communists or national liberation foreign dignitaries. If he was to be around longer, he lived in an apartment. That was the case in the fall of 1960 when he was a delegate to a conference of eighty-one parties that did not end until December.
The well-heated apartment was situated on an upper floor of a centrally located building whose garbage chutes and stairwells did not reek of clogged refuse and stale urine. It had a parlor, a bedroom, a study alcove, a large safe for storage of secret documents he was allowed to study but not keep, and a decent bath and kitchen. A cook/housekeeper maintained an ample supply of food and drink, and replenished it daily. Before leaving for the day, she insisted on preparing a cold supper even if he was dining out. On such occasions, she took the supper home with her.
Morris soon discovered that members of the International Department liked to visit him in the evening. They may have been sincere in their professed desire to discuss âgeneral problemsâ or âgeneral intelligence.â They undoubtedly were sincere in their enjoyment of the unlimited quantities of whisky and vodka they could imbibe for free. Morris welcomed them and all the inside information they imparted, wittingly or unwittingly. Now and then he did plead fatigue and suggest that prospective callers stop by later. On those evenings, he meant to copy documents by hand.
Ponomarev in late November or early December gave Morris two documents to study. One provided a chronology of events that culminated in the breach between the Soviets and Chinese; the other was a Soviet analysis of the gravity of the breach. Upon receiving the documents from the FBI in late December, the State Department declared them to be âof unique importance.â 9
By the end of 1960, Freyman, Burlinson, and the few others in the FBI who knew about SOLO could be proud of its results.
At the time, some prestigious journalists, academicians, politicians, and foreign affairs analysts in the United States still believed Fidel Castro to be a crusading votary of liberty and independence for the Cuban people. To them, any suggestion that he might be willing to sell Cuba to the Soviet Union in return for personal status as an absolute dictator would have seemed nothing short of paranoid. The early intelligence emanating from SOLO, however, warned U.S. policymakers of what was likely to happenâand what in fact did happenâin Cuba, and thereby allowed them to plan accordingly.
To much, perhaps most, of the world, the Soviet empire and Peoplesâ Republic of China in 1960 appeared to be a fearsome monolith occupying a fourth of the earthâs land surface and comprising more than a third of its population. Later, when little signs
of trouble between them inevitably surfaced, they were widely dismissed as inconsequential. âExpertsâ could and did argue that far more united than divided the communist partners. For years, some influential U.S. intelligence officials even contended that the indicators were deceptions, part of a grand disinformation scheme.
Almost from the inception of the SinoâSoviet split, authentic SOLO intelligence gathered at the highest echelons in Peking and Moscow showed that the breach was real, widening, and perhaps irreparable.
Soviet leaders now welcomed Morris and Jack into their confidence; they relied on them to maintain the financial lifeline of American communism and trusted them to work with the KGB.
Freyman and Burlinson had every professional reason to believe that, if security and Morrisâ health held, there would be much more to come.
five
THE LUCK OF THE FBI
NO ONE PROGRAMMED the events that made two new members available to the team. But Carl Freyman took full advantage of the good luck.
During the annual inspection of the Cryptanalysis Section at FBI headquarters in late 1960, Supervisor Walter Boyle stood accused of two transgressions.
The section chief, Churchill
The well-heated apartment was situated on an upper floor of a centrally located building whose garbage chutes and stairwells did not reek of clogged refuse and stale urine. It had a parlor, a bedroom, a study alcove, a large safe for storage of secret documents he was allowed to study but not keep, and a decent bath and kitchen. A cook/housekeeper maintained an ample supply of food and drink, and replenished it daily. Before leaving for the day, she insisted on preparing a cold supper even if he was dining out. On such occasions, she took the supper home with her.
Morris soon discovered that members of the International Department liked to visit him in the evening. They may have been sincere in their professed desire to discuss âgeneral problemsâ or âgeneral intelligence.â They undoubtedly were sincere in their enjoyment of the unlimited quantities of whisky and vodka they could imbibe for free. Morris welcomed them and all the inside information they imparted, wittingly or unwittingly. Now and then he did plead fatigue and suggest that prospective callers stop by later. On those evenings, he meant to copy documents by hand.
Ponomarev in late November or early December gave Morris two documents to study. One provided a chronology of events that culminated in the breach between the Soviets and Chinese; the other was a Soviet analysis of the gravity of the breach. Upon receiving the documents from the FBI in late December, the State Department declared them to be âof unique importance.â 9
By the end of 1960, Freyman, Burlinson, and the few others in the FBI who knew about SOLO could be proud of its results.
At the time, some prestigious journalists, academicians, politicians, and foreign affairs analysts in the United States still believed Fidel Castro to be a crusading votary of liberty and independence for the Cuban people. To them, any suggestion that he might be willing to sell Cuba to the Soviet Union in return for personal status as an absolute dictator would have seemed nothing short of paranoid. The early intelligence emanating from SOLO, however, warned U.S. policymakers of what was likely to happenâand what in fact did happenâin Cuba, and thereby allowed them to plan accordingly.
To much, perhaps most, of the world, the Soviet empire and Peoplesâ Republic of China in 1960 appeared to be a fearsome monolith occupying a fourth of the earthâs land surface and comprising more than a third of its population. Later, when little signs
of trouble between them inevitably surfaced, they were widely dismissed as inconsequential. âExpertsâ could and did argue that far more united than divided the communist partners. For years, some influential U.S. intelligence officials even contended that the indicators were deceptions, part of a grand disinformation scheme.
Almost from the inception of the SinoâSoviet split, authentic SOLO intelligence gathered at the highest echelons in Peking and Moscow showed that the breach was real, widening, and perhaps irreparable.
Soviet leaders now welcomed Morris and Jack into their confidence; they relied on them to maintain the financial lifeline of American communism and trusted them to work with the KGB.
Freyman and Burlinson had every professional reason to believe that, if security and Morrisâ health held, there would be much more to come.
five
THE LUCK OF THE FBI
NO ONE PROGRAMMED the events that made two new members available to the team. But Carl Freyman took full advantage of the good luck.
During the annual inspection of the Cryptanalysis Section at FBI headquarters in late 1960, Supervisor Walter Boyle stood accused of two transgressions.
The section chief, Churchill
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