can kill them.
That is particularly true since the Obama administration has been employing drones to target suspected militants far beyond the al Qaeda leaders who were the programâs original targets. McClatchy Newspapers reported in 2013 that U.S. intelligence reports showed that drone strikes in Pakistan had been used to kill a wide range of Afghan and Pakistani militants, some of whom belonged to groups that didnât even exist at the time of the 9/11 attacks. A number were low-level militants with no identified affiliation. McClatchy also determined that the U.S. intelligence reports it had reviewed revealed that U.S. drone pilots were not always sure whom they were killing.
The International Crisis Group, an independent nonprofit organization, warned that drone strikes were a short-term fix that could not solve the fundamental political problems fueling militancy in Pakistanâs northwest frontier region. Pakistan needs to end the second-class status of its tribal areas but is unwilling or incapable of doing so, and America isnât pushing for political reform, the group observed. âDrone strikes alone will not eliminate the jihadi threat in Pakistanâs Federally Administered Tribal Areas,â the group said in a 2013 report. âExtension of Pakistani law and full constitutional rights to the region is the only long-term solution.â
The drone campaign is already having a deep political impact in Pakistan, where it has become an issue of national sovereignty. But it is increasingly seen as a human rights issue as well. In late 2012, Imran Khan, one of Pakistanâs most famous celebrities, a cricket star turned politician, led thousands in a protest march against the drones. The march was so large it had to be blocked from entering Waziristan by the Pakistani Army. âThe drones are inhumane,â Khan said. âAre these people not humans?â he pleaded. âThese humans have names.â
In a major national security speech in May 2013, President Obama finally acknowledged the growing criticism both at home and overseas of his drone policies, and vowed to impose new limits on drone strikes. In addition to vowing to move drone operations from the CIA to the U.S. military, he discussed ways in which he might make decision-making on target selection more open and transparent. But Obama provided few details, and his vague promises left him plenty of flexibility to continue strikes wherever and whenever he sees fit.
In fact, so little changed that in October 2013, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch both issued reports claiming that U.S. drone strikes were killing far more civilians than the Obama administration was willing to admit, and that the United Statesâ drone campaign was in violation of international law.
Â
It is never a good sign for a corporation when its chairman has to write a book to defend the firmâs reputationâeven worse when the book has to refute charges that the companyâs personnel were involved in torture. But for J. Phillip London, executive chairman of CACI, a defense and intelligence contractor based in northern Virginia, the war on terror has been a battle of extremes. London has fought for years to cleanse his companyâs reputation from the stain of Abu Ghraib. In the meantime, CACI and London have also been making loads of money.
CACI is a multibillion-dollar defense contractor and Fortune 500 company. It is best known, at least on the Internet, for its infamous role at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, CACI sent contractors to serve as interrogators at Abu Ghraib. One of those interrogators was later caught up in the Abu Ghraib torture scandal that broke in 2004 with the release of graphic photographs of abuse of Iraqi prisoners by American guards. While the low-ranking soldiers involved in the scandal faced punishment from the military justice system, the senior military and intelligence
That is particularly true since the Obama administration has been employing drones to target suspected militants far beyond the al Qaeda leaders who were the programâs original targets. McClatchy Newspapers reported in 2013 that U.S. intelligence reports showed that drone strikes in Pakistan had been used to kill a wide range of Afghan and Pakistani militants, some of whom belonged to groups that didnât even exist at the time of the 9/11 attacks. A number were low-level militants with no identified affiliation. McClatchy also determined that the U.S. intelligence reports it had reviewed revealed that U.S. drone pilots were not always sure whom they were killing.
The International Crisis Group, an independent nonprofit organization, warned that drone strikes were a short-term fix that could not solve the fundamental political problems fueling militancy in Pakistanâs northwest frontier region. Pakistan needs to end the second-class status of its tribal areas but is unwilling or incapable of doing so, and America isnât pushing for political reform, the group observed. âDrone strikes alone will not eliminate the jihadi threat in Pakistanâs Federally Administered Tribal Areas,â the group said in a 2013 report. âExtension of Pakistani law and full constitutional rights to the region is the only long-term solution.â
The drone campaign is already having a deep political impact in Pakistan, where it has become an issue of national sovereignty. But it is increasingly seen as a human rights issue as well. In late 2012, Imran Khan, one of Pakistanâs most famous celebrities, a cricket star turned politician, led thousands in a protest march against the drones. The march was so large it had to be blocked from entering Waziristan by the Pakistani Army. âThe drones are inhumane,â Khan said. âAre these people not humans?â he pleaded. âThese humans have names.â
In a major national security speech in May 2013, President Obama finally acknowledged the growing criticism both at home and overseas of his drone policies, and vowed to impose new limits on drone strikes. In addition to vowing to move drone operations from the CIA to the U.S. military, he discussed ways in which he might make decision-making on target selection more open and transparent. But Obama provided few details, and his vague promises left him plenty of flexibility to continue strikes wherever and whenever he sees fit.
In fact, so little changed that in October 2013, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch both issued reports claiming that U.S. drone strikes were killing far more civilians than the Obama administration was willing to admit, and that the United Statesâ drone campaign was in violation of international law.
Â
It is never a good sign for a corporation when its chairman has to write a book to defend the firmâs reputationâeven worse when the book has to refute charges that the companyâs personnel were involved in torture. But for J. Phillip London, executive chairman of CACI, a defense and intelligence contractor based in northern Virginia, the war on terror has been a battle of extremes. London has fought for years to cleanse his companyâs reputation from the stain of Abu Ghraib. In the meantime, CACI and London have also been making loads of money.
CACI is a multibillion-dollar defense contractor and Fortune 500 company. It is best known, at least on the Internet, for its infamous role at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, CACI sent contractors to serve as interrogators at Abu Ghraib. One of those interrogators was later caught up in the Abu Ghraib torture scandal that broke in 2004 with the release of graphic photographs of abuse of Iraqi prisoners by American guards. While the low-ranking soldiers involved in the scandal faced punishment from the military justice system, the senior military and intelligence
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