War
Â
Â
Â
Â
In the first weeks of 1967, Dave Thompson, Paul Lichfield, and I made a choice we could not have predicted. As we designed the eradication project for Nigeriaâs Eastern Region, we also researched smallpox reports from past years. We recorded the previous outbreaks by date and place on maps of the region, and as we did, a macro pattern appeared. At the beginning of most high-transmission seasons, smallpox outbreaks were generally more prevalent in the northern part of Eastern Nigeria, suggesting that they migrated in from the Northern Region and gradually moved southward. We wondered initially if we could impede the progression, and thus stop smallpox, by building a fire line of mass vaccinations across the northern part of the region. The results in Abakaliki, however, were compelling and gave us pause, especially as they followed so soon after the dramatic results in Ogoja. We decided that the surveillance/containment approach ought to be tested in a larger area.
With this thought in mind, we talked with Dr. A. Anezanwu, directorof the smallpox program for the Eastern Region and our supervisor at the Ministry of Health in Enugu, about putting most of our resources into surveillance and containment, focusing on the northern portion of the region first, with plans to continue south. We would go ahead with some mass vaccination activities because the measles program required that approach. But we could channel much of our effort into finding and containing outbreaks as the mass vaccination approach proceeded. Changing strategies involved risk. If the new strategy failed, the entire Nigerian eradication program could possibly be delayed or even jeopardized. As we discussed the pros and cons, Dr. Anezanwu warmed to the idea of trying something new and radical. He was a member of the Ibo tribe, as were the majority of people in the Eastern Region, and the Ibos have a reputation for entrepreneurship and taking risks. He agreed to try surveillance/containment, though probably not because we were so persuasive. Rather, Eastern Nigeria in early 1967 was the right place and time for decisions that were at odds with federal thinking. It was yet another expression of the rebellion brewing at that time.
TESTING A RADICAL APPROACH IN A REBELLIOUS LAND
What no one knew was that we had only six months to test the new approach. War was looming between the Eastern Region and the rest of Nigeria. When we consulted political officers about how soon the fighting would start, they were somewhat reassuring: both sides needed time to secure weapons, train soldiers, and actually begin military actions; meanwhile, there were hopes for a settlement that would forestall war.
The political situation affected the smallpox effort directly. For one thing, it increased the risks involved in travel. The fear of war meant heightened security and numerous local roadblocks. On some trips, our car was stopped and searched every few miles. The roadblocks were often maintained by citizen soldiers or two or three teenagers who mixed guns, alcohol, and bravado. They had to be taken seriously at all times. Sometimes travel was facilitated by showing an official letter thatstated our purpose and asked all security personnel to speed our travel for the sake of stopping smallpox. This might not work if the guards lacked sufficient literacy, but the reverse was also true: someone wanting to fake literacy would feign reading an official-looking letter and give orders to allow us to proceed. We soon learned to construct our own letters, putting enough stamps on them so they conveyed importance.
One missionary was questioned at a roadblock about the labeling machine in the trunk of her car. She explained its use and then demonstrated it by asking one guard for his name, which she spelled out on a label. She presented the label to the very happy young man, and of course the other two guards requested the same and she obliged. Several miles
Â
Â
Â
Â
In the first weeks of 1967, Dave Thompson, Paul Lichfield, and I made a choice we could not have predicted. As we designed the eradication project for Nigeriaâs Eastern Region, we also researched smallpox reports from past years. We recorded the previous outbreaks by date and place on maps of the region, and as we did, a macro pattern appeared. At the beginning of most high-transmission seasons, smallpox outbreaks were generally more prevalent in the northern part of Eastern Nigeria, suggesting that they migrated in from the Northern Region and gradually moved southward. We wondered initially if we could impede the progression, and thus stop smallpox, by building a fire line of mass vaccinations across the northern part of the region. The results in Abakaliki, however, were compelling and gave us pause, especially as they followed so soon after the dramatic results in Ogoja. We decided that the surveillance/containment approach ought to be tested in a larger area.
With this thought in mind, we talked with Dr. A. Anezanwu, directorof the smallpox program for the Eastern Region and our supervisor at the Ministry of Health in Enugu, about putting most of our resources into surveillance and containment, focusing on the northern portion of the region first, with plans to continue south. We would go ahead with some mass vaccination activities because the measles program required that approach. But we could channel much of our effort into finding and containing outbreaks as the mass vaccination approach proceeded. Changing strategies involved risk. If the new strategy failed, the entire Nigerian eradication program could possibly be delayed or even jeopardized. As we discussed the pros and cons, Dr. Anezanwu warmed to the idea of trying something new and radical. He was a member of the Ibo tribe, as were the majority of people in the Eastern Region, and the Ibos have a reputation for entrepreneurship and taking risks. He agreed to try surveillance/containment, though probably not because we were so persuasive. Rather, Eastern Nigeria in early 1967 was the right place and time for decisions that were at odds with federal thinking. It was yet another expression of the rebellion brewing at that time.
TESTING A RADICAL APPROACH IN A REBELLIOUS LAND
What no one knew was that we had only six months to test the new approach. War was looming between the Eastern Region and the rest of Nigeria. When we consulted political officers about how soon the fighting would start, they were somewhat reassuring: both sides needed time to secure weapons, train soldiers, and actually begin military actions; meanwhile, there were hopes for a settlement that would forestall war.
The political situation affected the smallpox effort directly. For one thing, it increased the risks involved in travel. The fear of war meant heightened security and numerous local roadblocks. On some trips, our car was stopped and searched every few miles. The roadblocks were often maintained by citizen soldiers or two or three teenagers who mixed guns, alcohol, and bravado. They had to be taken seriously at all times. Sometimes travel was facilitated by showing an official letter thatstated our purpose and asked all security personnel to speed our travel for the sake of stopping smallpox. This might not work if the guards lacked sufficient literacy, but the reverse was also true: someone wanting to fake literacy would feign reading an official-looking letter and give orders to allow us to proceed. We soon learned to construct our own letters, putting enough stamps on them so they conveyed importance.
One missionary was questioned at a roadblock about the labeling machine in the trunk of her car. She explained its use and then demonstrated it by asking one guard for his name, which she spelled out on a label. She presented the label to the very happy young man, and of course the other two guards requested the same and she obliged. Several miles
Similar Books
