On the Brink by Henry M. Paulson

lenient terms. “Covenant-lite” loans appeared, in which bankers eased restrictions in order to allow borrowers, like private-equity firms, increased flexibility on repayment.
    Indeed, I recall a dinner at the New York Fed on June 26, 2007, that was attended by the heads of some of Wall Street’s biggest banks. All were concerned with excessive risk taking in the markets and appalled by the erosion of underwriting standards. The bankers complained about all the covenant-lite loans and bridge loans they felt compelled by competitive pressure to make.
    I remember Jamie Dimon, the JPMorgan chairman and CEO, saying that such loans, made mostly to private-equity firms, did not make sense, and that his bank wouldn’t be making any more of them. Lloyd Blankfein said Goldman, too, would not enter into any such transactions. Steve Schwarzman, the CEO of Blackstone, a dominant private-equity firm, acknowledged he had been getting attractive terms and added that he wasn’t in the business of turning down attractive money.
    Chuck Prince, the Citigroup CEO, asked whether, given the competitive pressures, there wasn’t a role for regulators to tamp down some of the riskier practices. Basically, he asked: “Isn’t there something you can do to order us not to take all of these risks?”
    Not long after, I remember, Prince was quoted as saying, “As long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.”
    It was, in retrospect, the end of an era. The music soon stopped. Two of the CEOs at that dinner—Prince and Jimmy Cayne of Bear Stearns—would be gone shortly, their institutions reeling.
    Leverage works just great when times are good, but when they turn bad it magnifies losses in a hurry. Among the first to suffer when housing prices fell were a pair of multibillion-dollar hedge funds set up by Bear Stearns that had made leveraged investments in mortgage-related securities that subsequently went bad. By late July both funds had effectively shut down.
    Bad news came fast, from within and outside the United States. Spooked investors began to shun certain kinds of mortgage-related paper, causing liquidity to dry up and putting pressure on investment vehicles like the now-notorious structured investment vehicles, or SIVs. A number of banks administered SIVs to facilitate their origination of mortgages and other products while minimizing their capital requirements, since the SIV assets could be kept off the banks’ balance sheets.
    These entities borrowed heavily in short-term markets to buy typically longer-dated, highly rated structured debt securities—CDOs and the like. To fund these purchases, these SIVs typically issued commercial paper, short-term notes sold to investors outside of the banking system. This paper was backed by the assets the SIVs held; although the SIVs were frequently set up as stand-alone entities and kept off banks’ balance sheets, some maintained contingent lines of credit with banks to reassure buyers of their so-called asset-backed commercial paper, or ABCP.
    Financing illiquid assets like real estate with short-term borrowings has long been a recipe for disaster, as the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s demonstrated. But by 2007, several dozen SIVs owned some $400 billion in assets, bought with funds that could disappear virtually overnight. And disappear these funds did—as investors refused to roll loans over even when they appeared fully collateralized. The banks like Citi that stood behind the SIVs now faced a huge potential drain on their capital at just the moment they had to contend with a liquidity crunch.
    SIVs weren’t the only issuers of asset-backed commercial paper. Other entities that invested in debt securities relied on that market—as did a number of specialized mortgage lenders, which lacked access to the retail deposits of their commercial bank rivals. They were all part of a shadow banking market that had grown quickly and out of the sight of