subject fairly extensively, though not exhaustively. Likewise for MI5, and to a much smaller extent SOE.
American and other Allied intelligence services, especially on the counter-espionage side. After OSS and FBI, the information Kim could have produced on the French and the Poles might have been of much interest.
Political information. Here the spin-off from counter-espionage work was considerable. Enemy peace feelers, for example, would have been of special importance. Our work also gave us insight into the political position and intentions of Spain, Portugal and other countries. The Russians had no diplomatic representation in the Iberian area and probably few sources of information. In addition we saw many diplomatic intercepts and some Foreign Office telegrams.
GC&CS. Kim could have told the Russians in detail which Abwehr and SD cyphers were being read, but his information about GC&CS work on diplomatic cyphers might have been more valuable. I doubt if he knew much about enemy military cyphers.
The X Factor – the information a person in Kim’s position could have picked up outside his own field, if he were so minded. It is always far more than one expects.
It is a formidable list. But there were two extremely stringent limiting factors: first, the extent to which Kim and the Russians would have judged it safe to meet, and second, the time he could spare from his fairly exacting Section V work to prepare written or verbal reports for Moscow, or to carry out other risky and time-consuming tasks such as extracting papers and later getting them back to the office. The Russians would have calculated that Kim’s real fulfilment would come after the war, when anti-communist work would be resumed, and that his first wartime priority must be to improve his own position and reputation in SIS and avoid all serious risks. I would judge that the Russians had to exercise fierce self-denial over Kim at this time. The section of the NKVD that controlled him may have had to resist many demands from other sections and departments for information on this or that pet subject.
Paradoxically, a case can be made that in these years, mid-1941 to mid-1944, Kim’s position as a Russian spy may actually have brought the British greater advantage than disadvantage, irrespective of the merits of his work for Section V. Consider the balance sheet. We and the Russians were fighting on the same side. To give them our information about enemy intelligence activities or armed forces could not do us much harm provided that the information was not put at risk by Russian insecurity or by enemy capture. Details of British and Allied intelligence services and their work, though obviously relevant to their post-war capabilities, might not be of great practical value to the Russians unless and until updated after the war. On the other side of the balancesheet, Kim was in a position to render an unusual service to the British. During the war we and the Americans were constantly giving assurances to the Russians on a number of matters. The Russian attitude was often sceptical, even when our assurances were genuine and accurate. But where Churchill, Eden and Roosevelt might not be believed, Kim probably would be. For example, he could have told them, if he reported accurately, that the Allies were broadly trustworthy in their refusal to consider any kind of anti-Soviet deal either with the German government or with anti-Nazi plotters. Whether he did so report, of course I cannot say. Certainly the Russians in their propaganda often accused the Allies of such deals – I remember particularly seeing as part of my post-war diplomatic duties a shamefully mendacious Soviet film, The Fall of Berlin , in which Churchill was shown in collusion with a German arms dealer while the Russians were fighting for their lives – but if they really believed such nonsense then they must have been bigger political fools than I take them for. With Kim (and Donald Maclean and
American and other Allied intelligence services, especially on the counter-espionage side. After OSS and FBI, the information Kim could have produced on the French and the Poles might have been of much interest.
Political information. Here the spin-off from counter-espionage work was considerable. Enemy peace feelers, for example, would have been of special importance. Our work also gave us insight into the political position and intentions of Spain, Portugal and other countries. The Russians had no diplomatic representation in the Iberian area and probably few sources of information. In addition we saw many diplomatic intercepts and some Foreign Office telegrams.
GC&CS. Kim could have told the Russians in detail which Abwehr and SD cyphers were being read, but his information about GC&CS work on diplomatic cyphers might have been more valuable. I doubt if he knew much about enemy military cyphers.
The X Factor – the information a person in Kim’s position could have picked up outside his own field, if he were so minded. It is always far more than one expects.
It is a formidable list. But there were two extremely stringent limiting factors: first, the extent to which Kim and the Russians would have judged it safe to meet, and second, the time he could spare from his fairly exacting Section V work to prepare written or verbal reports for Moscow, or to carry out other risky and time-consuming tasks such as extracting papers and later getting them back to the office. The Russians would have calculated that Kim’s real fulfilment would come after the war, when anti-communist work would be resumed, and that his first wartime priority must be to improve his own position and reputation in SIS and avoid all serious risks. I would judge that the Russians had to exercise fierce self-denial over Kim at this time. The section of the NKVD that controlled him may have had to resist many demands from other sections and departments for information on this or that pet subject.
Paradoxically, a case can be made that in these years, mid-1941 to mid-1944, Kim’s position as a Russian spy may actually have brought the British greater advantage than disadvantage, irrespective of the merits of his work for Section V. Consider the balance sheet. We and the Russians were fighting on the same side. To give them our information about enemy intelligence activities or armed forces could not do us much harm provided that the information was not put at risk by Russian insecurity or by enemy capture. Details of British and Allied intelligence services and their work, though obviously relevant to their post-war capabilities, might not be of great practical value to the Russians unless and until updated after the war. On the other side of the balancesheet, Kim was in a position to render an unusual service to the British. During the war we and the Americans were constantly giving assurances to the Russians on a number of matters. The Russian attitude was often sceptical, even when our assurances were genuine and accurate. But where Churchill, Eden and Roosevelt might not be believed, Kim probably would be. For example, he could have told them, if he reported accurately, that the Allies were broadly trustworthy in their refusal to consider any kind of anti-Soviet deal either with the German government or with anti-Nazi plotters. Whether he did so report, of course I cannot say. Certainly the Russians in their propaganda often accused the Allies of such deals – I remember particularly seeing as part of my post-war diplomatic duties a shamefully mendacious Soviet film, The Fall of Berlin , in which Churchill was shown in collusion with a German arms dealer while the Russians were fighting for their lives – but if they really believed such nonsense then they must have been bigger political fools than I take them for. With Kim (and Donald Maclean and
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