FOREWORD
This book does not make for comfortable reading. It is a meticulous examination of
Bandenbekämpfung
, a term that has much broader and more pervasive meaning than simply “antipartisan warfare” and that characterized the German approach to security in occupied areas during the Second World War. Philip Blood demonstrates that the concept predated this conflict and actually stretched into Germany’s colonial past and its conduct in France in the Franco–Prussian War of 1870–71. Indeed, by its conception of “bandits” as microbes hostile to the very existence of the body politic, its roots go deeper, to the Thirty Years’ War or even to the Roman Empire. But on September 16, 1941, a decree under Keitel’s signature established Bandenbekämpfung as the strategic doctrine behind the Germanization of Europe. It affirmed that immediate and drastic action was imperative at the first sign of trouble, and the death penalty was to be used lavishly as a reprisal: this was how “great peoples restored order.” The implementation of this doctrine was eventually to become the responsibility of an SS officer who occasionally changed his name but is best known as Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski. He had served as an infantry officer in the First World War and by 1942 was the higher SS and police leader in the region of Russia-Centre. In August 1942, he became inspector of Bandenbekämpfung for the entire eastern area and was speedily appointed “plenipotentiary” that autumn, representing Himmler in all relevant matters and providing a key link between the SS and the Wehrmacht. But, in a way so typical of the rival fiefdoms that characterized the Nazi state, there were numerous squabbles and overlaps, and Bach-Zelewski’s appointment in mid-1943 as
Chef der Bandenbekampfverbände
, responsible, as he put it “for all partisan reports for the whole of Europe,” was intended to produce overall coherence.
Philip Blood describes
Bandenbekampfverbände
as “an exceptional form of information warfare and the driving force of an asset-stripping strategy that encompassed extermination and enslavement.” The details of the process and the troops involved, including formations that combined SS Police with Waffen-SS units, a variety of non-German units, and even the Dirlewanger brigade recruited from criminals serving prison sentences, are carefully cataloged. For instance, in 1943, Operation “Nasses Dreiek” (“Wet Triangle”) near Kiev, involved an ad hoc battle group supported by river police, a Luftwaffe signals regiment, pro-German Cossacks, and Hungarian supporting troops, with support from dive-bombers, which attacked a village “to cleanse it of enemies and return to its legal standing.” Although 843 “bandits” were killed and another 205 summarily executed, only ten rifles were recovered. The operation’s commander explained that this was because the bandits either buried their weapons or dropped them in swamps, but it is hard not to discern the wholesale brutality that characterized such operations. In another case, a Luftwaffe noncommissioned officer reported that “we had orders to kill all persons over five years of age.” In contrast, Operation “Wehrwolf,” which used Germans, Russians, Italians, Ukrainians, Poles, and Hungarians against a well-organized force under Major General Kovpak in 1943, saw substantial casualties on both sides.
Philip Blood uses abundant documentary and oral evidence to take us beyond the verdict of Christopher Browning’s ground-breaking
Ordinary Men
, his study of Reserve Police Battalion 101 in Poland, by examining the policy and structure that enabled ordinary men to do such extraordinarily dreadful things. Both historians observe the phenomenon, which still gives us pause for thought: men capable of carrying out deeds that might make us doubt our common humanity were themselves subject to the whole gamut of human emotions. Finally, Dr. Blood concludes by
This book does not make for comfortable reading. It is a meticulous examination of
Bandenbekämpfung
, a term that has much broader and more pervasive meaning than simply “antipartisan warfare” and that characterized the German approach to security in occupied areas during the Second World War. Philip Blood demonstrates that the concept predated this conflict and actually stretched into Germany’s colonial past and its conduct in France in the Franco–Prussian War of 1870–71. Indeed, by its conception of “bandits” as microbes hostile to the very existence of the body politic, its roots go deeper, to the Thirty Years’ War or even to the Roman Empire. But on September 16, 1941, a decree under Keitel’s signature established Bandenbekämpfung as the strategic doctrine behind the Germanization of Europe. It affirmed that immediate and drastic action was imperative at the first sign of trouble, and the death penalty was to be used lavishly as a reprisal: this was how “great peoples restored order.” The implementation of this doctrine was eventually to become the responsibility of an SS officer who occasionally changed his name but is best known as Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski. He had served as an infantry officer in the First World War and by 1942 was the higher SS and police leader in the region of Russia-Centre. In August 1942, he became inspector of Bandenbekämpfung for the entire eastern area and was speedily appointed “plenipotentiary” that autumn, representing Himmler in all relevant matters and providing a key link between the SS and the Wehrmacht. But, in a way so typical of the rival fiefdoms that characterized the Nazi state, there were numerous squabbles and overlaps, and Bach-Zelewski’s appointment in mid-1943 as
Chef der Bandenbekampfverbände
, responsible, as he put it “for all partisan reports for the whole of Europe,” was intended to produce overall coherence.
Philip Blood describes
Bandenbekampfverbände
as “an exceptional form of information warfare and the driving force of an asset-stripping strategy that encompassed extermination and enslavement.” The details of the process and the troops involved, including formations that combined SS Police with Waffen-SS units, a variety of non-German units, and even the Dirlewanger brigade recruited from criminals serving prison sentences, are carefully cataloged. For instance, in 1943, Operation “Nasses Dreiek” (“Wet Triangle”) near Kiev, involved an ad hoc battle group supported by river police, a Luftwaffe signals regiment, pro-German Cossacks, and Hungarian supporting troops, with support from dive-bombers, which attacked a village “to cleanse it of enemies and return to its legal standing.” Although 843 “bandits” were killed and another 205 summarily executed, only ten rifles were recovered. The operation’s commander explained that this was because the bandits either buried their weapons or dropped them in swamps, but it is hard not to discern the wholesale brutality that characterized such operations. In another case, a Luftwaffe noncommissioned officer reported that “we had orders to kill all persons over five years of age.” In contrast, Operation “Wehrwolf,” which used Germans, Russians, Italians, Ukrainians, Poles, and Hungarians against a well-organized force under Major General Kovpak in 1943, saw substantial casualties on both sides.
Philip Blood uses abundant documentary and oral evidence to take us beyond the verdict of Christopher Browning’s ground-breaking
Ordinary Men
, his study of Reserve Police Battalion 101 in Poland, by examining the policy and structure that enabled ordinary men to do such extraordinarily dreadful things. Both historians observe the phenomenon, which still gives us pause for thought: men capable of carrying out deeds that might make us doubt our common humanity were themselves subject to the whole gamut of human emotions. Finally, Dr. Blood concludes by
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