the Abwehr was, uniquely in the Third Reich, exempt from the Aryanisation laws that barred Jews from government service.
For Canaris, the means justified the end, and if the Abwehr was to play a decisive role in Germanyâs future it had to be inoculated against the charges of treason, sentimentality and pro-Zionist tendencies, especially as its chief was hardly the embodiment of aryan vigour. That meant not only supping with the devil but imbibing much of the poison on the same menu.
Canaris was ambitious. He knew that his was only one of seven intelligence gathering agencies in Hitlerâs Germany ( see the diagram on page 109 ) and his aim was to make the Abwehr the predominant and best informed of them. The Abwehr had to share the intelligence stage with the Sicher-heitsdienst, the Naval Intelligence section, Goeringâs Forschungs Amt, Rosenbergâs Foreign Political Office, the German Minorities Intelligence Centre and the Foreign Ministry. It was by no means clear that the Abwehr could establish the necessary predominance to overshadow these rivals, all of which had Hitlerâs ear in one way or another. Relations with the Foreign Ministry were especially strained, partly on account of Ribbentropâs jealousy but also on account of that inevitable tension between diplomats and intelligence officers which always casts a shadow over collaboration betweenthese organisations. It is in the nature of diplomacy to strive to avoid incidents which result from espionage activity, while it is in the nature of intelligence work to risk provoking such events, if only because espionage frequendy involves people for whom the codes of diplomacy are sadly very far from being second nature.
In order to establish credibility and dominance, Canaris aimed to mend fences on all fronts. He established cordial links with the Foreign Ministry through a former naval officer and colleague, von Weiszäcker, then a state secretary but soon to play an important role at the Vatican as German minister to the Holy See, and to collaborate with Canaris in heading off Hitlerâs instructions later in the war to kidnap Pope Pius XII.
Later during the war, many of the peace-feelers that would engage London and Berlin would be transmitted through the Vatican. At a stroke, Canaris and Weiszäcker restored cordial relations: the freemasonry of the imperial German navy apparently breaking the ice which had frozen relations between the Tirpitzufer (German admiralty) and the Aussen Amt (foreign ministry).
With the SD, any reserve felt by the Abwehr officers after Canarisâ inaugural speech may have been dissipated by a Bierkeller evening specially arranged for officers of the Abwehr and the SD on the evening of 13 January, less than two weeks after Canaris took over as Abwehr chief. The mood was convivial and field-grey and black appeared to mingle on the best of terms. Himmler, predictably well-briefed by Heydrich, hit it off with Canaris: the naval officer with the understated manner, but keen gaze, was the spy chief of all his fantasies come true.
As it happened it was also the day of the Saar plebiscite. The rich coal mining area lying north of Lorraine was detached from Germany under articles 45-50 of the Treaty of Versailles, and the rights of exploitation granted to France for a period of fifteen years. At the close of this period the population were to decide their future status, on this day voting more than ninety per cent in favour of reunion with Germany. Unsurprisingly, themood in the Berlin Bierkeller was gemütlich (convivial). Both sides could take pleasure in the fact that the ball of German ascendancy had been set rolling.
The viperâs nest of competing intelligence in the Third Reich
Less than a week later, on 17 January, Canaris and Heydrich met to establish the framework, later to be known as the Ten Commandments, which would regulate the work between the SD and the Abwehr. The need for such a
For Canaris, the means justified the end, and if the Abwehr was to play a decisive role in Germanyâs future it had to be inoculated against the charges of treason, sentimentality and pro-Zionist tendencies, especially as its chief was hardly the embodiment of aryan vigour. That meant not only supping with the devil but imbibing much of the poison on the same menu.
Canaris was ambitious. He knew that his was only one of seven intelligence gathering agencies in Hitlerâs Germany ( see the diagram on page 109 ) and his aim was to make the Abwehr the predominant and best informed of them. The Abwehr had to share the intelligence stage with the Sicher-heitsdienst, the Naval Intelligence section, Goeringâs Forschungs Amt, Rosenbergâs Foreign Political Office, the German Minorities Intelligence Centre and the Foreign Ministry. It was by no means clear that the Abwehr could establish the necessary predominance to overshadow these rivals, all of which had Hitlerâs ear in one way or another. Relations with the Foreign Ministry were especially strained, partly on account of Ribbentropâs jealousy but also on account of that inevitable tension between diplomats and intelligence officers which always casts a shadow over collaboration betweenthese organisations. It is in the nature of diplomacy to strive to avoid incidents which result from espionage activity, while it is in the nature of intelligence work to risk provoking such events, if only because espionage frequendy involves people for whom the codes of diplomacy are sadly very far from being second nature.
In order to establish credibility and dominance, Canaris aimed to mend fences on all fronts. He established cordial links with the Foreign Ministry through a former naval officer and colleague, von Weiszäcker, then a state secretary but soon to play an important role at the Vatican as German minister to the Holy See, and to collaborate with Canaris in heading off Hitlerâs instructions later in the war to kidnap Pope Pius XII.
Later during the war, many of the peace-feelers that would engage London and Berlin would be transmitted through the Vatican. At a stroke, Canaris and Weiszäcker restored cordial relations: the freemasonry of the imperial German navy apparently breaking the ice which had frozen relations between the Tirpitzufer (German admiralty) and the Aussen Amt (foreign ministry).
With the SD, any reserve felt by the Abwehr officers after Canarisâ inaugural speech may have been dissipated by a Bierkeller evening specially arranged for officers of the Abwehr and the SD on the evening of 13 January, less than two weeks after Canaris took over as Abwehr chief. The mood was convivial and field-grey and black appeared to mingle on the best of terms. Himmler, predictably well-briefed by Heydrich, hit it off with Canaris: the naval officer with the understated manner, but keen gaze, was the spy chief of all his fantasies come true.
As it happened it was also the day of the Saar plebiscite. The rich coal mining area lying north of Lorraine was detached from Germany under articles 45-50 of the Treaty of Versailles, and the rights of exploitation granted to France for a period of fifteen years. At the close of this period the population were to decide their future status, on this day voting more than ninety per cent in favour of reunion with Germany. Unsurprisingly, themood in the Berlin Bierkeller was gemütlich (convivial). Both sides could take pleasure in the fact that the ball of German ascendancy had been set rolling.
The viperâs nest of competing intelligence in the Third Reich
Less than a week later, on 17 January, Canaris and Heydrich met to establish the framework, later to be known as the Ten Commandments, which would regulate the work between the SD and the Abwehr. The need for such a
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