenhower. That would also explain why none of that information was known by the DIA and released by Anonymous with the Serpo material in 2005. The DIA part of the narrative picks up with the training of the Serpo team in 1963. At that point, the agency was two years old, and had evidently just been brought into the operation by McNamara and Kennedy, so they would have had only those records in their archives.
If this assumption is correct, then Kennedy would have been led to believe that the return visit
Similar Books
