since 1962, and portraits of General Aung San. By doing so, they sought to convey that they represented General Aung San’s true legacy. Moreover, the protesters sought to remind the army that General Aung San’s vision had been of an army that defended the people’s interests, not one that killed its fellow citizens.
Nevertheless, during the demonstrations, as many as three thousand people in Rangoon and other towns were killed, most shot by the military while marching. 7 There were also incidents when civilians surrounded and killed suspected military intelligence personnel and others. Some civilians also came out with swords, daggers and sharpened bicycle and umbrella spokes. After years of feeling frustrated and powerless, the desire for revenge was overwhelming.
The ABFSU in Rangoon set up a security department early on to manage the crowds during demonstrations. Ko Doe, a serious-looking young man who was a member of the security department, remembers how difficult it was to stop some of the violence, which included beheadings.Those who carried out the beheadings didn’t have proof that the person was an intelligence agent, he said. ‘They just suspected or hated that person, so they killed him.’ Sometimes Ko Doe and his team received telephone calls telling them to rush to a scene where violence was breaking out, but by the time they arrived, it was too late. Ko Doe said: ‘We students didn’t want this kind of thing.’
Ko Doe explained that he and other student activists suspected two kinds of people were behind the killings: ordinary people who were angry and lost control and military people in plain clothes trying to create a chaotic situation so that the military would have a justification for clamping down. Although the students understood these problems, Ko Doe said they were too inexperienced to know how to prevent them.
Ko Doe came from a military family, so his primary duty was to collect information about the military’s activities. Through sympathetic military people, he learned what kind of guns and other equipment they had and, on some occasions, whether or not the soldiers had been given orders to shoot. Some of the military people told him they had to shoot because they were ordered to, but they didn’t want to. He said: ‘They felt really confused and found it difficult to understand. So they gave us all the information.’
Not only in Rangoon, but also in some rural towns and villages, there were soldiers, though rarely intelligence officers or higher-ranking army officers, who helped the demonstrators. One long-time activist, Myat Hla, who was in a town in central Burma at the time, said: ‘Some of the local army men defected to the demonstrators and even told me they would give training to the villagers when the time came.’
Myat Hla was helping villagers establish local strike committees, but he said that the situation in his area was chaotic. Mobs of villagers captured weapons from police stations, and it was very close to armed struggle. Although he urged the villagers to use non-violent methods, they laughed at him and said he was naive. Myat Hla said: ‘Ordinary people do not believe in non-violent methods. They were surprised that they shouldn’t do anything when the soldiers shot at them. At least they wanted to use swords.’ In Myat Hla’s area, local authorities apparently tried to stir up trouble by provoking clashes between Muslims and Burmese and allowing soldiers to steal rice and take all the money out of the local bank.
With demonstrations taking place all over the country, on 12 August 1988 General Sein Lwin was removed as president. On 19 August, Dr Maung Maung, a legal scholar with a senior position in the BSPPgovernment, was appointed as Sein Lwin’s successor. Five days later, troops were called back to their bases and the shooting stopped.
No longer afraid of being killed, numerous people who had originally hesitated to come out now took to the streets.
Nevertheless, during the demonstrations, as many as three thousand people in Rangoon and other towns were killed, most shot by the military while marching. 7 There were also incidents when civilians surrounded and killed suspected military intelligence personnel and others. Some civilians also came out with swords, daggers and sharpened bicycle and umbrella spokes. After years of feeling frustrated and powerless, the desire for revenge was overwhelming.
The ABFSU in Rangoon set up a security department early on to manage the crowds during demonstrations. Ko Doe, a serious-looking young man who was a member of the security department, remembers how difficult it was to stop some of the violence, which included beheadings.Those who carried out the beheadings didn’t have proof that the person was an intelligence agent, he said. ‘They just suspected or hated that person, so they killed him.’ Sometimes Ko Doe and his team received telephone calls telling them to rush to a scene where violence was breaking out, but by the time they arrived, it was too late. Ko Doe said: ‘We students didn’t want this kind of thing.’
Ko Doe explained that he and other student activists suspected two kinds of people were behind the killings: ordinary people who were angry and lost control and military people in plain clothes trying to create a chaotic situation so that the military would have a justification for clamping down. Although the students understood these problems, Ko Doe said they were too inexperienced to know how to prevent them.
Ko Doe came from a military family, so his primary duty was to collect information about the military’s activities. Through sympathetic military people, he learned what kind of guns and other equipment they had and, on some occasions, whether or not the soldiers had been given orders to shoot. Some of the military people told him they had to shoot because they were ordered to, but they didn’t want to. He said: ‘They felt really confused and found it difficult to understand. So they gave us all the information.’
Not only in Rangoon, but also in some rural towns and villages, there were soldiers, though rarely intelligence officers or higher-ranking army officers, who helped the demonstrators. One long-time activist, Myat Hla, who was in a town in central Burma at the time, said: ‘Some of the local army men defected to the demonstrators and even told me they would give training to the villagers when the time came.’
Myat Hla was helping villagers establish local strike committees, but he said that the situation in his area was chaotic. Mobs of villagers captured weapons from police stations, and it was very close to armed struggle. Although he urged the villagers to use non-violent methods, they laughed at him and said he was naive. Myat Hla said: ‘Ordinary people do not believe in non-violent methods. They were surprised that they shouldn’t do anything when the soldiers shot at them. At least they wanted to use swords.’ In Myat Hla’s area, local authorities apparently tried to stir up trouble by provoking clashes between Muslims and Burmese and allowing soldiers to steal rice and take all the money out of the local bank.
With demonstrations taking place all over the country, on 12 August 1988 General Sein Lwin was removed as president. On 19 August, Dr Maung Maung, a legal scholar with a senior position in the BSPPgovernment, was appointed as Sein Lwin’s successor. Five days later, troops were called back to their bases and the shooting stopped.
No longer afraid of being killed, numerous people who had originally hesitated to come out now took to the streets.
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