Moscow.
But Arras, like the phoney war itself, was only an interlude. Kim had already been told ‘in pressing terms’ by the Russians that his first priority must be the British secret service. He relates that after he returned to England in the summer of 1940 he had an interview with Frank Birch at Bletchley, arranged through a mutual friend, but was turned down because GC&CS thought the salary was not worth his while. (Conceivably, the friend was Dilly Knox, of whom Aileen sometimes spoke in familiar terms. 4 ) How different his history might have been if Birch had been able to lay hands on another £100 a year.
When Kim finally joined Section D of SIS in July 1940, with Guy Burgess’s help, he was still some way from what the Russians had in mind. The training schools at Brickendonbury and Beaulieu must have yielded interesting rather than vital information. Probably Kim’s greatest usefulness to Soviet intelligence at this time arose from his visits to London and such access as this gave him to senior officers in SOE and elsewhere; no doubt, too, it was these visits that allowed an opportunity for occasional contact with the Russians. But although his reports may not have been of great moment, he had two important things going for him: his own obvious ability and a now increasing circle of friends in the intelligence world. Through Burgess and SOE he met Tommy Harris; through Harris he came to know Dick Brooman-White and others in MI5; and thence came the introduction to Section V in August 1941. Now he was inside the citadel.
In spite of his faith in the Soviet Union, Kim must have had some anxious moments as the Germans drove rapidly towards Moscow. The Red Army might be defeated, an anti-communist government installed. And even if the worst did not happen,Kim’s own role might become known to the Germans through captured NKVD records or staff. The German propaganda machine could have made a good deal of the Kim story. Probably it was not until after Stalingrad that this particular danger could safely be discounted.
Kim’s three years in Section V, 1941 to 1944, gave him access to abundant secret information, and not only on Section V’s own work. Here, not necessarily in order of priority, are a few of the subjects he could have reported on:
The past work of SIS and MI5 against the Soviet Union and communism generally, and future plans in this field. Kim was able, as he relates, to do some delving into the first in SIS files, and was well placed to cover the second.
The Axis intelligence services. His information on these was obviously extensive, but would relate mainly to the western European and western Mediterranean area, in which the Russians may not have been closely interested. If he had tried to find out in detail what was known in the east European and Middle East subsection about Abwehr and SD work against the USSR, he would have run the risk of making himself conspicuous. Probably he picked up items here and there, and perhaps an occasional monthly summary, but did not have the opportunity to probe thoroughly.
Axis military movements and plans. In Section V we saw very little of the vast Bletchley output on this subject, or of the intelligence appreciations made there and in the War Office, Admiralty and Air Ministry. SIS agent reports, filed in Central Registry, might in theory have been accessible to Kim, but in practice he would not have had the necessary time or background knowledge to assess and deal with them. Nor could he have got hold of them in quantity without drawing attention to himself. Probably he was told to give this whole subject a miss.
Allied war plans. Kim could have told the Russians something about Torch, Overlord and other major operations several months in advance; but, of course, the Russians were given much of this information officially.
SIS organisation, operations, agents, capabilities and plans; and details of SIS staff at home and abroad. He could have covered this
But Arras, like the phoney war itself, was only an interlude. Kim had already been told ‘in pressing terms’ by the Russians that his first priority must be the British secret service. He relates that after he returned to England in the summer of 1940 he had an interview with Frank Birch at Bletchley, arranged through a mutual friend, but was turned down because GC&CS thought the salary was not worth his while. (Conceivably, the friend was Dilly Knox, of whom Aileen sometimes spoke in familiar terms. 4 ) How different his history might have been if Birch had been able to lay hands on another £100 a year.
When Kim finally joined Section D of SIS in July 1940, with Guy Burgess’s help, he was still some way from what the Russians had in mind. The training schools at Brickendonbury and Beaulieu must have yielded interesting rather than vital information. Probably Kim’s greatest usefulness to Soviet intelligence at this time arose from his visits to London and such access as this gave him to senior officers in SOE and elsewhere; no doubt, too, it was these visits that allowed an opportunity for occasional contact with the Russians. But although his reports may not have been of great moment, he had two important things going for him: his own obvious ability and a now increasing circle of friends in the intelligence world. Through Burgess and SOE he met Tommy Harris; through Harris he came to know Dick Brooman-White and others in MI5; and thence came the introduction to Section V in August 1941. Now he was inside the citadel.
In spite of his faith in the Soviet Union, Kim must have had some anxious moments as the Germans drove rapidly towards Moscow. The Red Army might be defeated, an anti-communist government installed. And even if the worst did not happen,Kim’s own role might become known to the Germans through captured NKVD records or staff. The German propaganda machine could have made a good deal of the Kim story. Probably it was not until after Stalingrad that this particular danger could safely be discounted.
Kim’s three years in Section V, 1941 to 1944, gave him access to abundant secret information, and not only on Section V’s own work. Here, not necessarily in order of priority, are a few of the subjects he could have reported on:
The past work of SIS and MI5 against the Soviet Union and communism generally, and future plans in this field. Kim was able, as he relates, to do some delving into the first in SIS files, and was well placed to cover the second.
The Axis intelligence services. His information on these was obviously extensive, but would relate mainly to the western European and western Mediterranean area, in which the Russians may not have been closely interested. If he had tried to find out in detail what was known in the east European and Middle East subsection about Abwehr and SD work against the USSR, he would have run the risk of making himself conspicuous. Probably he picked up items here and there, and perhaps an occasional monthly summary, but did not have the opportunity to probe thoroughly.
Axis military movements and plans. In Section V we saw very little of the vast Bletchley output on this subject, or of the intelligence appreciations made there and in the War Office, Admiralty and Air Ministry. SIS agent reports, filed in Central Registry, might in theory have been accessible to Kim, but in practice he would not have had the necessary time or background knowledge to assess and deal with them. Nor could he have got hold of them in quantity without drawing attention to himself. Probably he was told to give this whole subject a miss.
Allied war plans. Kim could have told the Russians something about Torch, Overlord and other major operations several months in advance; but, of course, the Russians were given much of this information officially.
SIS organisation, operations, agents, capabilities and plans; and details of SIS staff at home and abroad. He could have covered this
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