placing Joseph in a specialized private school. The school district, however, still hesitated to do so. 8
The statute also provides that parents such as the Murphys can bring a lawsuit against the school district in a federal court. The Murphys did so and eventually won. The court ordered the district to pay for Joseph’s education at a private school. 9
All these proceedings were expensive. The Murphys had hired an educational expert, who charged them $29,000 for her help. The courts later found that the expert’s services were well worth that price. But the Murphys, who were people of modest means, asked the school district to reimburse them for the cost not only of their lawyers but also of their expert. When the district refused, they asked the court to require the school district to pay. 10
At this point the court had to decide whether it had the power to order the school district to reimburse the Murphys. The federal statute says that the court may “award” a prevailing party like the Murphys “reasonable attorneys’ fees
as part of
[
their
]
costs
.” The Murphys argued in court that the word “costs” includes the fees of experts they had to hire to support their case. The district argued that the statutory phrase did not include expert fees. That was the question of statutory interpretation that reached the Supreme Court. 11
Does the word “costs” include the fees of experts? On the one hand, one can read the statute’s language as restricting “costs” to “attorneys’ fees” plus a few extra expenses, for example, court filing fees, while excluding the separate fees of experts. Courts have often interpreted the word “costs” when used in other rules and statutes in this way. On the other hand, one might read the word as including the “fees” of experts. Those fees do not differ radically in kind from attorneys’ fees. Indeed, attorneys themselves often hire experts and pass an expert’s charges on to the client as part of the attorney’s bill. Moreover, an expert’s fee is a “cost” to the client as the word “cost” is often used in everyday affairs.
It helps to examine the statute’s purposes. Overall, the statute seeks to make available to disabled children the kind of education that fewparents can afford. The statute more specifically seeks to create procedures (including court procedures) that will allow parents to dispute a school district’s claim that it is already doing so. To have any hope of success, parents must often turn to experts, who are expensive. Thus, reading “costs” as
excluding
expert fees, by requiring a winning family to pay those fees, could well place that education beyond the reach of a typical family even if that family shows it is entitled to receive that education. Consider this consequence in light of the statute’s basic purpose. Does it not hinder, interfere with, perhaps thwart, the statute’s basic purpose, namely, an appropriate education for each handicapped child? 12
Yet we must go further. After all, Congress might have had a subsidiary money-saving purpose, in respect to legal costs for example. This is why it is important to examine the relevant legislative materials, such as the history of the debates in Congress that led to enactment of the legislation. In this case these materials strongly suggested that Congress intended for the district to pay these expert fees.
A report of a Senate-House conference committee (the joint committee to reconcile House and Senate versions of the bill and produce a final text) said that the statutory language includes reasonable “expenses and
fees of expert witnesses.”
Both houses of Congress unanimously adopted this report. The upshot is that an examination of purposes and consequences would lead the Court to interpret the statute in the way that members of both houses of Congress seemed to intend. It would produce an interpretation that furthered the basic purposes underlying the statute.
The statute also provides that parents such as the Murphys can bring a lawsuit against the school district in a federal court. The Murphys did so and eventually won. The court ordered the district to pay for Joseph’s education at a private school. 9
All these proceedings were expensive. The Murphys had hired an educational expert, who charged them $29,000 for her help. The courts later found that the expert’s services were well worth that price. But the Murphys, who were people of modest means, asked the school district to reimburse them for the cost not only of their lawyers but also of their expert. When the district refused, they asked the court to require the school district to pay. 10
At this point the court had to decide whether it had the power to order the school district to reimburse the Murphys. The federal statute says that the court may “award” a prevailing party like the Murphys “reasonable attorneys’ fees
as part of
[
their
]
costs
.” The Murphys argued in court that the word “costs” includes the fees of experts they had to hire to support their case. The district argued that the statutory phrase did not include expert fees. That was the question of statutory interpretation that reached the Supreme Court. 11
Does the word “costs” include the fees of experts? On the one hand, one can read the statute’s language as restricting “costs” to “attorneys’ fees” plus a few extra expenses, for example, court filing fees, while excluding the separate fees of experts. Courts have often interpreted the word “costs” when used in other rules and statutes in this way. On the other hand, one might read the word as including the “fees” of experts. Those fees do not differ radically in kind from attorneys’ fees. Indeed, attorneys themselves often hire experts and pass an expert’s charges on to the client as part of the attorney’s bill. Moreover, an expert’s fee is a “cost” to the client as the word “cost” is often used in everyday affairs.
It helps to examine the statute’s purposes. Overall, the statute seeks to make available to disabled children the kind of education that fewparents can afford. The statute more specifically seeks to create procedures (including court procedures) that will allow parents to dispute a school district’s claim that it is already doing so. To have any hope of success, parents must often turn to experts, who are expensive. Thus, reading “costs” as
excluding
expert fees, by requiring a winning family to pay those fees, could well place that education beyond the reach of a typical family even if that family shows it is entitled to receive that education. Consider this consequence in light of the statute’s basic purpose. Does it not hinder, interfere with, perhaps thwart, the statute’s basic purpose, namely, an appropriate education for each handicapped child? 12
Yet we must go further. After all, Congress might have had a subsidiary money-saving purpose, in respect to legal costs for example. This is why it is important to examine the relevant legislative materials, such as the history of the debates in Congress that led to enactment of the legislation. In this case these materials strongly suggested that Congress intended for the district to pay these expert fees.
A report of a Senate-House conference committee (the joint committee to reconcile House and Senate versions of the bill and produce a final text) said that the statutory language includes reasonable “expenses and
fees of expert witnesses.”
Both houses of Congress unanimously adopted this report. The upshot is that an examination of purposes and consequences would lead the Court to interpret the statute in the way that members of both houses of Congress seemed to intend. It would produce an interpretation that furthered the basic purposes underlying the statute.
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