“Touching glasses at a party with his liberal friends, the belligerent Kissinger would suddenly become a dove.” 60 Nixon knew it was happening, but he was forgiving. “I know this. Kissinger likes to be liked. I understand that.” 61 Even years later, when Kissinger published some harsh comments about him, Nixon would only say to the historian Joan Hoff, “I will be fair to Henry, even if he isn’t always to me.” 62
For all the tensions between them, the two men made one of the most influential foreign policy teams in American history. “Nixinger diplomacy,” one academic has called their tenure. 63 Not only did they have the same perspective on international relations, they believed in keeping all major policies and initiatives in their grip. They shared a penchant for intrigue and secrecy. Both had trouble trusting people, even their own staffs. Both spent much time and energy worrying about leaks. “They developed,” said Lawrence Eagleburger, a Kissinger aide who later became secretary of state for the first President Bush, “a conspiratorial approach to foreign policy management.” 64
It was, on some issues, such as the breakthrough with China, a very effective approach because they cut through the bureaucratic thickets of precedence and caution that have hemmed in so many leaders. It did not always work when they did not keep the rest of the American government, especially the State Department, up to date on what they were doing. And it did not work when they tried to do too much themselves or when they simply ignored issues, such as economic ones, that did not interest them.
Kissinger, who Nixon later said admiringly was a “very good infighter,” took full advantage of his position to consolidate his power. 65 He made good use of the new structure set up by Nixon for foreign affairs to make sure that he had the ultimate right of access to the president. Much to the annoyance of the State Department, he also started dealing directly with foreign representatives in Washington and abroad. After Nixon made it clear to Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, that he should work through Kissinger, the two men met regularly in Kissinger’s office without anyone else being present. Dobrynin entered and left the White House by the service entrance. In time a private telephone line linked Kissinger’s office directly to the Soviet embassy. 66 At Foggy Bottom, as the State Department building was known, they had only the vaguest idea of what Kissinger and Dobrynin were discussing, or even when their meetings were taking place. 67
That was how both Nixon and Kissinger wanted it. They were at one in their contempt for the State Department, which they saw as filled with egghead liberals and, from Kissinger’s perspective, rivals. “Our basic attitude,” said Kissinger as he and Nixon discussed the major crisis in South Asia in 1971, “was the hell with the State Department; let them screw around with the little ones.” 68 Major diplomatic secrets and initiatives could not be trusted to the State Department, Nixon and Kissinger believed, because it was incapable of moving rapidly and, in any case, was bound to leak information. It was, in their view, an incompetent, ineffective, and overstaffed bureaucracy. “I opened up China with five people,” Kissinger liked to say. 69 In his first year in office, a senior State Department official remembered, “Nixon gave us a little harangue about what our jobs were and how, by God, he was going to run foreign policy.” What is more, the president added, “If the Department of State has had a new idea in the last 25 years, it is not known to me.” 70 This was a view that Kissinger both shared and encouraged. “The spirit of policy and that of bureaucracy are diametrically opposed,” he had written in his book on Metternich and Castlereagh. Policy makers had to take chances, while the whole instinct of bureaucracy was to take refuge in
For all the tensions between them, the two men made one of the most influential foreign policy teams in American history. “Nixinger diplomacy,” one academic has called their tenure. 63 Not only did they have the same perspective on international relations, they believed in keeping all major policies and initiatives in their grip. They shared a penchant for intrigue and secrecy. Both had trouble trusting people, even their own staffs. Both spent much time and energy worrying about leaks. “They developed,” said Lawrence Eagleburger, a Kissinger aide who later became secretary of state for the first President Bush, “a conspiratorial approach to foreign policy management.” 64
It was, on some issues, such as the breakthrough with China, a very effective approach because they cut through the bureaucratic thickets of precedence and caution that have hemmed in so many leaders. It did not always work when they did not keep the rest of the American government, especially the State Department, up to date on what they were doing. And it did not work when they tried to do too much themselves or when they simply ignored issues, such as economic ones, that did not interest them.
Kissinger, who Nixon later said admiringly was a “very good infighter,” took full advantage of his position to consolidate his power. 65 He made good use of the new structure set up by Nixon for foreign affairs to make sure that he had the ultimate right of access to the president. Much to the annoyance of the State Department, he also started dealing directly with foreign representatives in Washington and abroad. After Nixon made it clear to Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, that he should work through Kissinger, the two men met regularly in Kissinger’s office without anyone else being present. Dobrynin entered and left the White House by the service entrance. In time a private telephone line linked Kissinger’s office directly to the Soviet embassy. 66 At Foggy Bottom, as the State Department building was known, they had only the vaguest idea of what Kissinger and Dobrynin were discussing, or even when their meetings were taking place. 67
That was how both Nixon and Kissinger wanted it. They were at one in their contempt for the State Department, which they saw as filled with egghead liberals and, from Kissinger’s perspective, rivals. “Our basic attitude,” said Kissinger as he and Nixon discussed the major crisis in South Asia in 1971, “was the hell with the State Department; let them screw around with the little ones.” 68 Major diplomatic secrets and initiatives could not be trusted to the State Department, Nixon and Kissinger believed, because it was incapable of moving rapidly and, in any case, was bound to leak information. It was, in their view, an incompetent, ineffective, and overstaffed bureaucracy. “I opened up China with five people,” Kissinger liked to say. 69 In his first year in office, a senior State Department official remembered, “Nixon gave us a little harangue about what our jobs were and how, by God, he was going to run foreign policy.” What is more, the president added, “If the Department of State has had a new idea in the last 25 years, it is not known to me.” 70 This was a view that Kissinger both shared and encouraged. “The spirit of policy and that of bureaucracy are diametrically opposed,” he had written in his book on Metternich and Castlereagh. Policy makers had to take chances, while the whole instinct of bureaucracy was to take refuge in
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