Introduction
O ver the last two decades US-Pakistan relations have often been described as Americaâs most difficult external relationship. Although the two countries have been nominal allies dating back to Pakistanâs independence in 1947, their relationship has never been free of friction. Even in its heyday during the 1950s and 1960s, the US-Pakistan partnership was far from an alliance based on shared values and interests; instead, each of the two partners was always preoccupied with confronting different enemies and pinning different expectations to their association.
Pakistanâs motive in pursuing an alliance with the United States is driven by its quest for security against its much larger neighbor, India. Pakistan has repeatedly turned to the United States as its most significant source of expensive weapons and economic aid. Although, in the hope of winning US support for Pakistanâs regional aims, Pakistani leaders have assured US officials that they share the United Statesâ global security concerns, Pakistan has been repeatedly disappointed because the United States does not share Pakistanâs fears of Indian hegemony in South Asia.
For its part, the United States has also chased a mirage when it has assumed that, over time, its assistance to Pakistan would engender a sense of security among Pakistanis, thereby leading to a change in Pakistanâs priorities and objectives. The United States initially poured money and arms into Pakistan in the hope of building a major fighting force that could assist in defending Asia against communism. Pakistan repeatedly failed to live up to its promises to provide troops for any of the wars the United States fought against communistforces, instead using American weapons in its wars with India. Furthermore, US hopes of persuading Pakistan to give up or curtail its nuclear weapons program or to stop using Jihadi militants as proxies in regional conflicts have similarly proved futile.
Three American presidentsâDwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnsonâhave asked the question: What do we get from aiding Pakistan? FiveâJimmy Carter, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obamaâhave wondered aloud whether Pakistanâs leaders can be trusted to keep their word. Meanwhile in Pakistan, successive governments have spent a lot of time trying to figure out how to maintain Pakistanâs freedom of action while depending on US aid. But neither country has changed its core policies nor have they given up the hope that the other will change.
The US-Pakistan relationship has depended largely on cordial ties between leaders and officials who have often misunderstood each otherâs intentions and limitations. Whereas Pakistanis have often benefited from the American tendency to ignore history and focus only on immediate goals, Americans have often assumed that building up Pakistanâs economic and military capacity provides them leverage even after periodically finding out the limits of US influence. And both sides have their own stereotypes about each other, traceable back to Pakistanâs emergence as an independent country.
During that period, soon after emerging from British Indiaâs bloody partition in 1947, Pakistanâs leaders confronted an uncertain future for their new country. When most of the world was indifferent to Pakistan as the potential homeland of South Asiaâs Muslims, India antagonized Pakistan without compromise or compassion. Because of this, soon after independence Pakistanâs founding fathers, encouraged by some British geostrategists, decided that they would continue to maintain the large army they had inherited even though the new nation could not afford to pay for it from its own resources and did not immediately face a visible security threat. Given Pakistanâs location at the crossroads of the Middle East and South Asia and its relative proximity to
O ver the last two decades US-Pakistan relations have often been described as Americaâs most difficult external relationship. Although the two countries have been nominal allies dating back to Pakistanâs independence in 1947, their relationship has never been free of friction. Even in its heyday during the 1950s and 1960s, the US-Pakistan partnership was far from an alliance based on shared values and interests; instead, each of the two partners was always preoccupied with confronting different enemies and pinning different expectations to their association.
Pakistanâs motive in pursuing an alliance with the United States is driven by its quest for security against its much larger neighbor, India. Pakistan has repeatedly turned to the United States as its most significant source of expensive weapons and economic aid. Although, in the hope of winning US support for Pakistanâs regional aims, Pakistani leaders have assured US officials that they share the United Statesâ global security concerns, Pakistan has been repeatedly disappointed because the United States does not share Pakistanâs fears of Indian hegemony in South Asia.
For its part, the United States has also chased a mirage when it has assumed that, over time, its assistance to Pakistan would engender a sense of security among Pakistanis, thereby leading to a change in Pakistanâs priorities and objectives. The United States initially poured money and arms into Pakistan in the hope of building a major fighting force that could assist in defending Asia against communism. Pakistan repeatedly failed to live up to its promises to provide troops for any of the wars the United States fought against communistforces, instead using American weapons in its wars with India. Furthermore, US hopes of persuading Pakistan to give up or curtail its nuclear weapons program or to stop using Jihadi militants as proxies in regional conflicts have similarly proved futile.
Three American presidentsâDwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnsonâhave asked the question: What do we get from aiding Pakistan? FiveâJimmy Carter, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obamaâhave wondered aloud whether Pakistanâs leaders can be trusted to keep their word. Meanwhile in Pakistan, successive governments have spent a lot of time trying to figure out how to maintain Pakistanâs freedom of action while depending on US aid. But neither country has changed its core policies nor have they given up the hope that the other will change.
The US-Pakistan relationship has depended largely on cordial ties between leaders and officials who have often misunderstood each otherâs intentions and limitations. Whereas Pakistanis have often benefited from the American tendency to ignore history and focus only on immediate goals, Americans have often assumed that building up Pakistanâs economic and military capacity provides them leverage even after periodically finding out the limits of US influence. And both sides have their own stereotypes about each other, traceable back to Pakistanâs emergence as an independent country.
During that period, soon after emerging from British Indiaâs bloody partition in 1947, Pakistanâs leaders confronted an uncertain future for their new country. When most of the world was indifferent to Pakistan as the potential homeland of South Asiaâs Muslims, India antagonized Pakistan without compromise or compassion. Because of this, soon after independence Pakistanâs founding fathers, encouraged by some British geostrategists, decided that they would continue to maintain the large army they had inherited even though the new nation could not afford to pay for it from its own resources and did not immediately face a visible security threat. Given Pakistanâs location at the crossroads of the Middle East and South Asia and its relative proximity to
Similar Books
