collected valuable intelligence about the comings and goings of ships in the harbour, of aircraft from the airfields, troop movements and map references for the position of German military supplies. One SOE agent wrote: ‘The information coming out of Crete at that time was of the utmost importance . . . because the Germans were using the island as their main base for the supplies of their forces in North Africa and information concerning their movements was used prior to the Battle of Alamein.’
Agents came and went, delivered by motor launch or submarine. Ralph Stockbridge was taken off the island shortly before Colonel Papadakis. He took with him a young Greek, Lefteris Kalitsounakis, Papadakis’s nephew, who had been forced to work for the colonel as almost a slave. Kalitsounakis was persuaded to join ISLD and the men returned to Crete a few weeks later, with Kalitsounakis as Stockbridge’s assistant. With them was a third ISLD agent, John Stanley. Their submarine was to be met on the north coast by Patrick Leigh Fermor. Unfortunately Leigh Fermor had drunk a great deal of wine and raki that day and was nowhere to be found. The three men made it by dinghy to what they thought was the right beach. Kalitsounakis went ahead and immediately ran into a barbed-wire fence. They were in a minefield. Kalitsounakis’s training in Cairo had included a course on explosives. He knew that a recently exploded mine leaves a smell like almonds, and he could smell almonds. He guessed that some of the minefield must have been detonated by wandering sheep. Very carefully he retraced his path, found the others and told them to walk only in his footsteps. This they did, and managed to unload the supplies from the dinghy. Sometime later they found Leigh Fermor in a deep, raki-induced sleep.
There were other dangers. No one was aware that the Germans had managed to insert a double agent into their midst, a man called Giorgios Komnas, who was a clerk in the Kommandantur at Heraklion. He had provided SOE with some very detailed information about Wehrmacht forces, which he claimed had been taken from ration returns. SOE intelligence officers in Cairo found that some things did not tally. In one report Komnas described in detail an SS battalion based at Prama, commanded by Major von Teitzen. There were no SS battalions on the island.
Cairo sent a signal expressing its concerns to Leigh Fermor, who sent a letter by runner to Andreas Polentas, the man who had taken over from Papadakis. It read:
Headquarters have a strong base to believe that the numbers concerning troops etc., incoming and outgoing with planes or ships, i.e.: The information we have sent recently, are heavily exaggerated. This, if true, can be attributed to two reasons:
a) the agent who sent this information had made a big mistake or
b) had taken these figures from somebody who had deliberately given an exaggerated idea of the forces the enemy has sent to Libya.
Headquarters has asked us to clear this up as soon as possible.
Polentas refused to believe that Komnas was a double agent. He knew that the Germans used certain tactics to fool Allied intelligence and spies. One ploy was to move troops on to air transports off ships in the day and disembark them at night, then take them by lorry to another part of the island. Polentas put the discrepancy in numbers down to ruses such as this. He then did a very rash thing. He was due to meet Vangelis Vandoulas in a cafe in Chania. He took Komnas with him and introduced him to the agent saying, ‘My dear Vangelis, it is my pleasure to introduce you to my friend Giorgios Komnas. Dear Giorgios this is my cousin Vangelis Vandoulas. I have already spoken to you about him when he arrived from down there.’
Vandoulas was horrified, ‘down there’ meant from Egypt. This was a very serious breach of security. Vandoulas stood up shook hands with Komnas, bought him a drink and then apologised and left saying that he had an
Agents came and went, delivered by motor launch or submarine. Ralph Stockbridge was taken off the island shortly before Colonel Papadakis. He took with him a young Greek, Lefteris Kalitsounakis, Papadakis’s nephew, who had been forced to work for the colonel as almost a slave. Kalitsounakis was persuaded to join ISLD and the men returned to Crete a few weeks later, with Kalitsounakis as Stockbridge’s assistant. With them was a third ISLD agent, John Stanley. Their submarine was to be met on the north coast by Patrick Leigh Fermor. Unfortunately Leigh Fermor had drunk a great deal of wine and raki that day and was nowhere to be found. The three men made it by dinghy to what they thought was the right beach. Kalitsounakis went ahead and immediately ran into a barbed-wire fence. They were in a minefield. Kalitsounakis’s training in Cairo had included a course on explosives. He knew that a recently exploded mine leaves a smell like almonds, and he could smell almonds. He guessed that some of the minefield must have been detonated by wandering sheep. Very carefully he retraced his path, found the others and told them to walk only in his footsteps. This they did, and managed to unload the supplies from the dinghy. Sometime later they found Leigh Fermor in a deep, raki-induced sleep.
There were other dangers. No one was aware that the Germans had managed to insert a double agent into their midst, a man called Giorgios Komnas, who was a clerk in the Kommandantur at Heraklion. He had provided SOE with some very detailed information about Wehrmacht forces, which he claimed had been taken from ration returns. SOE intelligence officers in Cairo found that some things did not tally. In one report Komnas described in detail an SS battalion based at Prama, commanded by Major von Teitzen. There were no SS battalions on the island.
Cairo sent a signal expressing its concerns to Leigh Fermor, who sent a letter by runner to Andreas Polentas, the man who had taken over from Papadakis. It read:
Headquarters have a strong base to believe that the numbers concerning troops etc., incoming and outgoing with planes or ships, i.e.: The information we have sent recently, are heavily exaggerated. This, if true, can be attributed to two reasons:
a) the agent who sent this information had made a big mistake or
b) had taken these figures from somebody who had deliberately given an exaggerated idea of the forces the enemy has sent to Libya.
Headquarters has asked us to clear this up as soon as possible.
Polentas refused to believe that Komnas was a double agent. He knew that the Germans used certain tactics to fool Allied intelligence and spies. One ploy was to move troops on to air transports off ships in the day and disembark them at night, then take them by lorry to another part of the island. Polentas put the discrepancy in numbers down to ruses such as this. He then did a very rash thing. He was due to meet Vangelis Vandoulas in a cafe in Chania. He took Komnas with him and introduced him to the agent saying, ‘My dear Vangelis, it is my pleasure to introduce you to my friend Giorgios Komnas. Dear Giorgios this is my cousin Vangelis Vandoulas. I have already spoken to you about him when he arrived from down there.’
Vandoulas was horrified, ‘down there’ meant from Egypt. This was a very serious breach of security. Vandoulas stood up shook hands with Komnas, bought him a drink and then apologised and left saying that he had an
Similar Books
