Rebuild the Dream by Van Jones

mandate confused people. On the one hand, it was ambitious—from the perspective of the Washington status quo. On the other hand, it was very narrow and limited—from the perspective of grassroots outsiders who longed to build an unstoppable, people’s movement.
    The audacity of the undertaking was impressive: it is no small task to convert a campaign apparatus into a permanent grassroots force, especially one that is charged with passing legislation, growing the Democratic Party, and preparing to reelect a president. As a mechanism to meet those goals, OFA worked very well.
    It is no small task to convert a campaign apparatus into a permanent grassroots force.
    This was, in part, because OFA was a true workhorse. In 2009, the organization held an average of 819 local events across the country each week. The organization was daring enough to experiment with a range of tactics—from crowd-sourcing television ads, to sponsoring days of community service—to build up the social capital within its ranks. In the first year alone, staffers conducted 8,649 one-hour, one-on-one conversations with members, to keep its most dedicated activists committed and plugged in. In its first two years, the organization added 2.6 million members; more than 5 million people took action through its auspices. It turned out to be indispensable in the fight to pass legislation, especially national health insurance reform. Well in advance of the2012 reelection campaign, OFA created a standing army without peer.
    But while it focused on those daunting tasks, OFA did not make room for—nor give full expression to—the energy and yearnings that made 2008 so dynamic and exciting. Of course, some drop in focus and energy after the campaign was inevitable. Electoral campaigns are defined by a clear objective, limited in time, and focused on a single opponent. The challenge of maintaining activist commitments during the long, tough, and open-ended slog of governing is much harder.
    Nonetheless, OFA became the object of intense criticism, as disappointed Obama supporters accused it of being uninspiring, undemocratic, and too afraid to rock the boat inside the Democratic Party. The agendas of the White House and DNC now reflected the day-to-day challenges of governing; they were no longer feeding and stoking the high-minded idealism upon which the Obama campaign was based. Yet those very ideals had been the source of attraction for many of those 13 million. As an appendage of the DNC, OFA could not drag the establishment in brave new directions; it was expected to help the people support the Democrats, not to make the Democrats answer to the people.
    The problem was baked into the cake from the very beginning. First of all, the DNC took OFA on as a “community-organizing project.” For some, this very designation and mission statement caused immediate concern. Not everyone who participated in the Obama campaign was a Democrat or trusted the DNC; there were left-leaning and moderate independents, Green Party members, and even Republicans who worked hard to elect Obama. Rather than being supported and equipped as an independent “movement” organization, the movement was being forced to become an adjunct of the national party.
    As part of the DNC, OFA’s mission was to “mobilize supporters in favor of Obama’s legislative priorities.” This narrow mission did not precisely align with the expectations of many Obama supporters; some had expected to continue mobilizing and fighting for change in the same creative way that had prevailed during the campaign. This misalignment was not just a problem at the level of abstract principle. The list of 13 million Obama supporters was the movement’s key asset. But it was now controlled by the DNC; therefore, there were limits on what OFA members could do together—and whom they could do it to.
    For example, the list could not be used to fight in a