Hitler's Jet Plane by Mano Ziegler

hack at the Achilles’ heel of the German Reich and Hitler realised that more such attacks would deprive him of an effective mechanised defence. A hectic programme of conferences was now begun at the highest level. The planned production of bomber and fighter aircraft was gone over repeatedly and reams of statistics produced. The possibility of its realisation changed from one day to the next. Goering, still in the dark about the true situation and what was possible, pleaded for a strong fighter arm and a no less strong bomber output. He studiously avoided taking the bull by the horns to disabuse Hitler of the notion that the invasion could be stopped by a notional ‘fastest bomber’. Being little more than Hitler’s lapdog, no doubt he felt his own powerlessness.
    That was how matters stood when a decisive conference was fixed for 23 May 1944, held in the SS barracks at Obersalzberg on the slope below Hitler’s residence. Goering had invited twenty representatives of the aviation and armaments ministries, of research, industry and the Luftwaffe including Reich Minister Speer, Milch, von Richthofen, Galland, Saur, Petersen (head of the Rechlin aircraft test base), Karl Frydag deputising for the managing director of Heinkel, Knemeyer and others.
    Goering opened proceedings by delivering a potted history of mistakes of the past including a sly dig at the posthumous Udet, and rounded off with the by now customary exhortation substantially to strengthen the Luftwaffe in order to regain its former aerial superiority and above all to fend off the threatened invasion of the European mainland. Goering praised Udet for his Stuka idea and for carrying it through but then blamed him for neglecting bomber production to do so. Valuable time had been squandered on useless experiments to turn the giant He 177 into a dive bomber which had naturally gone awry. Goering placed special value on strengthening the day- and night-fighter arms. It had now become very urgent to combat the Allied bomber fleets over the Reich and bring to a halt the destruction of German cities and armaments factories. Hitler was expecting above everything an enhanced production of heavy bombers, especially the four-engined He 277 to which preference was being given and of which the Führer was demanding a future monthly output of at least 200 machines. Next in line came the Ju 287 which had already shown great promise in test flights. The lighter bombers Do 355 and Ju 388 would be used on the Western Front as fast bombers. Goering referred to the Ar 234 and Me 262 as ‘support fighter bombers’. There was no more talk of the Me 262 as the ‘fastest bomber’, thus depriving those present of the chance to toss this subject into debate. Since Insterburg the Me 262 was no longer mentioned or discussed in wider circles. After Goering had told the assembly at the beginning of the conference of the urgent need for an increase in the defensive punch of the Reich defences, and those present had been informed that the production of the Me 262 fighter had already begun, if in small numbers, it seemed that the problems surrounding the Me 262 and its operational use must have been resolved. Those who were familiar with the problems of the aircraft by reason of their office or as engineers knew only too well that the Me 262 fighter bomber was depending on new jet turbines while the conversion to the ‘fastest bomber’ with a heavier bomb payload would take considerable time. In this respect there could be no answer to the most pressing questions.
    After the conference, Speer, Milch, Petersen, Generals Galland and Korten and a few others made for the Berghof to discuss with Hitler the Jägerstab-Programm aimed at strengthening the fighter arm. The great 30-room Alpine-style house was set on a ledge at 1,700 metres. At that time besides the tight security on the ground, air defence was provided, the Waffen-SS manning sixty flak guns sited on various favourable heights: 12 x