framework had, it may be recalled, been the result of Patzigâs refusal to allow the SD to encroach on the Abwehrâs political work, in particular the Abwehrâs right to act pari-passu with the Gestapo political police. The agreement now discussed envisaged the Abwehrâs monopoly on secret espionage left intact, in return for an undertaking that the SD had priority to act as more than primus inter pares with regard to political counter-espionage activity, which was subject to judicial procedure.
Both sides expressed their satisfaction with the agreement, which would be formally finalised at the end of the year. Of course, as no strict definition was applied to counter-espionage, there was needless to say ample room for manoeuvre on both sides. Moreover, the Abwehr remained the dominant agency in military matters and as anyone with the briefest of knowledge of the intelligence world could see, it would not be difficult to extend this interest into the political field in a country like the Third Reich. Even in democracies, the frontier between military and political espionage is rather fluid. Canaris could collect political intelligence on the grounds that it was relevant to military decision making. In this way he could continue to prick Ribbentrop and, as will shortly be seen, outshine the foreign ministerâs own intelligence credentials and so further ingratiate himself with Hitler.
Moreover, if he offered cooperation with the SD, this was a two-way street. If Heydrich felt he had a window on the military thanks to Canaris, the Abwehr was building up its own surveillance of the party, so that by December 1938, the diplomat von Hassell could note in his diary that theâone positive approach ⦠is the surveillance of the entire party through the intelligence section (Canaris) of the army.â 22
At the same time, Canaris set about building up his intelligence machine. The Abwehr was divided into five sections ( see the diagram on pages 112-3 ) . Section I, under Colonel Pieckenbrock, was responsible for secret espionage abroad. Section II (Sabotage), under the direction of Major Helmuth Grosscurth, was responsible for preparation of sabotage/ commando activity behind enemy lines. Into this section was inserted a formidable special forces unit known, after the area in which they were trained, as the âBrandenburgersâ. These were the true predecessors of todays special forces. Multi-lingual, highly mobile and trained to operate behind enemy lines, these units recruited by word of mouth proved more than a match for the NKVD at Murmansk and even the SAS at the Iron Gates on the Danube, and later at Leros. At the same time, these units may have later formed the secret potential nucleus for an armed revolt against Hitler.
Section III (Counter-Espionage), under Major Rudolf Bamler, was the principal department liaising with the SD and was a domestic security section dealing with infiltration, treason and counter-espionage.
In addition to these three sections, there was the so-called âForeign Sectionâ under Admiral Leopold Birkner, a colleague of Canaris from his Wilhelmshaven days, which had the job of evaluating foreign military intelligence and liaising with the military and naval attachés en poste abroad and foreign attachés posted to Berlin.
Finally, Section Z, under Major General Hans Oster, was responsible for administration and organisation: perhaps in many ways the most important, if least transparent, part of any intelligence organisation. This section dealt with budgeting issues, although in certain circumstances conflicts were resolved by Canaris himself.
As with other intelligence agencies, a civilian front company acted as a screen for the organisationâs financial transactions that could not behandled by the diplomatic bag. In this case the company was called, suitably enough, Transmare and was run by a Levantine Jew known only by his cover name of Baron
Both sides expressed their satisfaction with the agreement, which would be formally finalised at the end of the year. Of course, as no strict definition was applied to counter-espionage, there was needless to say ample room for manoeuvre on both sides. Moreover, the Abwehr remained the dominant agency in military matters and as anyone with the briefest of knowledge of the intelligence world could see, it would not be difficult to extend this interest into the political field in a country like the Third Reich. Even in democracies, the frontier between military and political espionage is rather fluid. Canaris could collect political intelligence on the grounds that it was relevant to military decision making. In this way he could continue to prick Ribbentrop and, as will shortly be seen, outshine the foreign ministerâs own intelligence credentials and so further ingratiate himself with Hitler.
Moreover, if he offered cooperation with the SD, this was a two-way street. If Heydrich felt he had a window on the military thanks to Canaris, the Abwehr was building up its own surveillance of the party, so that by December 1938, the diplomat von Hassell could note in his diary that theâone positive approach ⦠is the surveillance of the entire party through the intelligence section (Canaris) of the army.â 22
At the same time, Canaris set about building up his intelligence machine. The Abwehr was divided into five sections ( see the diagram on pages 112-3 ) . Section I, under Colonel Pieckenbrock, was responsible for secret espionage abroad. Section II (Sabotage), under the direction of Major Helmuth Grosscurth, was responsible for preparation of sabotage/ commando activity behind enemy lines. Into this section was inserted a formidable special forces unit known, after the area in which they were trained, as the âBrandenburgersâ. These were the true predecessors of todays special forces. Multi-lingual, highly mobile and trained to operate behind enemy lines, these units recruited by word of mouth proved more than a match for the NKVD at Murmansk and even the SAS at the Iron Gates on the Danube, and later at Leros. At the same time, these units may have later formed the secret potential nucleus for an armed revolt against Hitler.
Section III (Counter-Espionage), under Major Rudolf Bamler, was the principal department liaising with the SD and was a domestic security section dealing with infiltration, treason and counter-espionage.
In addition to these three sections, there was the so-called âForeign Sectionâ under Admiral Leopold Birkner, a colleague of Canaris from his Wilhelmshaven days, which had the job of evaluating foreign military intelligence and liaising with the military and naval attachés en poste abroad and foreign attachés posted to Berlin.
Finally, Section Z, under Major General Hans Oster, was responsible for administration and organisation: perhaps in many ways the most important, if least transparent, part of any intelligence organisation. This section dealt with budgeting issues, although in certain circumstances conflicts were resolved by Canaris himself.
As with other intelligence agencies, a civilian front company acted as a screen for the organisationâs financial transactions that could not behandled by the diplomatic bag. In this case the company was called, suitably enough, Transmare and was run by a Levantine Jew known only by his cover name of Baron
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