line forty miles from Tunis and await attack weather and dry going in the spring. When the sun began to shine in March 1943, C Company was in the line just north of Medjez-el-Bab dug in around a farm on theungrateful slopes of Djebel Tokurna. Between the ribbons of rock the earth dried to grey dust, and but for a few stunted corktrees and twisted olives, the farmer grew nothing but stones. There was a riverless valley of similar fertility and broken by dry wadis ,which stretched for half a mile to the facing hills which were occupied by the Boche. Major Arkdust summoned his commanders to an order group in the scullery of the farmhouse.
“Preparations are being made at Army Headquarters for a big attack to break through to Tunis. Since the planning staff have to make twenty-six copies of everything, they can’t do the job in five minutes. It’ll take them even longer than usual here, of course, because the dear chaps have to work three hundred miles away in Algiers. Even at that distance, from the smell of gunpowder they sense that the Germans may also be planning an attack. They would like the earliest possible warning if this is so, in order, no doubt, that they may withdraw to previously prepared positions in Rio de Janeiro. We are, therefore, instructed during the interim period to intensify our patrolling with two objects—one, to become familiar with the terrain between ourselves and the enemy in preparation for our possible attack, and two, to observe the enemy and detect as early as possible any sign of impending counterattack. We will now take each platoon’s sector in detail …”
Later, back at my platoon headquarters in a disused pull-up for goats, Sergeant Transom surveyed the German hills through his binoculars.
“If I was Jerry I’d not bother coming across here. He’s got just as good a load of stones on his djebel as we’ve got on ours.”
“His main position is around that sugarloaf, Djebel Aboudir. From his side, whoever holds that has got the valley. Our main task is to reconnoitre a possible route up there. And to watch whether he shows any intention of coming down.”
He studied the spot for a while.
“The more you stare at it,” he said, “the less you see. It’s loaded with false crests and crisscrossed with wadis. We’ll have to patrol down at night to get any sort of idea.”
The flat central bed of the valley was commanded by both sides and there was no possibility of unscreened movement across it by day. On four nights we patrolled across, but could never get any real idea of the going around Djebel Aboudir. The first patrol caught a trip-wire, set up a Boche flare, and spent three hours crouching in a heaven-sent hole while spandaus plastered their neighbourhood. The second found a German patrol already working its beat; on the third we became hopelessly lost among the wadis at the foot of the hill and the last, which made some progress across them, was defeated by dawn and an apparently unscalable chasm.
A flexible mind is an essential attribute of a good commander . He should always be prepared to change his approach if his initial plans do not bring success. I sat down quietly and thought our problem through. Then I called my subordinate commanders together.
“It is clear,” I said, “that we are not going to find out much about Djebel Aboudir by night.”
“And nobody’s getting down there in one piece by day,” said Sergeant Transom.
“If someone could get into the valley in daylight and up to the gorge that stopped us last night, he’d probably be able to see the best way up the hill.”
“If he had any peepers left to see with,” said Corporal Dooley. “There’s not a scrap of cover between here and the wadis. ”
“But he might get down there without cover,” I said “Some of them do.”
I pointed to an Arab riding his donkey along the track to our rear. His wife was walking in front with the luggage, a battle area reversal of the traditional
“Preparations are being made at Army Headquarters for a big attack to break through to Tunis. Since the planning staff have to make twenty-six copies of everything, they can’t do the job in five minutes. It’ll take them even longer than usual here, of course, because the dear chaps have to work three hundred miles away in Algiers. Even at that distance, from the smell of gunpowder they sense that the Germans may also be planning an attack. They would like the earliest possible warning if this is so, in order, no doubt, that they may withdraw to previously prepared positions in Rio de Janeiro. We are, therefore, instructed during the interim period to intensify our patrolling with two objects—one, to become familiar with the terrain between ourselves and the enemy in preparation for our possible attack, and two, to observe the enemy and detect as early as possible any sign of impending counterattack. We will now take each platoon’s sector in detail …”
Later, back at my platoon headquarters in a disused pull-up for goats, Sergeant Transom surveyed the German hills through his binoculars.
“If I was Jerry I’d not bother coming across here. He’s got just as good a load of stones on his djebel as we’ve got on ours.”
“His main position is around that sugarloaf, Djebel Aboudir. From his side, whoever holds that has got the valley. Our main task is to reconnoitre a possible route up there. And to watch whether he shows any intention of coming down.”
He studied the spot for a while.
“The more you stare at it,” he said, “the less you see. It’s loaded with false crests and crisscrossed with wadis. We’ll have to patrol down at night to get any sort of idea.”
The flat central bed of the valley was commanded by both sides and there was no possibility of unscreened movement across it by day. On four nights we patrolled across, but could never get any real idea of the going around Djebel Aboudir. The first patrol caught a trip-wire, set up a Boche flare, and spent three hours crouching in a heaven-sent hole while spandaus plastered their neighbourhood. The second found a German patrol already working its beat; on the third we became hopelessly lost among the wadis at the foot of the hill and the last, which made some progress across them, was defeated by dawn and an apparently unscalable chasm.
A flexible mind is an essential attribute of a good commander . He should always be prepared to change his approach if his initial plans do not bring success. I sat down quietly and thought our problem through. Then I called my subordinate commanders together.
“It is clear,” I said, “that we are not going to find out much about Djebel Aboudir by night.”
“And nobody’s getting down there in one piece by day,” said Sergeant Transom.
“If someone could get into the valley in daylight and up to the gorge that stopped us last night, he’d probably be able to see the best way up the hill.”
“If he had any peepers left to see with,” said Corporal Dooley. “There’s not a scrap of cover between here and the wadis. ”
“But he might get down there without cover,” I said “Some of them do.”
I pointed to an Arab riding his donkey along the track to our rear. His wife was walking in front with the luggage, a battle area reversal of the traditional
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