several raids on his establishments, despite Kelly’s insistence that he had gone “straight.” In one case, detectives traced a car that was used in a Harlem robbery back to Kelly’s garage. It was freshly painted, but of course Kelly had no idea how it got there. Then there was the occasion when police found a roulette wheel inside the club at this address. Kelly reasonably explained that he was just holding it for a friend.
By 1912, Paul Kelly may have been itching for the spotlight he had once so easily attained as leader of the most prominent gang in New York City. On one Monday night in May of that year, he essentially held a press conference denouncing his oppression at the hands of the police department. He complained to reporters that detectives were harassing his patrons and discouraging them from entering the club. As cameras flashed, Kelly claimed he wrote a letter to the mayor complaining of these abuses, stating his innocence as a reformed gangster turned legitimate businessman. However, the police department denied targeting the social club, suggesting it was a bit of theatrics on Kelly’s part to muster some attention.
By 1915, under the name “F. Paul A. Vaccarelli,” he was made vice-president of the powerful International Longshoreman’s Association (ILA). It was here where the “former” gangster’s influence was fully realized.
Vaccarelli had an immediate and enduring effect on the shipping industry in New York and had become one of the most influential labor leaders in the city. A May 17, 1916 New York Times headline announced, “P AUL K ELLY S TRIKE C AUSES E MBARGO AND T IES U P P IERS ,” with subtitles such as “T HUGS T HREATEN W ORKERS ” and “Employees Followed Home by Men from Longshoremen’s Union—Strike Started by Force.”
Over one thousand dock and ship workers failed to report to their posts at 6:00 a.m. on May 16 under the orders of Kelly. This bold move affected the delivery of thousands of tons of produce into the city from out west. According to reports, many longtime union members had no desire to strike but were threatened with violence by Kelly’s strong-arm men.
Longshoremen seemingly had no reason to strike at that time. They were recently awarded a modest salary increase after threatening to strike earlier in the month: thirty-five cents an hour for a ten-hour day and fifty cents for every hour after, plus a pension after twenty-five years on the job. This was considerably more than other positions earned in any industry. Paul Kelly demanded forty cents an hour, sixty cents for overtime and eighty cents for Sunday and holiday work. When demands were not met within two weeks, Kelly forced ILA members to strike. Three hundred or so who refused orders were beaten and harassed. Subsequently, the Southern Pacific steamship line, primary transporter of dried fruits and canned goods to the East Coast, declared an embargo on all shipments from its transfer stations in New Orleans, Louisiana, and Port of Galveston, Texas, which was backed up with six hundred rail cars of undelivered goods because of the strike.
Unloading banana boats in 1906. Detroit Publishing Company (Library of Congress) .
Southern Pacific made no bones about Paul Kelly’s ambitious shakedown. The media reported on the obvious trickledown cost that was passed on to consumers, as goods were eventually rerouted via rail. Newspapers also clearly calculated how much Kelly stood to earn from salary increases via marked-up kickbacks and “dues” from union members. Still, Kelly was somehow able to spin his image as a Robin Hood figure and retain favorable public opinion.
The strike was settled on May 21, and Kelly’s demands were met. Kelly had virtually single-handedly strong-armed a major national corporation by holding an entire industry (and city) hostage. This success only raised his profile further.
Another strike in early April 1919 threatened a “Complete Paralysis of New York
By 1912, Paul Kelly may have been itching for the spotlight he had once so easily attained as leader of the most prominent gang in New York City. On one Monday night in May of that year, he essentially held a press conference denouncing his oppression at the hands of the police department. He complained to reporters that detectives were harassing his patrons and discouraging them from entering the club. As cameras flashed, Kelly claimed he wrote a letter to the mayor complaining of these abuses, stating his innocence as a reformed gangster turned legitimate businessman. However, the police department denied targeting the social club, suggesting it was a bit of theatrics on Kelly’s part to muster some attention.
By 1915, under the name “F. Paul A. Vaccarelli,” he was made vice-president of the powerful International Longshoreman’s Association (ILA). It was here where the “former” gangster’s influence was fully realized.
Vaccarelli had an immediate and enduring effect on the shipping industry in New York and had become one of the most influential labor leaders in the city. A May 17, 1916 New York Times headline announced, “P AUL K ELLY S TRIKE C AUSES E MBARGO AND T IES U P P IERS ,” with subtitles such as “T HUGS T HREATEN W ORKERS ” and “Employees Followed Home by Men from Longshoremen’s Union—Strike Started by Force.”
Over one thousand dock and ship workers failed to report to their posts at 6:00 a.m. on May 16 under the orders of Kelly. This bold move affected the delivery of thousands of tons of produce into the city from out west. According to reports, many longtime union members had no desire to strike but were threatened with violence by Kelly’s strong-arm men.
Longshoremen seemingly had no reason to strike at that time. They were recently awarded a modest salary increase after threatening to strike earlier in the month: thirty-five cents an hour for a ten-hour day and fifty cents for every hour after, plus a pension after twenty-five years on the job. This was considerably more than other positions earned in any industry. Paul Kelly demanded forty cents an hour, sixty cents for overtime and eighty cents for Sunday and holiday work. When demands were not met within two weeks, Kelly forced ILA members to strike. Three hundred or so who refused orders were beaten and harassed. Subsequently, the Southern Pacific steamship line, primary transporter of dried fruits and canned goods to the East Coast, declared an embargo on all shipments from its transfer stations in New Orleans, Louisiana, and Port of Galveston, Texas, which was backed up with six hundred rail cars of undelivered goods because of the strike.
Unloading banana boats in 1906. Detroit Publishing Company (Library of Congress) .
Southern Pacific made no bones about Paul Kelly’s ambitious shakedown. The media reported on the obvious trickledown cost that was passed on to consumers, as goods were eventually rerouted via rail. Newspapers also clearly calculated how much Kelly stood to earn from salary increases via marked-up kickbacks and “dues” from union members. Still, Kelly was somehow able to spin his image as a Robin Hood figure and retain favorable public opinion.
The strike was settled on May 21, and Kelly’s demands were met. Kelly had virtually single-handedly strong-armed a major national corporation by holding an entire industry (and city) hostage. This success only raised his profile further.
Another strike in early April 1919 threatened a “Complete Paralysis of New York
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